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ABSTRACT 
Internet applications have been extended to various aspects of everyday life and offer 
services of high reliability and security. In the Academia, Internet applications offer 
useful tools for the remote creation of simulation models and real-time conduction of 
control experiments. The aim of this study was the design of a reliable, safe and secure 
software system for real time operation of a remote aero gas turbine, with the use of 
standard Internet technology at very low cost.  
The gas turbine used in this application was an AMT Netherlands Olympus micro gas 
turbine. The project presented three prototypes: operation from an adjacent 
computer station, operation within the Local Area Netwok (LAN) of Cranfield 
University and finally, remotely through the Internet. The gas turbine is a safety critical 
component, thus the project was driven by risk assessment at all the stages of the 
software process, which adhered to the Spiral Model. Elements of safety critical 
systems design were applied, with risk assessment present in every round of the 
software process. 
For the implementation, various software tools were used, with the majority to be 
open source API’s. LabVIEW with compatible hardware from National Instruments was 
used to interface the gas turbine with an adjacent computer work station. The main 
interaction has been established between the computer and the ECU of the engine, 
with additional instrumentation installed, wherever required. The Internet user 
interface web page implements AJAX technology in order to facilitate asynchronous 
update of the individual fields that present the indications of the operating gas turbine.  
The parameters of the gas turbine were acquired with high accuracy, with most 
attention given to the most critical indications, exhaust gas temperature (EGT) and 
rotational speed (RPM). These are provided to a designed real-time monitoring 
application, which automatically triggers actions when necessary.  
The acceptance validation was accomplished with a formal validation method – Model 
Checking. The final web application was inspired by the RESTful architecture and 
allows the user to operate the remote gas turbine through a standard browser, 
without requiring any additional downloading or local data processing.  
The web application was designed with provisions for generic applications. It can be 
configured to function with multiple different gas turbines and also integrated with 
external performance simulation or diagnostics Internet platforms. Also, an analytical 
proposal is presented, to integrate this application with the TURBOMATCH WebEngine 
web application, for gas turbine performance simulation, developed by Cranfield 
University.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the scope and the structure of the Thesis, along with a brief 
introduction to the gas turbine which was used in the project. 
1.1 Scope 
The Thesis presents the theoretical and experimental work accomplished in order to 
design a working software system that enables the flexible control of the operation of 
an uninstalled gas turbine remotely, with utilisation of Internet technology. When 
completed, the work produced 3 prototypes of the newly designed system: a local 
operating version from an adjacent computer station, a local area network (LAN) 
version and finally a web version. Initially, the problem is defined and appropriate 
literature review is presented. The experimental work is described along with the 
corresponding methodology in different self contained chapters, adapted to the 
applied software process model. Finally, the results and the final outcome are 
discussed, and potential recommendations for future work are suggested. 
The web application was designed with provisions for generic applications. It can be 
configured to function with multiple different gas turbines and also integrated with 
external performance simulation or diagnostics Internet platforms. Also, an analytical 
proposal is presented, to integrate this application with the TURBOMATCH WebEngine 
web application, for gas turbine performance simulation, developed by Cranfield 
University. This combination would produce a very powerful remote experiment 
platform, where the theoretical modeling of an aero gas turbine will be compared and 
adapted to the performance of an actual engine in real time. Moreover, the combined 
applications could form a remote diagnostic and assessment platform for in-service 
aero gas turbines, reducing the necessity for physical presence of experienced and 
specialized personnel. In a more extended version, this application could be configured 
to operate UAV’s through standard Internet technology.     
 
1.2 Thesis structure 
The Thesis comprises 12 chapters, divided into sub sections. The first 2 chapters 
(INTRODUCTION, AIM AND OBJECTIVES) are self explanatory. 
Chapter 3, LITERATURE REVIEW, includes the literature review related to the 
application. In section 3.1, the problem is identified, after research and discussion of 
various similar projects and applications, based on information and publications 
available in the public domain. Section 3.2 is a very brief introduction to gas turbines, 
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the potential risks in their operation and monitored parameters that are crucial for 
safety. Section 3.3 includes a research about risk analysis and methods used in 
industrial or aeronautical applications. Section 3.4 presents how risk analysis may be 
adapted to cover software related systems and what are the arguments about the 
effectiveness, according to the available literature. In section 3.5 the software process 
is discussed by addressing the key points of the procedure and how different 
approaches can be more or less appropriate for different types of applications. In 
section 3.6 a discussion about software tools suitable for interfacing real time 
mechanical systems takes place, stressing their advantages and disadvantages, always 
based on the literature available in the public domain. Section 3.7 briefly presents the 
Internet capabilities and the advantages or disadvantages of the various protocols. 
Finally, the effectiveness of the existing techniques for security over the Internet is 
discussed in section 3.8, along with methods of enhancing the performance.  
CHAPTER 4 describes the software process and applied model, the architecture of the 
system and the requirements. Section 4.1 describes the methodology of the software 
process. Section 4.2 describes the methodology followed for the definition of the 
application requirements, the procedural risk assessment, the requirements elicitation 
and the derivation of the System Requirements Specification (SRS).  The next section 
(Section 4.3) describes the architecture of the project, along with the modelling 
methodology applied. Section 4.4 includes the physical risk assessment of the project 
and the feasibility study. Section 4.5 presents the validation plan of the overall 
application and section 4.6 refers to the validation of the requirements. Finally, section 
4.7 includes a discussion about results of the previous tasks.    
CHAPTER 5 describes the part of the software process involved with the interfacing of 
the gas turbine with the PC. Section 5.1 describes the methodology followed and 
section 5.2 presents the risk assessment for this phase. The next section (Section 5.3) 
describes the analysis, the design and the implementation of the software, followed by 
Section 5.4, which describes the validation of the designed programs. Finally, section 
5.5 includes a discussion about the results produced in this chapter.    
CHAPTER 6 describes the part of the software process involved with the design of the 
next tier of software, the Engine Operation Control Software (EOCS). Section 6.1 
describes the methodology followed and section 6.2 presents the risk assessment for 
this phase. The next section (Section 6.3) describes the analysis, the design and the 
implementation of the software, followed by the design of the General Test Harness 
(GTH). Section 6.4 describes the validation of the designed programs and section 6.5 
includes a discussion about the results of the previous tasks.    
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CHAPTER 7 describes the part of the software process involved with the design of 
additional features of the system. Section 7.1 describes the methodology followed and 
section 7.2 presents the objectives and the risk assessment for this phase. The next 
section (Section 7.3) describes the analysis, the design and the implementation of the 
software, followed by Section 7.4, which describes the validation of the designed 
programs. Finally, section 7.5 includes a discussion about the results of the previous 
tasks accompanied by a presentation of the LAN version.       
CHAPTER 8 describes the part of the software process involved with the design of the 
web application and the integration with the other designed modules. Section 8.1 
describes the methodology for this task and section 8.2 presents the risk assessment. 
The next section (Section 8.3) describes the analysis, the design and the 
implementation of the software, followed by Section 8.4, which describes the 
validation of the designed programs. Finally, section 8.5 includes a discussion about 
the results of the previous tasks.       
CHAPTER 9 presents the final part of the software process, which involves the 
acceptance validation of the final application. Section 9.1 presents the objectives and 
the risk assessment for this phase and section 9.2 describes the methodology followed. 
The next section (Section 9.3) describes the requirements testing and final testing. In 
section 9.4 a proposed approach for probabilistic analysis of the reliability of the 
system is presented and finally, section 9.5 includes a discussion about the results of 
the previous tasks.       
CHAPTER 10 is a presentation of the development capabilities and suggested evolution 
of the system. Section 10.1 outlines how it will be capable of accommodating different 
gas turbines, section 10.2 describes the ability of configuration with multiple gas 
turbines and test stations simultaneously, and finally, section 10.3 explains how the 
program can be integrated with the TURBOMATCH Web Engine, an Internet gas 
turbine performance simulation tool developed by Cranfield University, for access 
through the Internet. 
CHAPTER 11 presents the general results of the project, which are discussed herein. 
Section 11.1 discusses about the SRS and the general risk assessment, 11.2 about the 
implementation rounds, 11.3 about the overall validation procedures and 11.4 about 
the Installation of the application and the handling of the data between the hardware 
and software components. Finally, section 11.5 explains how the application may be 
optimised for different aspects. 
CHAPTER 12 outlines the overall conclusions of the project and presents several 
recommendations for future improvement. Section 12.1 presents the conclusions and 
section 12.2 indicates the future work recommendations. 
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1.3 The AMT Netherlands Olympus gas turbine 
The gas turbine used for the project is an Olympus micro gas turbine manufactured by 
AMT Netherlands (Figures 1, 2), used in radio controlled aircraft, remote heat/power 
generators or auxiliary power units [5].  
 
Figure 1 - The Olympus AMT engine
 
 
Figure 2 - The Olympus AMT powering a Boeing 777 model
 
It is a miniature single spool turbojet gas turbine with an overall length of 270 mm, 
maximum diameter of 130 mm and maximum thrust of 190 N at maximum RPM 
(110,000). The single stage centrifugal compressor delivers a pressure ratio of 4:1 and 
handles a maximum value of mass flow 400 gr/sec [6]. It is controlled by a closed loop 
control Electronic Control Unit (ECU). The engine has a TBO cycle of 50 operating hours 
and already had accumulated 35 when the project commenced, posing a limiting 
factor to the amount of time available for running and testing.  
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2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The aim, objectives and contribution of this PhD study are outlined and explained in 
this chapter. 
2.1 Aim 
The aim of this project is to design a software system which will enable safe, secure 
and reliable remote operation of a gas turbine situated in a test facility, through the 
Internet, without tight coupling of the individual software components and with 
capability of running with browsers as thin clients - thus without the necessity to 
download any applets or other locally installed programs to run.  
2.2 Objectives 
The achievement of the final goal of the project requires the accomplishment of 
several objectives. These are: 
• Hardware connection of the gas turbine with an adjacent PC control station - 
design of an appropriate interface to interact with it. 
• Mitigation of the physical risks of operating the engine remotely 
• Design of appropriate software components that will interact with the remote 
user and the engine. These components shall enable access through a local 
area network (LAN) and the Internet, and manipulate the input and output 
data accordingly to assure operation of the gas turbine within the desired 
operating limits. 
• Plan and implement features of security against exposure and Internet 
threats. 
• Includes provisions for a generic application to accommodate different type of 
gas turbines. 
2.3 Contribution 
This project introduces a novel application for real-time remote operation of aero gas 
turbines through the Internet, with standard browsers as thin clients and without the 
requirement to download additional software components. It demonstrates how the 
underlying physical risks, Internet security and network performance can be weighted 
and combined accordingly to provide a reliable tool. The above factors can be assessed 
and the project as a whole can be optimized for each one of them individually, thus the 
compromises posed may be examined, with respect to the level of the desired 
operability. The final application is a flexible design that may be integrated with 
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Internet gas turbine performance simulation applications, providing a powerful 
experimental and operation platform.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review has focused on similar applications in the aviation sector, the 
industry and Academia, where many platforms for conducting remote experiments 
have also been designed. The review also investigates the various available options for 
Internet applications, the security against common Internet threats, software 
interaction protocols and the variety of techniques included in the software process. 
Very briefly the basic elements of gas turbine control theory and critical parameters 
are also discussed, along with software tools and programming languages suitable for 
real time systems.  
3.1 Similar applications and problem definition 
The information provided herein is based on material available in the public domain 
released by manufacturers and designers. For many applications, the available 
information is restricted, as it is considered to be confidential.  
A large number of applications that enable remote access to engineering tools, based 
on Internet technology, are available in the market. Applications related to aero gas 
turbine operation monitoring and real time data collection from them may be found in 
the aviation field integrated with MRO packages, for monitoring and diagnostic 
purposes.  In the power generation industry, there are systems that accomplish similar 
tasks in a different domain. In Academia, there are frameworks for developing 
distributed application that interface with hardware (mainly for control experiments). 
Also, there is a web-enabled gas turbine performance simulation platform, previously 
developed by Cranfield University. Many of the aforementioned applications rely on 
locally or centrally installed clients, others perform on thick clients, which require data 
to be downloaded and processed locally, or run by downloading and installing Java 
applets. Another category is Internet applications that run on regular Internet 
browsers acting as thin clients, but do not address the mitigation of high safety risks, 
like those underlying in the remote operation of a gas turbine.  
There are situations where central control and monitoring of operations is required 
hence the centralised clients are very suitable. However, this configuration does not 
provide flexibility. When an application requires applets or other applications to be 
locally installed, the risks for the security of the user’s computer may increase. The 
safety of applets was recently questioned, when vulnerabilities were revealed, 
according to Oracle’s security alert CVE-2013-0422 [118]. According to the alert, 
vulnerabilities in security could allow for remote exploitation without authentication. 
Among other corrections, the Security Level was set from "Medium" to "High", which 
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implies that the user is always prompted before any unsigned Java applet or Java Web 
Start application is run. 
The current project introduces a light user friendly application, which enables the 
operation of a gas turbine through the Internet from any web browser, without the 
necessity of downloading and locally storing data or programs. It is very simple for the 
end user and on the other hand, it automatically caters for the safety of the operation 
with programmatic intervention when required. 
3.1.1 Applications in the aviation sector 
The development of contemporary MRO packages for airlines more and more focuses 
on the capability to access, retrieve and manipulate data at real time for monitoring or 
quality purposes. An example of this can be seen in manage – m Websuite developed 
by Lufthansa Technik, integrated with their MRO packages, which is a toolbox of web – 
based tools allowing for the management of the technical operations of an airline 
fleet. Operations as quality monitoring, reliability trends and status reports can be 
obtained via web services  [90]. Manage – m can provide troubleshooting support by 
using data of the aircraft and its engines condition from on – board computers, even 
when the aircraft is airborne [90].      
3.1.2 Applications in power generation 
A similar application to the project described herein and with more details available in 
the public domain, is the Siemens SPPA – T3000 Control System for power plant 
management and control (Figure 3). As presented by Siemens, this system provides 
real time data at any place and any time, single software system imaging and 
simplification of the system architecture, rendering it easy to learn and use [130]. 
According to a research study from Karlsruhe University Germany, supervised by 
Siemens and available in the public domain, SPPA – 3000 is based on Java and XML and 
the application server can be accessed by any web browser. The web page of the 
application server consists of several Java applets. The system integrates different 
components of the plant around one main source named the Embedded Component 
Services [62]. The design follows a layered architecture with the following layers: 
• Instrumentation: sensors and electronic devices 
• I/O devices: digitalise analogue signals and transfer them upwards and vice 
versa 
• Automation Servers: control devices and handle data to and from other 
Automation servers and upwards or downwards  
• Application Servers (Web Servers): Windows 2003 OS, communicate data from 
the clients to the system and vice versa 
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• Thin clients: web browsers with Java  applications  
 
 
   Figure 3 – SPPA-T3000 Architecture [62] 
As presented by the resource from Karlsruhe University, the key points of safety and 
security of the system are the following [62]: 
• Physical safety  
• Communication between servers and clients only through HTTPS with SSL  
• Access via the Internet through VPN tunnel and firewall 
• Reference for introduction of SSH (Secure Shell) in the future. Applicable to 
client – server model 
• Intrusion Detection System (IDS) as proposed 
It is noted at this point that the aim of the Karlsruhe University research study [62] was 
the introduction of IDS and the final proposal included the selection of Snort, which is 
a signature based detection system. Additionally, the system implements a 
redundancy philosophy for communication between layers based on a set on X400 
switches, which act as a redundancy manager system in a formed ring topology 
between the highways of connection [62] (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 – Failsafe ring topology [62]  
ALSTOM has developed an integrated support system for power plants, the Plant 
Support Center [3]. It provides direct access to a global network of technical specialists 
to support troubleshooting, equipment trends analysis or to provide support during 
assessment [1]. The system provides 24/7 operation support, monitoring and 
diagnostics, and power train vibration remote assessments. Data from site are 
transmitted to the remote diagnostics central server via a secure connection at least 
once every 24 hours. Any deviation observed after the assessment of the data by the 
diagnostics tools at the Support Center, appropriate engineers or the plant operators 
are notified for action [2] (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 – ALSTOM Plant Support Center operation [2] 
A closely related application to the PCS is OPDD (On Line Power Plant Diagnostics), a 
development project at Alstom Power Finland Oy, designed for gas turbine combined 
cycle power plants, but can also be adapted to other types as well [81]. The data are 
transmitted via a secure connection to the support centre, where they are assessed 
against data from stored models (Figure 6). The information is displayed on 
appropriate clients  [81] (Figure 7).  
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Figure 6 – OPPD for ALSTOM Finland [81]  
 
Figure 7 – OPPD for ALSTOM Finland – Diagnostics display [81] 
3.1.3 Academic applications 
Another similar application is the NCSLab, developed by Glammorgan University 
(Figure 8). It is a control engineering experiment platform which consists of 6-tier 
architecture, based on MATLAB – Simulink. The experiment simulation takes place on 
MATLAB servers wrapped in Java RMI’s in order to communicate with the central 
server. It also includes a scheduled user access methodology inspired by the LINUX 
resource read/write privilege system. However, only one person can have full control 
privilege at a time. The redundancy of servers and device status detector module 
ensures network stability [124]. The layers of the system are shown below:  
• Controlled Devices 
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• Control Units 
• SOCKS proxy server to override firewall, if devices are installed in LAN 
• Experiment servers, which execute the control demands from the main server 
and transfer real time data to the web MATLAB servers. These provide remote 
simulation and compilation for the main server, avoiding MATLAB installation 
on local PC’s 
• Main server, which accepts requests from clients and displays generated 
dynamic web pages 
• Clients (web browsers that employ AJAX and Flash technologies)  
 
Figure 8 – NCSLab architecture [124] 
It is worth to be noted at this point that according to Qiao et. al. (2010) [124], SOAP is 
not suitable for displaying real – time data to the client. Hence AJAX technology was 
implemented in order to achieve real – time display with automatic renewal of the 
page at every change. The transport layer protocol used for real – time data transfer 
was UDP whilst for non – real time, TCP. 
Various other approaches have been designed to accommodate the capability of 
remote lab operation, mainly for control experiments. Ko et. al. (2001) [84] have 
developed a web – based laboratory for control experiments on a coupled tank 
apparatus (Figure 9). This application was based on LabVIEW and TCP for 
communication between client and server, instead of Common Gateway Interface 
(CGI). TCP remains in contact until the client’s request for discontinuing, whilst CGI – 
which is a per session basis protocol – would close after the response of the server. 
The data transfer between client and server is achieved with the employment of Java 
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Applets on the client end, which activates the TCP connections at the appropriate 
LabVIEW functions at the server end. 
  
Figure 9 – Web based laboratory for control of coupled tank apparatus [84] 
Similarly, Okajima et. al. (2006) rely on Java Applets on the client side for their WebLab 
Development Using a /DE9LHZ and -DYD integrated solution for Kyatera Network  
[108]. This design also incorporates LabVIEW for the conduction of the control logic 
and communication between Java and LabVIEW is achieved with TCP/IP. 
Another platform for remote control experiments has been introduced by Elmerabete 
et. al (2010) (Figure 10). Real time control is obtained with LabVIEW and TCP/IP 
communication between the client and the server [34].  
 
 Figure 10 - Application of Real-time Control System Using LABVIEW in Distance-Learning [34] 
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3.1.4 The Turbomatch WebEngine 
The TURBOMATCH WebEngine is an Internet application developed by Cranfield 
University, for the creation of gas turbine performance simulation models [7]. It 
utilises TURBOMATCH in the server side, a powerful gas turbine performance 
simulation tool developed by Cranfield University as well. The WebEngine offers ease 
of use with no local installations required (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11 – The User Interface of the TURBOMATCH WebEngine [7] 
It is based on client – server architecture, with TURBOMATCH as the core solver behind 
the GUI. As stated by Apostolidis (2013) [7], it has 2 major advantages. One is the 
modular architecture, which enables interchangeable engine components and future 
development. The other is the ability to integrate with other tools, such as optimisers 
and flow solvers. TURBOMATCH is built in a DLL file that is invoked by the Virtual 
Engine Console (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 12 - The WebEngine Architecture [7] 
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The user uses the drag and drop features to easily build the gas turbine model, which 
comprises of several individual bricks representing the major components. The 
WebEngine includes capability for design point and off – design performance, with the 
user entering the required parameters for each brick (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
   
 
Figure 13 – GUI of the WebEngine (Off design performance simulation) [7] 
 
Figure 14 – TURBOMATCH brick and related data [7] 
3.2 Gas turbines and basic performance monitoring elements 
3.2.1 Basic principles 
The various types of gas turbines are mainly distinguished in civil aviation, military 
aviation, industrial or marine. The major aim of a gas turbine is either the production 
of thrust (turbojet or turbofan aviation gas turbines) or power (turboprop, industrial, 
marine). There are several criteria for performance evaluation of a gas turbine, such as 
the propulsive efficiency, which is the ratio of the useful propulsive energy or thrust 
power against the kinetic energy of the jet and the specific thrust, which depicts the 
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thrust per unit mass of air absorbed by the engine [129]. These parameters are used to 
describe the efficiency of the thermodynamic cycle of a gas turbine, known as the 
Brayton cycle [120].  
Variables which influence the efficiency of the cycle are mainly the inlet air mass flow, 
the overall pressure ratio of the compressor, the heat input which relates to the fuel 
quantity and the expansion ratio at the turbines. The internal arrangement of the gas 
turbine determines the amount of compression work required, which is consumed 
from the total work produced by the engine [120]. According to Walsh et. al. (2004) 
[145], all the variables which describe the can be distinguished in groups of non - 
dimensional, semi – dimensional, referred, scaling or combined. An analytical table of 
these parameters can be found in Walsh et. al. chart 4.1 [145]. 
3.2.2 Steady state and transient performance 
The state of an operating gas turbine can be distinguished in steady state and transient 
performance. Steady state refers to the condition of operation where the parameters 
of the engine are constant relative to time. On the contrary, transient performance 
refers to the operating regime where the engine parameters alter with time [145]. 
Practically, it is the time intervals when throttle settings have been changed thus 
altering the parameters in order to obtain the newly selected steady state condition. 
As Walsh et. al. (2004) describe for a single spool turbojet gas turbine operating steady 
state, when the control system suddenly increases fuel flow, then the turbine power 
output increases because of the increased temperature. This exceeds the power 
output required to drive the compressor, auxiliaries and mechanical losses, rendering a 
case of unbalanced power [145]. The engine performance becomes a function of two 
independent parameters: fuel flow and rotational speed [120], hence requires a more 
complicated approach for parameters calculation, compared to steady state 
performance. 
3.2.3 Failure modes 
It is noticeable that compromise between independent parameters of the gas turbine 
operation is necessary and imposed by operating limits of critical rotating parts. 
Although increasing rotational speed enhances performance, it increases centrifugal 
stresses on rotating blades. These are steady state stresses which are combined with 
the dynamic stresses due to aerodynamic loads and vibrations and promote the 
fatigue failure mode (either LCF or HCF). Also as turbine entry temperature increases, 
the performance improves with the penalty of exceeding the operational limits of the 
turbine blades and vanes materials, promoting the failure mode of creep [129]. A 
general view of the failure modes of a gas turbine is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15  – Gas turbine failure modes [129] 
As gas turbines evolved through the decades, the necessity of sophisticated electronic 
closed loop control systems appeared. Modern gas turbine control systems consist of 
four control components, which are the controller, sensors, actuators and accessories. 
They aim to control the thrust at the desired value (Figure 16). However, as thrust 
cannot be practically measured in flight, control is obtained by varying fuel to regulate 
either the rotational speed or the pressure ratio of the engine, which are indicators of 
the actual thrust magnitude [78]. 
 
Figure 16 – Functional diagram of a simplified engine control system [78] 
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3.2.4 Gas turbine control systems 
Control systems apply alarm rules in order to detect values above certain limits during 
the engine operation. There are four unusual patterns of data points: 
• The instability pattern, where points are present outside the control limits, 
• The mixture pattern, characterised by the absence of points near the 
centreline,  
• The stratification pattern, with absence of points near the control limits and 
• The trend pattern, where an upward or downward trend is present. 
The most noticeable for the present study is the instability pattern, which means the 
existence of data points outside the control limits. The rules which are most widely 
applied for the classification are the Western Electric rules (Figure 17). They divide the 
control band into three zones where zone A is the area enclosed within 2 and 3 
standard deviations (σ) of the parameter, zone B, which stays between 1σ and 2σ and 
C, between ±1σ. A guideline for the alarm generation is: any point beyond zone A, 2 
out of 3 consecutive points in zone A, 3 out of 5 consecutive points in zone B and 8 
consecutive points on the same side of the centreline [78]. Typical input and output 
parameters of a large bypass ratio turbofan gas turbine are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 17 – Western electric rules [78] 
Finally, the monitoring of the gas turbine is essential for detection of abnormal 
conditions, such as fault, anomaly or failure [78]. These can be detected by observing 
deviation of certain engine parameters beyond the predetermined threshold of 
tolerance. Hence parameters such as pressure ratio, pressure and temperature at 
various stages of the engine, fuel flow and vibration levels are monitored and acquired 
in order to perform diagnostics and prognostics (Table 1). The former refers to 
discovering the current and past abnormalities whilst the latter refers to estimation of 
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future performance [78]. Examples of diagnostic methods are linear or non linear Gas 
Path Analysis, statistical inference based on the Maximum Likelihood estimate and 
artificial neural networks [88]. Various systems based on engine parameters trend 
analysis have been developed for implementation of prognostics programs. 
 
Table 1 –Indications and required input of typical Turbofan Engine CFM56-CA3 [32] 
Engine Input  Engine Output via FADEC  
Throttle angle  Measurements indicated to user  
Starter  LP Rotational Speed  
Electrical Power supply switch  HP Rotational Speed  
Fuel supply switch  LPT STG. 2 Total Temperature  
Ambient Static Pressure  Engine Oil Temperature  
Inlet Static Pressure  Engine Oil Pressure  
Inlet Total Temperature  Fuel Mass Flow delivered to the engine  
 
Condition indicated to the user  
 
Vibration Level of the HP shaft  
 
Vibration Level of the LP shaft  
 
Fault report  
 
Measurements required for control or diagnostics  
 
HPC Inlet Total Temperature  
 
HPC Delivery Static Pressure  
 
HPC Delivery Total Temperature  
 
HPT Shroud Support Temperature  
 
Fan Outlet Static Pressure  
 
HPC Inlet Total Pressure  
 
LPT Outlet Total Temperature  
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3.3 Hazard Identification, risk analysis and risk mitigation 
An important element of systems that are considered safety critical is risk analysis. The 
basic method of risk analysis is the identification and quantification of scenarios which 
may lead to hazardous conditions, and also the identification and quantification of the 
probabilities of these scenarios to occur, along with their consequences [10]. Hazard 
can be defined as the presence of any process abnormality which represents either a 
dangerous or a potentially dangerous state [68]. Risk could also refer to the statistical 
annual frequency for a particular hazard state [68]. 
3.3.1 Risk evaluation and mitigation 
The approaches and individual methodologies for risk evaluation and hazard mitigation 
described herein follow guidelines applicable to power plant systems, aerospace, 
chemical and nuclear industries, as these are considered to be adequate for covering 
the risk evaluation and mitigation of the present project. The underlying risk in this 
project is increased, because it involves the risks relative to the operation of a gas 
turbine in a stationary test facility combined with the risks due to remote operation 
through the Internet. 
 A method often found in power plant, aerospace, chemical and nuclear systems is the 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [68] [47].  This method is based on the identification of a top 
undesirable event that corresponds to a particular failure mode and consists of the 
individual events that contribute to the top event (Figure 18). FTA is a qualitative 
method in its nature but it can also provide a quantitative aspect as well [134]. 
According to BS IEC 61025, ‘FTA is particularly suited to the analysis of complex 
systems comprising several functionally related or dependent subsystems with 
different performance objectives. This is especially true whenever the system design 
requires the collaboration of many specialized technical design groups. Examples of 
systems to which fault tree analysis is commonly applied include nuclear power 
generating stations, aeroplanes, communication systems, chemical and other 
industrial processes’. The standard recommends the development of the fault tree 
early in the system design stage [20]. The logical analysis of the FTA is obtained with 
the implementation of Boolean reduction and the method of minimal cut sets [20] 
[68]. 
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Figure 18 – A simplified FTA [134] 
The Event Tree Analysis is related with FTA. Event trees are logical networks which do 
not include logical gates as the FTA and commence with the hazard state event (FTA 
top event) to assess the consequences to follow [68].  
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis is a method mainly used by the chemical 
industry [47] and it deals with the identification of deviation from the design intent, 
also investigating the causes and assessing their consequences [20] (Figure 19).  It is 
suggested that a HAZOP analysis is better to be conducted by a team. 
  
Figure 19 – HAZOP example [20] 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a method for the analysis of a system in 
order to identify the potential failure modes, their causes and any effects on the 
system performance [19]. According to the related standard [19], the term system may 
represent hardware, software (with their interaction) or a process. FMEA may be 
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initiated when the system is defined enough to be presented as a functional block 
diagram. According to this, FMEA is extremely efficient when it is applied to the 
analysis of elements that cause a failure of the entire system or of a major function of 
the system. It can be used alone or as a systematic inductive method of analysis, to 
complement other approaches, especially deductive ones, such as FTA. It is met in 
nuclear, chemical [47] and other applications. As stated by Fullwood (1999) [47], FMEA 
does not account for human operator errors, but still, these are depicted in the 
analysis by the respective equipment failure mode. When including criticality analysis 
in FMEA, it is then considered as Failure Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
[47] [19]. Criticality is a function of severity and frequency of a failure mode [19] and it 
provides a tool for quantification of risk (Figure 20). HAZOP is a system-centred 
approach whilst FMEA is component centred. FMEA starts with a possible component 
failure and then proceeds to investigate the consequences of this failure on the system 
as a whole [19]. 
   
Figure 20 – Risk – Criticality matrix [19] 
3.3.2 Probabilistic risk analysis 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a tool for quantitative risk analysis applied in sectors 
such as aerospace industry, chemical processing, energy production and 
transportation. It provides a set of tools to deal with uncertainty and apply 
probabilistic methods to estimate frequency or probabilities of undesirable events for 
the purpose of risk evaluation [10]. Statistical inference holds an important role in PRA, 
as it is called to utilize a limited sample of experimental observations and make an 
inference about the appropriate probability distribution to describe it [10]. A correct 
probability distribution is crucial as upon it, the developed statistical data for risk 
quantification will rely.   
3.3.3 Project risk analysis 
Not only physical risk analysis but also project risk analysis has been rapidly growing 
during the past decades. Bedford (2001) [10] describes the necessity of such an 
analysis in the construction industry, where large scale infrastructure projects suffer 
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from various uncertainties (political and financial). He states that application of this 
analysis can provide the management with quantitative insight into the different 
sources of uncertainty of the project, allowing for proper action. A typical example of a 
project risk management approach is the RISMAN method [10], which includes the 
following steps: 
• Identification of uncertainties 
• Quantification of uncertainties and countermeasures 
• Calculation of project risk 
• Calculation of the effect of countermeasures 
• Decision making and risk handling 
It can be observed that the above steps are more or less included in the HAZOP and 
FMEA methods. It is stated in the BS EN 60812 that FMEA can be used as a tool to 
study various processes (medical, laboratory, manufacturing, development, 
educational, etc.). In that case it is assumed as the Process FMEA or PFMEA. When 
PFMEA is performed, it is always done with regards to the process end goal or the 
target of a process. Each step within that process is then considered as a potential to 
produce an undesirable outcome of the other steps in the process or of the process 
end goal. Similarly, HAZOP has evolved to a tool which can be applied to assess wider 
applications like systems involving the movement of people by transport modes such 
as road and rail, examining different operating sequences and procedures, and 
assessment of administrative procedures in various industries [20]. 
3.4 Risk assessment and quality determination of software 
products 
3.4.1 Software quality metrics 
Quality determination of software products cannot be considered to be as straight 
forward as in the manufacturing industry. The determination of software quality has 
improved noticeably during the past 15 years. This improvement can be attributed to 
the development of techniques and standards that aim to specify and quantify quality 
for software products. Sommerville (2006) [122] indicates that parallelism of software 
and manufacturing quality cannot be obtained. That is because as software 
development is a complex concept with the product specifications difficult to be 
concretely defined in the initiation of the software process and software quality 
characteristics are not easily defined unambiguously [122]. According to the ISO 9126 
standard, six key characteristics have been defined to describe quality: functionality, 
reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability and portability [8]. The software quality 
metrics can be classified in two groups, product and process metrics. As Sommerville 
 24 
(2006) describes, there is a complicated and close relation between process and 
product quality, where the quality of the latter depends on the quality of the former. 
Several organizations are involved in the development of software quality 
determination standards, some of them being US DoD, NATO, ANSI, BSI and IEEE [132].  
Oliveira et. al. [109] (2008) identify the correlation of quality metrics for traditional 
software products with the so important physical metrics for embedded systems 
(performance, memory, energy, power, size, and weight). They outline several of the 
most important software quality metrics. The most notable of these are: 
• Coupling 
• Cohesion 
• Lack of Cohesion of Methods 
• Extendibility and reuse 
• Population metrics 
• Complexity 
3.4.2 Safety critical systems 
A safety - critical system is a system which, if it fails, it may cause life loss, injury or 
environmental impact. When designing a safety – critical system there are four major 
key points that characterize its dependability, along with all the quality features 
previously listed: availability, reliability, security and safety [132]. Availability expresses 
the ability of the system to run successfully at any given time whilst reliability can be 
defined as the probability it will execute as expected. It can be stated that security and 
safety are interrelated with reliability, as insufficient degree of the two latter can 
directly affect the former [132]. A generic approach for a safety life cycle for electrical, 
electronic or programmable electronic safety related systems is standardized by BS EN 
61508 [18].  According to this standard, various phases of a safety life cycle include 
from initial concept through design, implementation, operation and maintenance to 
decommissioning. It introduces the concept of safety integrity levels which depict the 
target of the safety level activities to be implemented in the related functions and 
adopts a risk based approach to determine the safety integrity levels [18].  
3.4.3 Software reliability prediction 
Gokhale and Trivedi (2002) consider that computer industry has seen uneven progress, 
as ‘With the steadily growing power and reliability of the hardware, software reliability 
has been identified as a major stumbling block in the realization of highly dependable 
computer systems. When lives and fortunes depend on software, assurance of its 
quality becomes an issue of critical concern’ [54].  
 25 
Several qualitative and quantitative methods have been applied for software reliability 
determination. For qualitative assessment, FMECA has been suggested, although not 
accepted by the whole software development community, as software components do 
not fail like mechanical ones [10]. Formal design and analysis methods are another 
approach which set up a discipline framework for specification programming, in order 
to reduce the chances of errors creation. Sneak analysis is described as a method or 
set of methods to trace design errors. It is regarded successful in finding problems that 
cannot be found by testing. Software testing is a crucial part of the development 
phase, inexplicably linked with the verification and validation process. It will be 
thoroughly discussed in Section 3.5.4. Error reporting is an important method 
accomplished by the users of the software via various systems [132]. 
The implementation of statistical tools for quantitative prediction of reliability has 
been controversial as software cannot follow the same engineering failure modes as 
physical or mechanical components do [10]. In mechanical engineering the various 
failure modes have been thoroughly studied and determined, whereas in software 
engineering, failure modes study and prediction of reliability are more recent fields. 
However, numerous estimation techniques have been developed, applicable for 
different cases. The goal of these estimators is to minimize the error between the 
actual value of the parameter and the estimated value [24]. According to Cangussu et. 
al. (2011) [24] these techniques can be mathematically classified in Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBNs), Bayesian Parametric Approaches (BPAs), non-parametric Models and 
Classical Parametric Approaches [24]. The study of Cangussu et. al. (2011) [24] 
presents a ranking of different representative techniques from the 4 mathematical 
categories, based on subjectivity, cost, applicability, latency and expressiveness. The 
ranking is supported by an example using 4 scenarios based on 4 organisations of 
different maturity level, according to CMM [131]. For example, for scenario 1, which 
refers to maturity level 1, there are little data available and lack of expert knowledge. 
The importance of low cost and high applicability favours the Classical Parametric 
approaches and CPA AP4, thus the ED3M model is ranked in first position [24].  
Meedeniya et.al. (2012) introduced a framework for evaluation of probabilistic models 
with uncertain parameters [94]. This framework applies Monte Carlo simulations to 
evaluate the reliability of a system based on its architecture specification. It has been 
expanded to utilise probabilistic model checking rather than using a dedicated 
reliability evaluation model with a specific evaluation technique. The main formalisms 
used in this approach are probabilistic temporal logics and Markov Models [94].  
This work was a continuation of that of Meedeniya et. al. (2011), where a number of 
parameters (environmental factors or system usage) uncertainties in architecture-
based quality evaluation were investigated [93].  The probabilistic model was 
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constructed as a well established DTMC (discrete markov chain) and Monte Carlo 
simulation was then applied. The expected number of visits to the nodes of the DTMC 
quantifies the expectation of use of this component, during a single execution of the 
system. To estimate the overall reliability, Meeddeniya et. al (2011) followed the 
approach also presented by Gokhale et. al (2002) [54], where the expected reliability 
of an application of n components, while ignoring the second order architectural 
effects, is given by the following equation: 
 ≈,∏ 	
,

      
Equation 1 – Expected Reliability of an application with n components 
When individual software components reliability is considered, various models are 
used to determine it. Goseva et. al (2001) [60] state that there is a class of models that 
estimate reliability from explicit considerations of non – failed executions, usually in 
the testing during the validation phase, where the software is not undergoing any 
changes [89], [96], [121]. In safety critical applications, the required reliability levels 
(10
-9
 /h or 10
-5
/h) is unreachable hence it is generally agreed for a practical limit of a 
failure rate in the range of 10
-2
 /h or 10
-4
/h to be aimed for in the assessment prior to 
operational use [60].  
3.4.4 Avionics development 
Software developers in avionics follow the RTCA/DO-178 document guidelines 
(Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification) in order to 
obtain FAA approval [65]. DO-178C has now been released and addresses errors and 
inconsistencies present in previous editions [126]. The DO-178 document includes 
guidelines for the software lifecycle, the planning and development process, 
verification, configuration management and quality assurance. An important topic 
within the document is the definition of criticality levels of software, determined 
according to the extent of the damage caused in the case of a failure, ranging from E 
(no effect) to A (catastrophic) [69] (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21 – Criticality Levels according to DO-178B [69] 
Finally, the prediction of the inherent reliability of a variety of military electronic 
equipment and systems is based on MIL – HDBK – 217F [140]. This document 
establishes and contains uniform methods for this purpose and also provides a basis 
for comparison and evaluation predictions or competitive designs. It introduces two 
methods of reliability prediction, the Parts Stress Analysis and the Parts Count. The 
former requires a larger amount of detailed information and it is applicable in the later 
stage of design, whereas the latter requires less information and is suitable for early 
design stage [140].      
3.5 Software development 
The development of a software system is described by the software process, which is a 
group of activities leading to the production of a software product [132]. According to 
Sommerville (2006) [132], the key points of the software process are the software 
specification, the software design and development, the software validation and the 
software evolution.  
3.5.1 Software process models 
Generic models describe the software process, based on the form of the requirements 
and the mode of approach. A model that mostly resembles the classical engineering 
models is the waterfall model, where each of the activities of the process represents 
an individual phase. It requires concrete software specification, thus commitments 
need to be made at early stages of the process, rendering the approach inflexible to 
alterations and changes that occur during later stages [132]. With evolutionary 
approach, the specification, design and implementation, and validation phase 
interleave and an initially developed system is evolved to meet the requirements of 
the customer [132]. It does not require concrete requirements specification, hence the 
requirements may be revisited at any phase and be easily modified [8]. A model which 
 28 
utilizes reusable software components to build a new system is known as the 
component – based software engineering model. This approach integrates existing 
components instead of designing them from the beginning and it is very useful in the 
case of existence of such components relative to the product under design [132]. 
As changes of the requirements of large projects are inevitable, an iterative approach 
is more efficient to cope with the particularity of the software development. An 
example of an iterative software process is the spiral approach, introduced by Boehm 
(1988) [13]. Each loop in the spiral represents a particular phase of the whole process 
and for each loop one may distinguish four sectors. These are the setting of the 
objectives, the assessment and reduction of risk, development and validation, and 
planning for the next cycle (Figure 22). The explicit recognition of risk distinguishes the 
spiral from the other models. The arrangement of this model allows particular phases 
of the process to be revisited if required [132].  
  
   
Figure 22 – The Spiral Model [132] 
An application of the Spiral Model can be seen in the definition and development of 
the TRW Software Productivity System (TRW-SPS), an integrated software engineering 
environment of the American Military.  The first cycle of the spiral refers to the 
feasibility study, the second cycle to the concept of operations and the third round 
includes the top level requirements specification [26]. The elements of round 1 of the 
spiral are shown in Figure 23. 
 29 
 
Figure 23 – Round 1 of the spiral process for the TWR – SPS project [26] 
Another example of the spiral model may be seen in a project described by the 
Swedish University of Linkoping in one of their handbooks. It is suggested for a 
software project of the PUM course and the spiral includes 3 rounds [67]:  
• First round: Pre – study and definition 
• Second round: Architecture and design 
• Third round: Implementation and test 
3.5.2 System Requirements 
The significance of the system requirements is very high as their ambiguity and 
preciseness defines the clarity of the project. Sommerville (2006) suggests a 
classification in User’s Requirements, which are high level abstract requirements and 
System Requirements, which are a detailed description of the system functionalities. 
The system requirements can represent a whole phase of the spiral model and the 
engineering process to produce them must include 4 key phases, including the study of 
feasibility, elicitation – analysis, the specification and the requirements validation  
[132], [8]. To achieve sufficient clarity of the System Requirements, Sommerville also 
suggests a standardized form of the latter with the inclusion of a short rationale to 
explain the necessity [132]. A standardized outline of the Software Requirements 
Specification (SRS) is presented by the IEEE – 830 – 1998 standard [73] in order to 
promote the key characteristics for an SRS document of high quality. According to the 
Standard, these characteristics are:  
• Correctness 
• Unambiguity 
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• Completeness 
• Consistence 
• Ranking for importance or stability 
• Verifiability 
• Modifiability 
• Traceability 
The expression of the SRS is crucial for the assurance of the above key features. The 
usage of structured natural language is a way of maintaining a standardized form of 
the requirements reducing disambiguities, whilst maintaining the expressiveness and 
understandability of natural language. Another method of requirements presentation 
is the formal system specification. This is based on formal methods, which are derived 
from mathematical representations [132]. There have been extensive arguments 
amongst software engineering researchers about the effectiveness of formal methods. 
These are often used in critical safety systems, although it is argued that the achieved 
level of their correctness is already high without the necessity for formal methods to 
be applied [21]. According to Broy (2009) [21], the following principles apply in 
software development: 
• Separation of Concerns 
• Stepwise refinement 
• Modularity and Compositionality 
• Decomposition 
• Abstraction 
• Rigor and formality 
• Generality 
• Mitigation of risk 
• Anticipation of Change 
• Incremental Development 
• Standardized Patterns 
• Scalability 
From the above, formal methods may contribute to the first 6, whereas the last 5 are 
not addressed by these methods [21]. Although formal specifications may uncover 
problems and ambiguities, they require a very detailed analysis and high cost to be 
developed [132]. 
3.5.3 Architectural design 
The architectural design of a software system is determined by the character and the 
functionality of the product, as it affects the performance, the robustness, the 
maintainability and the distributability [16]. Software architecture has been evolving 
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during the years with a purpose to assist developers to overcome common design 
issues and problems such as correct communication and communication of developers 
working from different divisions or reusing components. It represents the abstraction 
of system construction patterns [125]. Several architectural styles have been 
developed.  The repository model is convenient for an integration of sub – systems 
with large amount of information exchange. The client server model can be applied for 
systems that involve clients requesting remote services. This model has the sub 
systems organized into a group which provides services and into another which 
requests services. It has a very important advantage due to the distributed 
architecture [132]. The layered model organizes the system into layers, each of which 
provides a group of services. It supports the incremental development and it is also 
changeable and portable [132]. The design patterns introduced by Gamma et. al (1994) 
[49], is a concept inspired by classical architecture and utilizes standard abstract 
software design patterns as guidelines for developers (Figure 24). Software design 
descriptions are also standardized by the IEEE Standard for IT systems design 
descriptions [71], which provides guidelines for selection of the appropriate design 
description language. 
   
 
 Figure 24 – Design patterns and their relationships [49] 
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3.5.4 Validation & Verification 
The consensus of the field in software engineering is that during and after the 
implementation process, the developed program should be checked to ensure that it 
properly meets the requirements and functionalities it was designed for, prior to 
delivery [132]. The checking processes used for this purpose are known as verification 
and validation [132]. Simply, Boehm (1984) states their difference [15]: 
• ‘Validation: Are we building the right product?’ 
• ‘Verification: Are we building the product right?’ 
According to Sommerville (2006) there are two complementary approaches in the V&V 
process: software inspections, which are static analysis of the SRS document, the 
design document and the source code, and testing which is a dynamic approach based 
on test data [132]. The various methods which may be applied depend on the software 
process model. In a waterfall model the product cannot be tested before completion 
whereas in incremental or evolutionary approach, testing may be applied in between 
stages. Based on the definitions and guidelines of the DO-178 document, NASA [65] 
presents the types of structural coverage required for avionics software validation, 
based on control flow of the software. According to DO-178B, table A-7 of Annex A9  
[65], Modified Condition/Decision Coverage is required for software level A, Decision 
Coverage for levels A-B and Statement Coverage for levels A-C. As required by DO-178, 
the control flow testing takes place after the requirements testing, in order to exercise 
code statements and decision nodes not invoked during the requirements testing.   
 
Research for improvement of testing strategies is ongoing in order to improve testing 
capabilities in contemporary complicated software systems. Hayes et al. propose the 
usage of fault links (i.e. relationships between the types of code faults, or defects, and 
the types [64] of components in which faults are detected) in order to augment code 
reviews [64] (Figure 25). Clarke addresses the problem of testing abstract classes (as 
abstract they cannot be instantiated and tested independently with the use of 
standard testing strategies), by presenting a structured approach focused on ensuring 
the test of the features defined in the abstract class. The suggested strategy consists of 
first classifying the features of abstract classes and then identifying truly inherited 
methods [29]. Yoo et al (2012) introduce an optimizing approach to automated 
software test data generation for application in structural testing. Their work is based 
on the assumption that some data already exist and generates test data by exploiting 
the existing data [162]. Finally, changes imposed on a software product may harm its 
established behaviour. A particular strategy for verifying that changes do not affect the 
product negatively is regression testing. The importance of this strategy is stressed by 
a survey published by Yoo et.al (2012), where minimization, selection and prioritization 
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techniques are presented, open problems are discussed and potential directions for 
future research are proposed [162].  
 
   
Figure 25 - Fault code taxonomy [64] 
3.5.5 Model checking 
Model checking is a formal verification technique [11] and it is commonly applied in 
critical software systems. In contrast to simulation, formal verification methods do not 
rely upon the dynamic response of the system, but perform static analysis on a formal 
mathematical representation, in order to check it for correction with respect to a given 
specification [4]. It is also considered that the integration of formal methods - such as 
model checking - into software development environments contributes to the fight 
against increasing cost and complexity with automation and rigour [30]. 
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A practical implementation of model checking in critical software systems may be seen 
in an industrial application, described by Cimatti et. al [28], where the formal 
verification of Safety Logic of an interlocking system for the control of railway stations - 
developed by Ansaldo - is presented. The model checking is accomplished with the use 
of SPIN, one of numerous related software tools. The application of model checking is 
also becoming more favourable with the DGS-2100, a Rockwell Collins product that 
provides the cockpit displays and display management logic for large commercial 
aircraft. Rockwell Collins has developed a translation framework that bridges the gap 
between some popular industrial model-based development languages such as 
ESCADE or LUSTRE and several model checkers [30]. Specifically, the translation 
framework has focused on NuSMV, another model checking tool, developed by ITC-
IRST, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Genoa and the University of Trento.  
There are several model checking tools available, namely SPIN, NuSMV, FDR2, CADP, 
ALLOY and PROB [45]. Each tool has a set of properties and standards that characterize 
it and different tools might be more suitable for some cases than others. For example, 
SPIN is an explicit model checker and thus uses an explicit representation of the 
transition system associated to a model specification, whilst NuSMV is a symbolic 
model checker and represents the transition system as a Boolean formula. However, 
they both support temporal languages like LTL (Linear Temporal logic) and CTL 
(Computation Tree Logic) for property specification [45]. Temporal logic is a special 
case of modal logic, which allows the reasoning of the evolution of predicates along 
time. LTL and CTL have different path quantifiers and even those with the same 
meaning cannot always construct equivalent formulae. This fact indicates that the two 
logics have different expressing powers [146] (Figure 26). However, as stated by Vardi, 
M. (2001) [142], verification is considered easier with CTL and preferred in the 
industrial world against LTL, although the restricted syntax of CTL limits the expressive 
power of this Logic. On the other hand, LTL is considered not expressive enough [142]. 
Also, CTL is more exhaustive in the expression of a path existence compared to LTL. 
 
Figure 26 – Relation between LTL and CTL [146] 
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3.6 Real time operating systems interfacing software 
The interfacing of a mechanical component such as a gas turbine with a computer 
application could be found in real – time operating systems. Suitable programming 
languages (usually known as synchronous programming languages) for real – time 
embedded systems should include provisions to access hardware components. 
Systems – level languages such as C may also be used [132]. A system which responds 
to sensor stimulus is shown schematically in Figure 27.  
  
Figure 27 – Sensor/actuator process [132] 
It is often that real – time system programming languages appear integrated in 
development suites. Scade Suite developed by Esterel Technologies is such an 
example, where scade language, a derivative of LUSTREL is integrated. Scade suite is a 
model based development environment used for critical embedded software design in 
aerospace, rail transportation and heavy industry [35].  
A widely known programming language often used in real – time systems is MATLAB, 
developed by Mathworks [91]. It is also integrated with Simulink, which is a 
development environment for multi-domain simulation and model-based design for 
dynamic and embedded systems [91]. MATLAB includes a wide range of toolkits which 
enhance its capabilities. With appropriate toolkits, MATLAB can communicate with 
data acquisition devices (DAQ’s) of third party designers. Simulink can be translated 
and execute C or C++ code with the use of Simulink coder [92]. Simulink however is 
mostly specialized in the design and modelling of control systems.    
Another familiar tool suitable for real – time applications is LabVIEW, a graphical 
environment developed by National Instruments which integrates programming 
language G [100]. This is more specialized in data acquisition and controlling devices. It 
is also accompanied with compatible hardware components manufactured by National 
Instruments hence allow easy interfacing of mechanical devices. LabVIEW can 
communicate with native or higher level languages (C++, Java or .NET applications) via 
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shared libraries (DLL) [106] or by TCP connection with the implementation of 
appropriate visual instruments, as Ko et. al demonstrate in their application of a web 
based laboratory for control experiments on a coupled tank apparatus real – time 
control system in distance learning [84]. Another way of calling LabVIEW from other 
languages is by using Microsoft ActiveX [105]. However, according to developers’ 
opinions in National Instrument forums [107], access via DLL is considered a faster 
technique rather than via ActiveX. Java can communicate with LabVIEW with prior 
conversion of Java code into native with the use of appropriate tools such as Java 
Native Interface (JNI) or Java Native Access (JNA).   
3.7 Internet applications and protocols 
Preparation of an Internet application requires certain knowledge about the existing 
protocols applied to communicate data and the tools available in order to construct 
the most efficient and appropriate solution.  
3.7.1 Internet data communication protocols 
Protocols describe the forms of transferring transfer through the network. According 
to the International Organisation of Standardisation, the network protocol layers are 
described by the Open Systems Interconnect (OSI) model [74] (Figure 28). The Internet 
layer model (Figure 29) does not show a one to one correspondence to the OSI model 
and has been developed based on the necessity and by numerous people co – 
operating loosely.  
 
Figure 28 – The OSI model [74] 
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Figure 29 – The Internet layer model [74] 
3.7.2 Web services and web applications 
A Web service is a means of providing operations to remote clients using standard 
Internet technology. According to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), ‘A Web 
service is a software system designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine 
interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a machine-processable 
format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the Web service in a manner 
prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using HTTP with 
an XML serialization in conjunction with other Web-related standards.’ [143]. 
It is noticeable that Web services typically use HTTP protocol for the application layer. 
HTTP, currently upgraded to HTTP/1.1 [150], is a basic communication protocol on the 
Internet, suitable for transferring images, sounds or several different types of files. It 
applies a simple client – server methodology and all the requests are handled 
individually. Most web browsers support all versions [74]. HTTP runs on top of TCP at 
the transport level, although it alters some of the TCP methodologies. The main 
contradiction between them is that TCP is session oriented and maintains a logical 
connection between the client and the server for the time of the data exchange whilst 
once HTTP conveys a message; the two terminal machines forget each other [9]. One 
more interesting feature of HTTP is that the HTTP binding, as defined by W3C, natively 
supports the Request – Response and the SOAP Message Exchange Patterns, thus 
utilizes the capabilities of the underlying protocol in order to implement an abstract 
feature [61].    
Apart from XML web services described above, there is another approach to remote 
services known as RESTful web services. These do not adhere to any particular web 
service protocols but represent an architectural design of services, abstracted from 
HTTP 1.1, as defined by Fielding (2000) [40]. Web sites, images or CGI scripts are 
considered as resources that can be addressed using URLs and a web application is an 
accumulation of resources. With HTTP requests, messages may be sent to the 
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resources and a direct manipulation of a resource is not intended. Each access is made 
indirectly using a URL assigned to the particular resource [122] Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30 – RESTful web services [122] 
According to Fielding (2014) [39] not any HTTP based interface may be called a REST 
API, unless it adheres to several strict rules, such as communication protocol 
independence, no alteration of communication protocol, no definition of fixed 
resource names, no typed resources significant to the client and ‘A REST API should be 
entered with no prior knowledge beyond the initial URI (bookmark) and set of 
standardized media types that are appropriate for the intended audience’. This 
definition has caused a wide debate about what should be called REST API and what 
RPC, which is an approach more relevant to XML web services.  
The term STREST (Service Trampled REST) [127] is being used to describe services 
claiming to be REST API’s but do not adhere to the strict guidelines of Fielding. 
However, Richardson (2008) [127] disputes the term STREST and describes these 
services as REST – RPC hybrid web services. According to Richardson (2008), the latter 
are considered to have architecture in between REST and RPC. They use HTTP as a 
convenient envelope in a manner that overlaps with what a RESTful web service might 
do and there are occasions that this hybrid architecture can be used to form powerful 
web tools. 
Pautasso et. al. (2008) [119] presented a study that compared “big” (XML) web 
services and REST. In their study, there is a discussion with regards to differences in 
protocol layering between the 2 approaches, and the debate takes place around the 
question, whether HTTP is considered as an application or a transport protocol. Their 
observation states that in RESTful services, the Web is seen as the universal medium 
for publishing globally accessible information, thus HTTP is used as a uniform 
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application protocol. Applications become part of the Web by using URIs to identify 
the provided resources, data, and services and by leveraging the full semantics of the 4 
HTTP verbs (GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE) to expose operations on such resources. By 
contrast, in XML services, the Web – thus HTTP - is seen as the universal transport 
medium for messages, which are exchanged between Web services endpoints of 
published applications with only one HTTP method (POST).  
The main conclusion from the study of Pautasso et. al. (2008) [119] was that the tool 
styles have many similarities. REST was regarded efficient in terms of flexibility and 
control, yet requires a lot of low-level coding. XML web services provide better tool 
support and programming interface convenience, but introduce dependency on 
vendors and open source projects. Their main recommendation from this comparison 
was to use RESTful services for tactical, ad hoc integration over the web and to prefer 
XML services in professional enterprise application integration scenarios, with a longer 
lifespan and advanced QoS requirements.   
3.7.3 HTTP requests 
An HTTP request is a message package from the client to a server. It contains standard 
lines of information, one of which depicts the request method to be applied to the end 
resource [41]. Considering 2 of the most commonly used http request methods, GET 
and POST, the following can be noted [152]: GET is used to request data from a specific 
resource whilst POST is applied to submit data to be processed to a specified resource. 
Noticeable differences are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 – Differences between GET and POST methods [152] 
GET POST 
requests can be cached 
requests are never cached 
requests remain in the browser history 
requests do not remain in the browser 
history 
requests can be bookmarked 
requests cannot be bookmarked 
requests have length restrictions 
requests have no restrictions on data 
length 
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3.7.4 File Transfer Protocol 
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) was designed for transmitting files and fixed data blocks. It 
is used to upload/download applications or data to or from a local machine or a server 
[61]. It opens 2 ports and runs on top of TCP as well. Although it requires the opening 
of 2 TCP connections, transactions may be interleaved. The requirement for 2 ports 
poses a burden to the application compared to HTTP and also command transmission 
is more complicated than in HTTP [74]. 
3.7.5 TCP and UDP 
It can be inferred from the previous sections that TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) 
protocol of the Transport layer acts as the main mean for transmission under HTTP and 
FTP. However, UDP (User Datagram Protocol) may be preferred in some cases instead 
of TCP. TCP is considered as a reliable connection  [74] and requires acknowledgment 
between sender and recipient. The shortcoming of this protocol is that it is relatively 
slow [74]. By contrast, UDP does not apply acknowledgement but transmits data faster 
and it is used by application layer protocols such as RTP which transmits and receives 
real time data, including voice or image [74]. UDP is not as reliable as TCP (which 
additionally delivers error messages) and should require additional work for the 
developer in order to implement reliable communication on top of UDP. However, the 
additional work in combination with lack of experience could lead to failure prone 
connections. 
3.8 Performance and security over the web 
The Internet may constantly be developing, providing increasing applications and ease 
of use, but also, the threats that accompany it rise and become more and more 
difficult to counteract.  
3.8.1 Internet threats 
A system once placed on the Internet becomes vulnerable to exposure. Classification 
and quantification of the Internet threats is not easy to define. According to Vacca 
(2007) [141], a general classification of threat types can be presented as shown below. 
• Hackers. This group of attackers aims to break into computer systems and 
exploit them for various reasons. 
• Malware. Disguised pieces of code causing undesirable events transmitted with 
disks, email or other communication means. 
• Spam. Unsolicited commercial email messages. 
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• Denial of Service (DoS). During this attack the perpetrator renders an enterprise 
unable to use certain network resources by introducing network traffic which 
exploits an existing weakness of the system. 
• Inappropriate Web Usage. This implies the access of inappropriate material 
from users or usage of the network to accomplish personal matters. 
• Insider Attacks. Either disgruntled employees or others aiming to financial gain 
and access privileges can pose an interior threat to a system. 
Vacca (2007) [141] also states that the volume of Internet attacks increases and the 
nature of the attacks becomes more sophisticated. Assessment of the threats is 
suggested by the cost of the damage to the enterprise. Prevention of the threats 
requires extensive knowledge of the nature and the purpose of the potential attackers, 
motives and target Vacca (2007) [141]. 
3.8.2 Internet security 
Various ways of protection against threats may apply according to each specific 
application and ongoing research aims to optimisation of techniques for their 
identification and mitigation. Roy et. al. (2012) [128] have presented a novel approach 
known as attack countermeasure tree (ACT) which takes into account attacks as well as 
countermeasures and avoids the generation and solution of a state-space model in its 
analysis. Three case studies have been used to study the results of implementation of 
countermeasures (ACT for BGP attack, ACT for a SCADA attack and ACT for malicious 
insider attacks) [128]. A firewall placed at an appropriate station may control the 
traffic of the network. Incorporation of application proxies can block several forms of 
attacks disguised as legitimate traffic and perform other security and inspection 
functions. Firewalls can also be used to segment internal networks [141].  Malware 
protection can be obtained with the installation of host – based or gateway – based 
scanners to search targeted software components against known threats [141]. The 
Virtual Private Networking (VPN) is a mean of establishment of secure virtual tunnels 
through the Internet. It provides the security benefits of private lines with the cost 
structure of public networks [141]. Wade et. al. (2010) [144] proposed a cross – layer 
approach to mitigate distributed DoS, by implementing a remote firewall, or a device 
driver packet filtering. The concept of the remote firewall aims to protect access links 
with limited bandwidth from being overwhelmed by DDoS traffic and flash crowds. As 
described by Wade et. al (2010), filtering malicious and excessive legitimate traffic at a 
local firewall may be too late if a surge in network traffic clogs the access link. Thus a 
remote firewall drops or rate-controls such as potentially harmful traffic before they 
get in the access link. Furthermore, the remote firewall is proposed to allow 
administrators to update their firewall configurations without being dependent on 
their Internet service providers and consequently reducing administrative delay. The 
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second approach (packet filtering) is achieved by implementing two Bloom filter based 
packet filter methods and has the advantage that the malicious packets are dropped at 
the earliest possible time before they are processed by the upper layers in a protocol 
stack. Hence, consumption of processing a resource of a victim server by the malicious 
packets is prevented. As a conclusion of the research, it was stated that device based 
packet filter implementation has shown satisfactory results, whilst remote firewall can 
provide additional mitigation of DoS on top of other applied solutions [144]. 
Installation of switches between the hardware components of a computer system may 
enhance security, as they provide an additional level of security, rendering the tracking 
of a network more difficult [46]. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been 
developed to monitor computer systems or networks for unauthorized access and 
misuse. These systems can be considered as a second line of defense against attacks 
on networks and are becoming more popular as the likelihood and the severity of 
potential attacks increases [31]. According to Di Pietro (2008) [31], they can be 
classified in signature based and in anomaly based systems.  
Several techniques of encryption of the data transferred are available. Authentication 
and access management is a highly important element of assuring security of a 
software system over the Internet. Restriction of access to unauthorized users does 
not eliminate, but seriously minimizes the risk of allowing potential attackers to 
penetrate. Wilding (2003) [149] stresses the vulnerability of static passwords used for 
authentication and addresses the necessity more secure methods for encryption of 
electronic fund transfer systems or other forms of high security processing. In Wilder’s 
password disclosure matrix there are more than 10 ways of password cracking 
displayed. Consequently, the authentication method applied contributes to the 
security of the credentials transmission. A form based authentication, although not 
easy to implement, may easily encrypt the data with the use of HTTPS, in contrast with 
other less secure methods, such as the basic authentication, where passwords are not 
encrypted [66]. Another even more secure technique is the client side certificate 
issued by appropriate authorities. However, this method is not convenient and 
increases the cost of the application  [66].  
Increase of security may be obtained with the implementation of a secure protocol in 
the application layer that allows for data encryption and user authentication. An 
example is the Secure Shell protocol, SSH, offered by the SSH Communications Security 
Corporation [75]. However, compatibility with other security targeted applications 
needs to be taken into account. It is noted here that commercial SSH presently does 
not implement VPN. To combine SSH and VPN the designer should use the openSSH, 
which is a free version of SSH [110].  
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Another related factor to be considered is the contribution of the HTTP request 
methods applied to the security of transmitted data. In the HTTP specification, it is 
recommended that GET method should not be used to transmit passwords or other 
sensitive data with HTTP, as this will cause this data to be encoded in the Request-URI. 
There are many cases of servers, proxies and user agents that may log the request URI 
somewhere visible to third parties [42]. POST-based form submission can be used 
instead, where parameters are not stored in browser history or in web server logs  
[152]. Although storage and logging restrictions in POST method may increase the 
security level against GET method, in order to achieve encryption of the transmitted 
data in both methods, the implementation of a secure transport layer would be 
necessary (HTTPS, running on top of SSL).  
 
Finally, the inside attacker cannot be taken lightly. This type of threat should always be 
considered as possible, even if such a possibility may be remote, depending on the 
enterprise internal relations between staff and administration or the internal level of 
physical security. You et. al. (2012) have recently published a proposal for defense 
against insider threats and internal data leakage [163]. 
3.8.3    Network performance 
Apart from security, the other major concern of an Internet application is Quality of 
Service (QoS), which is closely related to the network utilization. Network utilization is 
defined as the ratio of demand over capacity of the network and has direct effects to 
performance [31]. According to available literature, 30 % of utilization is a commonly 
cited rule of thumb for network utilization [70]. TCP provides congestion control and 
ensures reliable data by retransmitting unacknowledged segments, which however 
may be a problem for several real time applications, including sound and voice 
transfer. As an alternative, UDP may be used but this protocol does not provide 
congestion control [70]. 
Performance of a network may be described by several parameters. Halsall (1992) [63] 
presents an example of performance measurement of a Local Area Network (LAN), 
where the mean transfer delay of a frame of data to be transferred across the network 
is considered, against the normalized throughput, which is the ratio of the offered bit 
load over the available bit rate [63]. However, a short finite time delay is always 
expected during data transmission, as a result of the physical impedance of the 
medium connecting the ends and the distance between them. This is known as the 
transmission propagation delay and may be described by the round trip delay, which 
can be defined as the time delay between the first bit of a block transmitted by the 
sender and the last bit of its associated acknowledgement being received [63]. This 
parameter is a function of the time for a frame to be transmitted at a given link bit rate 
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and the propagation delay, which depends on the type of the medium and the 
distance. As an example given by Halsall (1992), the signal propagation through a 
twisted pair wire or a coaxial cable for 1 meter length will last 0.5 x 10
-8 
sec.      
Corruption of data during transmission is very likely to occur, especially when long 
distance separates the ends or noise is present. For improved performance, error 
control is introduced as the cycle of combined error detection and correction. Once 
the errors are detected, the assurance of the transmitted data correction is required 
[63]. Halsall (1992) [63] refers to two approaches for this process, the forward error 
control and the feedback error control. In the former, the character or frame 
transmitted contains redundant information to allow the receiver to detect when and 
where errors are present. In the latter, the transmitted frames only inform the receiver 
about the presence of errors but not their location. Various detection schemes may be 
used and these are determined by the bit error rate and the type of errors. Namely, a 
few error detection methods are the parity bit method, commonly used with 
asynchronous and character oriented synchronous transmission, the block sum 
checked, suitable when blocks of characters are transmitted and the cyclic redundancy 
check when error bursts are present [63]. 
Another important element related to data link protocols is flow control. This 
parameter describes the control of the transmission rate of frames or characters in a 
way that the receiver always has sufficient buffer storage in order to accept the data 
before processing them. There is an automatic flow control facility often invoked, 
which involves the return of special control characters X-OFF and X-ON. On reception 
of the former, the keyboard ignores the input of additional characters, until the 
reception of the latter. Another mechanism present is the sliding window, which is 
suitable for the control of frame flow across a link. Briefly, this mechanism allows the 
transmission of new frames only after acknowledgement of reception of the previous  
[63]. 
An error and network condition reporting protocol integrated with the IP 
implementations is the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). ICMP includes a 
variety of messages that describe the condition of a network allowing for network 
management. Basic functions related to this protocol include error reporting, reliability 
testing, congestion control, route – change notification, performance measuring and 
subnet addressing [63]. ICMP detects IP datagrams (format of an IP data unit) discard 
by a host or gateways of a network and issues appropriate messages. A software tool 
associated with ICMP messages for checking connection of remote servers is PING 
(Figure 31). It implements the Echo request/reply function of the ICMP to verify the 
reachability of a host or gateway and it may be executed as a command in different 
operating systems. However, it must be noted that as a security measure, many 
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organizations may block the return of ICMP package, preventing the function of PING 
[95].   
 
 
   Figure 31 – ICMP messages and their application [63]  
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4 SOFTWARE PROCESS, REQUIREMENTS AND 
ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter presents the methodology applied for the overall software process along 
with the methodology for the selected architecture. It also describes the definition of 
the System Requirements, the System Requirements Specification and the validation 
of the requirements. 
The system was developed following an evolutionary process, leading to the design of 
3 distinct prototypes: Operation by local PC, Operation in LAN and finally Internet 
operation 
4.1 Software Process 
4.1.1 The Spiral as the Software Process Model 
The software process was selected to adhere to an adaptation of the Spiral Model. This 
was introduced by Boehm (1988) with the purpose of overcoming the difficulties 
imposed by the existing up to the then-prevalent techniques, such as the waterfall 
model, the evolutionary and the transform model. It had been based on experience 
with various refinements of the waterfall model as applied to large government 
software projects [14]. According to Boehm, the radial dimension represents the 
cumulate cost incurred in the accomplishment and the angular dimension depicts the 
progressed achieved in the completion of each cycle (Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32 - The Spiral Model as introduced by Boehm [14] 
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Each cycle of the spiral is initiated with the identification of: the objectives of that 
cycle, the alternative means of implementation and the constraints imposed by the 
alternatives, with risk analysis to follow. At an example provided by Boehm (1988) [14], 
indicatively the rounds of a spiral process may include the following steps: 
• Round 0: feasibility study 
• Round 1: concept of operations, including the key points of objectives, 
constraints, alternatives, risks, risk resolution, risk resolution results, plan for 
next stage, commitment 
• Round 2: top – level requirement specification with consideration of the 
respective key points of this stage, as in Round 1.  
• Succeeding rounds: development, Implementation and validation 
Several features of the spiral identified from the examples of Boehm are: 
• Fostering of the development of specifications that are not necessarily uniform, 
exhaustive or formal 
• Incorporation of prototyping as a risk reduction option at any stage of the 
development 
• Accommodation of reworks or returns to earlier stages as more attractive 
alternatives are identified or if new risk issues need resolution. 
The spiral differs from the other models mainly in the identification and consideration 
of risk [132]. Evaluated by Boehm himself [14], its main advantage is the risk driven 
approach in combination with the accommodation of the good features from other 
process models. These were the 2 main factors that have led to the selection of this 
approach for the development of the system in this project.  
Prototype driven development is a software process model that was also considered. 
There are occasions when requirements are not identified with detail by the customer, 
or the developer may not be sure about the efficiency of an algorithm or the 
adaptability of an operating system. In these situations, the application of the 
prototype paradigm (Figure 33) may offer a sufficient solution. The process 
commences with communication in order to identify any available requirements and 
proceeds to the quick design and construction of a working prototype application. This 
model can be used as a stand-alone process, but it is commonly used within other 
software process models, often for the derivation of more specific requirements [123]. 
In this project, a prototype driven process would not be sufficient on its own, due to 
the necessity to consider the risk management, as the project has been regarded as a 
safety critical system. However, it would be useful in sub phases of the Spiral process 
and it is used for the requirements validation. It would also be applicable to the design 
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of the final individual components of the application, after the initial implementation 
rounds were completed successfully.  
  
Figure 33 – The prototype paradigm 
Agility (or Agile Development) is a software development approach that has been 
gaining popularity the last years. It adheres to the rules of the Manifesto for Agile 
Software Development, issued by a group of notable software developers in 2001 
[123]. It is not a single standard methodology, but consists of several software 
development approaches that attempt to overcome the difficulties imposed by 
traditional process models, such as the waterfall model. They emphasize effective 
response to changes, facile communication between involved parties and rapid 
delivery of working software. They de-emphasize the importance of intermediate work 
products, which is not always considered to be positive [123]. However, in a case of a 
safety critical application, a well defined (although not exhaustive) initial Requirement 
Specification should be available, in order to allow for risk consideration, risk 
mitigation and planning of alternative approaches. Hence agility was not considered as 
effective as the Spiral Model for this application.  
4.1.2 Adaptation of the Spiral to the present project 
The rounds of the Spiral in this case represent the following elements (Figure 34): 
• Round 0: Feasibility study and SRS 
• Round 1: Local Interfacing of the gas turbine – Local PC version 
• Round 2: Interaction with gas turbine interface program and design of core 
operation control program  
• Round 3: Implementation of additional performance and safety features – LAN 
version 
• Round 4: Internet Implementation 
• Round 5: Acceptance Validation 
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Figure 34 – Adaptation of the Spiral for the current project 
 
 50 
4.2 System Requirements 
This section describes the methodology applied for the elicitation, definition and 
presentation of the system requirements. The final version of the Functional 
Requirements is shown in Appendix A. The requirements have been finalised after the 
completion of rounds 0 – 3 of the software process, as according to the Spiral Model, 
requirements are not final from the initiation, but instead, they are revisited after each 
round and adapted according to risen risk issues and alternatives applied in each 
round. 
4.2.1 Methodology 
The general layout of the SRS document adheres to the IEEE – 830 – 1988 – SRS 
Standard [73]. According to the Standard, key points addressed by the SRS are: the 
functionality of the software, the external interfaces, the performance, the attributes 
and the design constraints imposed on the implementation. The document comprises 
of the following sections: 
• Introduction  
• Overall description 
• Specific Requirements  
The Overall Description sub section outlines the features of the system in the form of 
User’s Requirements, statements in natural language that outline what the final 
system should do [132]. The elicitation of User’s Requirements was obtained by 
collaboration with the involved Departments of the University and has taken into 
account the risks of operating a gas turbine remotely, the required performance and 
the prospective of a generic application.  
The requirements elicitation process included use – case scenarios derived after 
discussions with the involved parties. Gallina et. al. (2007) proposed a requirement 
elicitation template of Dependable Product Lines [48] which includes among others, 
fault assumptions and risk analysis. Other elements shown and extended by Gallina et. 
al. (2007) [48], are the description, the synchronous primary actors, resources, 
dependency, preconditions, post conditions, main scenario, specification of non – 
functional properties, mis – scenarios and fault variation description. Fault analysis and 
risk analysis were implemented for the elicitation of the requirements of the project, 
along with the use of the other aforementioned elements. 
Risk analysis forms a basic part of the initiation of the process. The Fault Tree Analysis 
and Event Tree Analysis were based on the initial use case scenarios [68], [18]. As 
these methods are recommended by the respective Standard [18] early in the system 
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design stage, they were selected to be applied at this initial stage of the software 
process, i.e. requirements elicitation, in order to provide a qualitative assessment of 
risk and introduction of means of mitigation before proceeding further into 
development. The logical analysis of the FTA was obtained with the implementation of 
Boolean reduction and the method of minimal cut sets [68], [18]. Two major 
undesirable events were identified and the analysis was built around them. Moreover, 
HAZOP analysis was also applied [20], as an assisting tool to allow for direct indication 
of measures required at the early stages of design. HAZOP was also adapted and 
applied as a procedural risk analysis for the SRS phase.   
The User’s Requirements were distinguished in functional and non – functional 
requirements. The former show the system reaction and behaviour in particular input 
and certain situations, whilst the latter express various constraints posed on the 
functions [132]. Functional and non – functional requirements were clearly 
distinguished and in the SRS each one included a brief rationale in order to justify its 
existence [132]. The System Requirements were classified in different modes of 
operation and they were individually numbered. They were expressed in structured 
natural language, in order to avoid the ambiguities of natural language. The use of 
formal specification was also considered but as this would add complexity into this 
time limited project, they were not implemented. Besides, according to Broy (2009) 
[21], most of the process principles required to be encountered in the SRS are covered 
with a non formal standardized expression of the system requirements.   
The feasibility and validation of the requirements was assessed by review with the 
collaborating Departments and inspection. Finally, a simple prototype program that 
simulated the various suggested components of the system and their interaction was 
designed, in order to render the system and the requirements more understandable. 
The software components were modelled with the implementation of Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) [12].  
4.2.2 Objectives and risk analysis 
In accordance with the Spiral Model, the objectives of Round 0 were defined before 
proceeding (Table 3). 
  
 52 
Table 3 - Round 0 Objectives 
Elicitation of Requirements 
Identify Physical Risks 
Define System Requirements Specification 
Validate Requirements 
Determine Feasibility 
 
Following the definition of the objectives, the procedural risks were identified with the 
implementation of HAZOP (Appendix B, Table B-2). Significant identified elements with 
underlying risks included the objectives identification, the feasibility testing of the 
application, the clarity of the requirements and the identification of the physical risks. 
It was realised from the very first stages that the requirements should be clearly 
defined and stated and also the physical risks mitigated prior to further development. 
The procedural risk assessment dictated the approach for the accomplishment of this 
round, where risk analysis played a major role. Additionally, cost was identified as an 
underlying risk, as improper estimation at an early stage would have a negative impact 
on the overall budget of the project. 
4.2.3 Elicitation of the requirements and the SRS 
The SRS was derived after elicitation of the requirements, approached by use case 
scenarios, use case diagrams, collaboration with the involved Departments and 
consideration of the risks identified in the previous analyses. The use case scenarios 
were derived with 2 different approaches. First approach with human actors involved 
(3 users: one in the engine test house, one in the nearby PC station and one through 
the Internet) and the software represented as a single actor (Figure 35). The other 
approach was with the hardware and software components as actors, taking into 
account the abstract definition of the software modules that would be designed later 
on: The Engine Interface Software, the Engine Operation Control Software and the 
Client (Figure 36). 
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Figure 35 – Use case analysis with human users as actors 
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Figure 36 – Use case analysis with software and hardware components as actors 
The User’s Requirements (Appendix A, Section A.1) were clearly distinguished to 
functional and non – functional. Key points were: 
• The ability of the system to apply automated actions in the case of limits 
exceedance or power supply and network connection abnormalities. The 
system shall be used by individuals with basic knowledge of gas turbine 
operation but due to the variety of experience levels among the users, it must 
assure that the input is filtered and the engine operated properly.  
• Inclusion of provisions for accommodation of generic expansion in the future in 
order to add other types of gas turbines and interact with external simulation 
or diagnostics applications. 
• It will not be allowed to operate unless the specified observers are in their 
positions.  
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Each requirement was expressed with the use of mathematical symbols and notations 
inspired from object oriented programming. They comprise of 168 individual functions 
that form the 12 functional requirements, all distributed in 6 basic modes of operation 
(Table 4).  
Table 4 – Functional Requirements 
Mode Description Functional Requirements 
0 Web Application 
0.1 Authentication 
0.2 System Monitoring 
1 
Engine start – No malfunction 
1.1 Engine Start 
2 
Engine start – Malfunction present 
2.1 Engine Start 
3 Engine Running 
3.1 Acceleration 
3.2 Deceleration 
3.3 Parameter Logging 
4 
Trouble Shooting 
4.1 Protection when absolute operating 
limits exceeded 
4.2 Protection when relative operating 
limits exceeded 
4.3 Local Protection 
5 
Engine Shutdown 5.1 Normal Shutdown 
5.2 Emergency Shutdown Local 
 
4.3 Architecture and Modelling 
At this point an abstract design of the system was constructed, and the general 
architecture was depicted, along with the hardware and software components from 
which the system would be comprised. The system was broken down to multiple sub 
components - modularity enhances changeability and replaceability; if one of the 
modules needs to be totally replaced, the impact to the rest of the software will be 
controlled. An abstract context model (Figure 37) was used herein to represent the sub 
modules, their interaction and the proposed protocols of communication. The modules 
were distinguished in 4 major groups: the Olympus gas turbine hardware components, 
the engine interface software related programs and hardware, the external hardware 
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components and the additional software components required to be designed. The 
basic components, classified from client’s end to service end, were the following: 
• The client. Any web browser or a thin client for LAN version. 
• Web Application (for Internet version).  
• Data Storage System (DSS). Storage of operating information and logs for the 
engine (future development).  
• Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS). Coordinates the interaction 
between all the different components.  
• Mains Supply Interface System (MSIS). Checks the condition of mains power 
supply to the end server PC.  
• Network Connection Monitoring System (NCMS). Checks the network 
connection between the remote components (future development).  
• Ambient Conditions Acquisition System (ACAS). Acquires ambient temperature 
and pressure. 
• Trouble Shooting System (TSS). Receives input from NCMS, MSIS, ACAS and the 
Measurements Acquisition system and checks the values of the related 
parameters with regards to predefined limits. 
• EIS Interface (EISI). Transmits data between MOCS and EIS.  
• Engine Interface Software (EIS). Program designed in LabVIEW to output the 
function signals to the NI Data Acquisition Unit and read in the measurements. 
• Data Acquisition Unit. This is a NI 9174 compactDAQ hardware platform. 
• Control Hardware Modules. The NI 9263 C Series analogue output module. 
• Measurement Acquisition Hardware Module. Comprises of 2 serial to USB 
interfaces, an NI 9401 C Series digital I/O module, an NI 9215 C Series analogue 
input module and a NI 9215 thermocouple input module. 
• Junction Box. Comprises of switches and Y – leads to interconnect manual with 
remote circuits. 
•  ECU. The Electronic Control Unit of the Engine (Already installed on the 
engine).  
• Manual Engine Control Box Already installed on the engine).  
• Engine Data Terminal. Displays the information from the ECU (Already installed 
on the engine). 
• AMT Netherlands Olympus Gas Turbine.  
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Figure 37 – Context model of the system 
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The system adheres to the client – server architecture [132]. The repository model 
would be convenient for sub – systems which exchange large amount of 
information. Although there is information exchange between modules in the 
project, their size is estimated to several Kilobytes hence there is no necessity for 
repository architecture. As the client will request services from the end server the 
client – server would be more appropriate, also enabling distributed architecture, 
that also supports the incremental development, changeability and portability, and 
maintainability [132] (Figure 38). 
 
Figure 38 – Architecture and data flow  
The various states of the system from engine at rest to start, run and end position, 
where the engine is at rest again, were distinguished here with the use of an abstract 
state machine (Figure 39). The sequence of the actions between the various 
components in response to the different inputs was depicted in a sequence diagram 
(Figure 39). 
 
Figure 39 – Preliminary abstract state machine of the system 
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Figure 40 – Sequence diagram 
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4.4 General Physical Risk Assessment 
Two major undesirable events with potential harmful consequences have been 
identified and were used as the top events for the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) applied 
(Appendix B, Section B.1), based on the general architecture and components of the 
system in Figure 37. The first top event was considered to be the total loss of control, 
where the engine would run without being controlled, neither through the Internet, or 
manually. Individual events that may contribute to this: 
A. Loss of power supply 
B. Network connection loss 
C. Exploit attack 
D. DoS attack 
E. User Misuse 
F. Undetected bugs triggered 
G. Manual control switch failure 
H. Connection – control hardware malfunction 
I. Intercom system failure 
J. Camera system failure 
K. Malware 
L. Inside attack 
The second top event was considered to be an erroneous command order incident, 
where the engine does not follow an intended command but instead operates at 
power settings other than the desired. Individual events that may contribute to this: 
A. User Misuse 
B. Undetected bugs triggered 
C. Connection – control hardware malfunction 
D. Engine Sensor Failure 
E. Exploit Attack 
F. DoS Attack 
G. Intercom system failure 
H. Camera system failure 
I. Malware 
J. Inside Attack 
Following the FTA analysis, an ETA was conducted for both top events (Appendix B, 
Section B.1). A series of possible events, which if combined together would lead to 
dangerous or hazardous situations, was identified along with the criticality of each 
combination.  
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Moreover, a HAZOP analysis was implemented at this stage, in order to derive and 
explicitly state actions required for mitigation of the underlying risk. The following 
elements were considered for deviation from proper function, based on the 
architecture of the overall system: 
• Junction box 
• Control hardware modules system 
• Measurement acquisition hardware modules system 
• Control Unit 
• Engine Interface Software 
• Control Software 
• Condition checking system 
• Recorded data storage system 
• Camera system 
• Intercom 
• Web application 
 
4.5 Validation Plan 
Validation and verification can be considered to comprise of two complementary 
approaches. One was the software inspections, which were static analysis of the SRS 
document, the design document and the source code. The other was testing which is a 
dynamic approach based on test data [132]. The various methods which may be 
applied depend on the software process model. In a waterfall model the product 
cannot be tested before completion whereas in incremental or evolutionary approach, 
testing may be applied in between stages, as in the current project. The general V&V 
plan follows the guidelines of IEEE-1012-2004 [72] Integrity Level 3 and DO-178B [65] 
for FAA Avionics Certification.  
Based on Integrity Level 3 of IEEE-1012-2004, the following activities have been 
included in all the V&V procedures throughout the project: 
• Requirements review 
•  Interface Analysis 
• Criticality analysis 
• Hazard and risk analysis 
• Component test plan, procedure, design, test cases generation and execution
  
• Integration test plan, procedure, design, test cases generation and execution 
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• System test plan, procedure, design, test cases generation and execution 
• Acceptance test plan, procedure, design, test cases generation and execution 
According to DO-178B [69], the system was classified as of criticality Level C, based on 
the most severe damage expected from the implemented ETA, which was estimated 
that it would not exceed major damage. In this case, DO-178B requires achievement of 
100% Decision Coverage and Structure Coverage of the written code. 
4.6 Validation of the Requirements 
The validation of the requirements has been approached by review and inspection, 
and by the development of a simple prototype Java SE program that simulated the 
various proposed components of the system and depicted their interaction.  
The developed prototype (Figure 41) did not represent the actual communication 
modes and protocols, as it comprised of simple Java classes under the same package. 
The Engine Interface Software and the gas turbine were simulated with the Engine 
class, which received switch and throttle position input.  For each throttle position 
value it included a predefined value of RPM, EGT, Fuel Flow, with normal distribution 
randomness. It returned indication to the control software for these 3 parameters. The 
Troubleshoot class and InputNominals() class were parts of the system that simulated 
the check of the engine parameters and imposed an automatic shut down if certain 
values were exceeded. The check referred to EGT and RPM against nominal values for 
each throttle position. Class Troubleshoot received nominal values from 
InputNominals() class, ambient conditions from Ambient class and measured 
parameters from the EngineDemo() class. Consequently it corrected the parameters to 
ISASL and checked for exceedance, in which case it conveyed Boolean variables to 
EngineDemo() class. Action was taken once the input values exceeded the value of 2 
standard deviations of the read parameter at the current throttle setting. Finally, the 
EngineDemo class was the main coordinator of the interaction between the other 
classes and represented the Engine Interface to the user. All the aforementioned 
classes were sub components of the Engine Operation Control System. 
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Figure 41 – Context model of the prototype program  
4.7 Results – Discussion 
The general risk assessment of the project revealed several vulnerabilities. These could 
be caused by external factors such as main power supply and network connectivity. 
The minimal cut sets (Appendix B, Section B.1.5) from the FTA results for the first top 
event (total loss of control) showed that individual event A (loss of power supply) 
formed a minimal cut set on its own (Equation 2), thus implying a high degree of effect 
on the top event. The failure of the junction switch (G) was also evident in many 
minimal cut sets of 2 events. Also, the different types of Internet threats (C, D, E, F, K, 
L) - although each one individually did not form a major invocation factor for the top 
event – were responsible for the formation of 8 additional cut sets likely to trigger the 
top event. Even the insider attack event (L) posed a threat to the system (present in 2 
cut sets) and although not highly likely, it required consideration. 
Po = A+GB+GC+GD+GE+GF+GK+GL+GH+IJB+IJC+IJD+IJE+IJF+IJK+IJL+IJH  
Equation 2 – Boolean analysis for top event “Total loss of control” 
The deployment of the ETA based on this top revealed that the worst combination may 
cause a major damage event. 
The Boolean reduction for the second top event did not contain an individual event 
alone in a cut set (Equation 3). However, the large number of minimal cut sets (16) 
indicated a high number of combinations that could trigger the top event. 
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Miscommunication caused by camera or intercommunication system failure (G, H) was 
frequent in this series of events, along with many Internet threats.  
Po = GD+GC+GA+GB+GE+GF+GI+GJ+HC+HD+HA+HB+HE+HF+HI+HJ     
Equation 3 - Boolean analysis for top event “Erroneous command order” 
A list of all the precautions needed to be taken was demonstrated in Appendix B, 
Section B.2, based on the results of HAZOP analysis for the physical risks of the project. 
Moreover, the elements examined in the procedural HAZOP for the SRS phase 
(Appendix B, Table B-2) have all been addressed and implemented. The SRS was 
validated by thorough inspection and discussion and the requirements have been 
considered feasible. The prototype program indicated that interaction between the 
potential software and hardware elements was also feasible. 
The version of the Functional Requirements attached in Appendix A , sections A.2 - 
A.6, was finalised after conclusion of round 3. The requirements were not concrete 
from the first stage, as they would if a waterfall software process would have been 
followed. On the contrary, they were revisited after each round of the spiral process 
and modified or adapted according to findings, risk issues and alternative options 
applied during the phase. For example, initially, unsuccessful camera and intercom 
connection would not allow the program to run. This would render it very rigid – 
although safer – hence the alternative approach was to simply transmit live image and 
sound but not have it as a crucial factor, as long as there would be 2 human safety 
observers in the path of execution along with the program automations. Additionally, 
some features were suspended due to restriction of time (Data recording and retrieval) 
or simplified (network connection monitoring), with suggestions to be implemented at 
later evolution. 
The objectives were all met and the procedural risks mitigated successfully. This may 
be noticed from the successful overall outcome of the project. If an inadequate 
planning from the requirements stage had taken place, it would have affected the 
whole work negatively. The inspection of the requirements in combination with the 
programmatic representation with the designed prototype, provided a safe conclusion 
that the project was feasible and with controllable risk, as shown by the risk analysis 
and the ETA. Finally, the prototype program was utilized later on in the project and 
formed the basis upon which the General Test Harness of the system was designed. 
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5 GAS TURBINE INTERFACING 
5.1 Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology and the implementation of round 1 of the 
Spiral: the design of a program that will interact with appropriate hardware in order to 
interface the gas turbine. At this stage, interaction with the gas turbine was 
established via the ECU and the parameters available from there. Additional 
parameters were acquired at a later stage. The objectives of this round are listed in 
Table 5. 
Table 5 – Objectives of round 1 
Selection of Interfacing Hardware 
Selection of Interfacing Programming language  
Design of appropriate programs to interact with hardware and gas turbine 
Physical connection of gas turbine and interfacing hardware 
Determine Feasibility of next round 
Adequate validation and testing 
 
The Engine Interface Software (EIS) phase involves the translation of software 
commands to hardware signals to the engine and vice versa. MATLAB and LabVIEW 
programming environments were considered. The latter was selected because it offers 
a great variety of functions that ease data acquisition and signal generation with 
directly compatible hardware components, whereas MATLAB would require a special 
toolkit. LabVIEW 2011 SP1 for Windows 7 was used. LabVIEW is a drop – and drag 
design language based on programming language G, developed by National 
Instruments [100]. It includes a large variety of functions that integrate base methods 
in order to provide convenient tools for a number of functionalities, such as signal 
generation (analogue or digital), data acquisition, embedded control, control 
simulation. It also has multitasking capabilities, allowing for parallel execution of the 
various functions.  
 Two analogue signals were generated for the engine ECU: One ranging from 0 to 5 
Volts DC for the START/STOP 3 position switch and another from 0 to 5 Volts for the 
throttle knob. The readings of EGT, RPM, the status of the engine and the ECU error 
messages are transmitted in the form of serial data (RS-232). The hardware connected 
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to the engine was the NI 9174 compactDAQ unit [100] and the C series NI 9263 
analogue output (-10 to +10 Volts) module [101]. The serial data is driven into the PC 
through a serial to USB converter. 
The physical Risk Assessment was accomplished with the use of FMEA and FMECA [19]. 
This method can be used and may be applied at this stage, as the system is defined 
enough to be presented as a functional block diagram. FMECA also accounts for the 
criticality assessment of the design. HAZOP [47] was applied for the procedural risk 
assessment. The reason for this selection was that the analytical layout of HAZOP could 
provide the opportunity to address the mitigation actions directly, even for the 
procedural risks, in a similar manner when applied in physical risk analysis.  
Validation included unit testing of individual functions, inspection of the code and 
control flow testing of the complete functions. Finally, integration testing was 
accomplished after integration of the functions by reapplying the test cases previously 
identified for the control flow. Control flow testing was based on the derived control 
flow diagrams of the designed software components, which were used to define the 
appropriate test cases. The cyclomatic complexity suggested by Tom McCabe [147] 
was calculated and used as a guide to identify the independent paths of the designed 
methods, in order to create the required test cases. 
5.2 Risk Assessment 
The process has been examined for underlying procedural and physical risks. The 
physical risks were approached by FMEA and FMECA. The NI hardware components 
have known MTBF. For the electric and electronic components that do not have 
published MTBF, once they have been purchased from reliable manufacturers and 
comply with the Mil– HDBK - 217F standard, it has been assumed that they have 
similar MTBF standards. Any part that has been modified in the lab to match specific 
needs of the project has been assumed to have one level of failure frequency higher 
(Appendix B, Section B.3). 
The highest scoring physical risks reached the value of 9 (undesirable) according to 
FMECA and they involved looseness of cable connections and power supply to the 
system. For these reasons, special care has been taken to secure the wiring and the 
routing of the cables. Also, the system is protected against power loss or surge with a 
power stabiliser and at a later stage, the mains power supply monitoring was 
implemented. One of the elements of the procedural risk assessment was – amongst 
others - the consideration of cost. Hence in order to maintain the cost of the project 
low, investigation for reusable existing components (hardware or software) was 
conducted and a wide search of the market took place (Appendix B, Table B-10).  
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5.3 Analysis, Design and Implementation 
5.3.1 Software  
The EIS was designed as a LabVIEW VI with 3 main functions. The function ECUSerial 
receives the serial data transmitted from the ECU: RPM, EGT, throttle position, fuel 
pump out voltage, ECU supply voltage, error conditions of the ECU, and the status of 
the engine. The data acquired from the ECU were categorised as the Normal data set, 
the Alternate data set and the Error data set. Data are transmitted in blocks of 6 bytes 
comprising 8 bits each at a rate of 48 bytes per second. During normal operation the 
normal data set is continuously transmitted and every 3 seconds the Alternate data set 
is transmitted. Error data set is transmitted only when an error occurs. The value of 
the last byte of the block determines which set type will follow. The bytes are 
transmitted as unsigned 8 bit characters. LabVIEW reads them in as ASCII characters. 
The attributes of this function were the characteristics of the serial data transmission 
of the ECU (Figure 42). These were entered into the VISAConfigure sub function. The 
sub functions that follow read in the data as string characters (ASCII), cast them to 1 – 
dimensional arrays of unsigned characters and then index the individual elements 
according to the manufacturer’s serial transmission protocol. After appropriate 
manipulations the data are presented on the front panel of the VI. The operation 
programmatically stops if an error in the data input occurs. Thorough description is 
shown in Appendix E, Section E.1.3. 
 
Figure 42 – UML Class diagram of ECUSerial function 
The attributes of the SwitchSignal function (Figure 43) for the start/stop switch signal 
generation were: the name of the physical output channel, the minimum voltage 
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value, the maximum voltage value and the measurement unit of voltage. These were 
entered into the CreateVirtualChannelSwitch sub function which configures the signal 
at the indicated channel. The output value can be controlled by the user through a 
slider control in the SwitchVoltage sub function, where every change imposed by the 
user from the front panel is implemented through the SwitchWrite sub function. The 
sub VI ceases to operate if an error occurs, the user presses the Emergency Stop 
Button, or the serial input from the ECU is lost. A detailed description of the function is 
shown in Appendix E, Section E.1.1. 
 
Figure 43 – UML Class diagram of function SwitchSignal 
The ThrottleSignal function (Figure 44) for the throttle signal generation was designed 
almost identically with the SwitchSignal function. The attributes were entered into the 
CreateVirtualChannelThrottle sub function, which configures the signal at the indicated 
channel. The output value can be controlled by the user through a slider control in the 
ThrottleSlider sub function, where every change imposed by the user from the front 
panel is implemented through the ThrottleWrite sub function. The function ceases to 
operate if an error occurs, the user presses the Emergency Stop Button, or the serial 
input from the ECU is lost. A detailed description is shown in Appendix E, Section E.1.2. 
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Figure 44 - UML Class diagram of function ThrottleSignal 
The calibration between the throttle and the signal was based on the relationship 
observed between the existing manual throttle knob and the throttle feedback 
indicated on the Engine Data Terminal (EDT). The full active route of the knob was 
measured 225
o
. Divided in 100 intervals of 2.25
o
, the response of the throttle 
indication was observed for each incremental movement of the knob by 2.25
o
. The 
relationship was found approximately linear, with a low level of non linearity for low 
values of the knob setting that diminished after around 40% setting (Figure 45). 
Therefore, the relationship between the throttle knob and the generated signal was 
able to be considered linear with a very good approximation.   
 
Figure 45 – Relationship between the manual throttle knob and the throttle indication 
Due to the linearity between throttle knob and indication, the implemented throttle in 
the software was also assumed to have a linear relationship between the movement 
and the throttle signal generation. The maximum value of the generated signal was 
increased until the throttle indication on the EDT reached 100%. The signal value was 
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observed at 4.652 Volts. Hence, with 0 Volts corresponding to 0% throttle setting and 
4.652 Volts to 100%, the slider was configured to increase the signal value in 
increments of 0.0465 Volts, for each one of the 100 intervals of the full route (Figure 
46Figure 1).  
 
Figure 46 - Relationship between the software throttle slider and the throttle indication 
All the aforementioned designed functions were included in a single VI (EIS.vi) and 
operate in parallel mode when they are invoked. They interact when: 
• The user presses the Emergency Stop Button. Then the throttle signal is set 
to 0% and after 3 seconds delay the Switch signal VI is set to AUTO STOP 
position, allowing the engine to stop smoothly. The ECUSerial function 
continues to operate, even when the engine has been shut down. 
• An error in ECUSerial occurs. Then the other 2 functions follow the previous 
shutdown sequence. 
• An error in the signal generation functions occurs. Then the ‘TAKE MANUAL 
CONTROL’ indicator is invoked and illuminated.   
5.3.2 Hardware  
Channel C (switch channel) and channel D (throttle channel) of the ECU were branched 
by connection of Y – lead splitters, contained in the configured junction box. Each 
extension was then connected to a switch that disconnects the input signal. For each 
splitter installation, only one switch may be closed every time, allowing signal input 
either from the PC or from the manual control box. Simultaneous signals 
counterbalance the voltage hence there is no input to the ECU channels. One branch of 
each extension was routed to the manual control box of the engine. The other branch 
was routed to the NI 9263 module, ports 0 and 2 for the positive (+) wires, and ports 1 
and 3 for the neutral. The module was installed in slot 1 of cDAQ – 9174 data 
acquisition unit which in turn was connected to the PC via USB (Figure 47). 
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Similarly, the Telemetry output of the ECU was branched in the junction box and one 
branch was routed to the existing Engine Data Terminal (EDT) and the other to the PC 
port COM3, via a serial to USB converter cable. No switch intervenes in this circuit, 
allowing the monitoring of the ECU output both at the EDT and the PC simultaneously 
(Figure 47).      
 
Figure 47 – Wiring diagram of the hardware connection to the ECU 
5.4 Validation 
SwitchSignal and ThrottleSignal functions validation was accomplished as shown: 
• LabVIEW Unit Test Framework (UTF). Values were imported from the front panel 
of the sub VIs and checked for correct expected values at the designated 
indicators.  
• Signal measurement. The analogue DC output was physically measured with an 
oscilloscope.  
• ECU indications in LabVIEW were compared to the EDT indications simultaneously, 
when the engine battery was in ON position.    
ECUSerial individual validation: 
• Unit testing by implementation of serial loopback test. The function VI included a 
Write sub function which, when enabled, allowed the user to enter data in the 
form transmitted from the ECU and check whether they were read as expected. 
The transmission and reception was achieved by connecting pins 2 and 3 of the 
serial port of the computer.  
• ECU indications in LabVIEW were compared to the EDT indications simultaneously, 
when the engine battery was in ON position.    
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• ECU indications in LabVIEW were compared to the EDT indications simultaneously, 
with the engine.  
The validation of messages that are not transmitted under normal operation 
conditions was achieved by simulation with the loopback approach. Consequently, 
control flow testing was accomplished for the 3 designed functions (Appendix C, 
Section C.1). 
Integration testing of the 3 functions into EIS.vi reapplied the previous testing 
procedures: 
• ECU indications in LabVIEW were compared to the EDT indications 
simultaneously, with the engine.  
• Serial Loopback test was applied to simulate all the cases where error messages 
are transmitted, as this was not possible during normal operation. 
Control flow testing of the integration is shown in Appendix C, Section C.1.4.   
5.5 Results – Discussion 
The individual function testing has produced successful 100% statement and decision 
coverage. The integration testing which took place at fully operational conditions of 
the engine produced 100% statement and decision coverage of the EIS as well. 
Function ECUSerial was inevitably complex with a cyclomatic complexity VG = 20, 
which was much higher than the conventional limit of 10. The reason was that it had to 
encounter every different ECU response and create a corresponding message. Albeit 
this complexity, it has been possible to derive the required test cases. 
The throttle indication was tested both from the LabVIEW interface and the manual 
throttle knob. The settings were changed from 0% to 100%, first from the interface 
and then from the knob. The feedback indication from the ECU was observed from 
both, the LabVIEW interface and from the EDT simultaneously. The results showed that 
the interface slider incremental setting variation had totally matched the knob 
incremental setting variation. Consequently, the engine was initially started from 
LabVIEW and operated all the way up to 100% throttle by increments of 5%. Then the 
throttle was reduced by 20% at each step down to 0% (idle), increased again to 100% 
by 20% and reduced in one step to 0%. Transition to manual operation control 
followed and all the previous sequence was repeated. Finally, transition to PC control 
was re-established and the engine was shut down by pressing the Emergency 
Shutdown button. During the previous manipulations, the readings of LabVIEW and 
EDT were monitored and the results were plotted in graphs for comparison (Figure 48, 
Figure 49). 
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(a)         (b) 
 
 
(c)         (d) 
 
  
 (e)                       (f) 
Figure 48 – RPM indication 
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 (a)      (b) 
        
(c)                  (d) 
          
(e)                          (f) 
Figure 49 – EGT indication 
The results showed 100% match of the RPM indication. The EGT was nearly 100% 
matched (deviation below 1%) and the only deviation between the EDT and LabVIEW 
was due to the representation difference, as on LabVIEW EGT was depicted with 
double precision whilst on the EDT as an integer (Figure 50.a). Negligible deviation 
(below 1%) was also observed at the fuel pump output voltage, where the difference 
occurred in second and third decimal digits, again due to the numerical representation 
and different accuracy settings between LabVIEW and the EDT (Figure 50.b). The 
throttle indication was 100% matched and also the ECU supply voltage was identical. 
The indications in LabVIEW responded rapidly to the throttle manipulation, either 
manually or from LabVIEW without any noticeable latency between the EDT and the 
PC.  
 77 
 
 
    (a) 
 
    (b) 
Figure 50 - Deviation between indications of LabVIEW and EDT during manual and LabVIEW 
operation  
It was also observed that the throttle reached 100% setting at around 4.7 Volts DC 
signal, rather than 5.0 Volts as expected. However, as long as the settings generated 
from LabVIEW match the settings generated from the manual control box, this 
deviation was considered acceptable. Besides, it had been mentioned by the 
Manufacturer that the signal values were approximate. This was attributed to the 
nature of analogue signal, whereas with digital signal values signal generation would 
be precise. Finally, at the day of the final validation test of the EIS, the manual throttle 
regulator was able to reach only 96% throttle setting. This fact did not affect the 
overall test.  
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A function not included in the design was the remote operation of the battery switch 
of the engine. This was a simple 2 position switch that can easily be replaced at any 
time with a relay switch, accepting a signal from the EIS. The EIS will need to be 
modified to include an additional signal generation function. However, to simulate this 
operation, a battery toggle switch was placed in the operation interface, representing 
a Boolean parameter in the program, which if not selected it will not allow the other 
functions of the system will not operate. This feature has been carried along the next 
phases of the program as well.  
As a conclusion, at this point an independent application for a standalone computer 
was completed, with an ergonomic operation panel. Controls were placed left, 
indications in the centre of the panel, with EGT and RPM most noticeable, and 
warnings and status on the right Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51 – Stand alone application Operation Panel  
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6 ENGINE OPERATION CONTROL SOFTWARE 
This chapter describes the methodology and implementation of round 2 of the Spiral 
process. It discusses about the core program – Engine Operation Control Software 
(EOCS) design and interaction with the Engine Interface Software (EIS). By the end of 
this phase, a basic LAN version was able to run but yet not completed and safe as 
required. 
6.1 Methodology 
The EOCS was broken down to 2 basic software sub components: the EIS Interface 
(EISI) and the Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS). The objectives of this 
round are listed in Table 6  
 Table 6 – Objectives of round 2 
Design other language program and invoke EIS  
Establish connection between EIS and designed program on the same computer 
Exchange data between EIS and local program 
Determine position of the Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS) 
Design the MEOCS 
Establish connection between local program and MEOCS and exchange data 
Design integration testing harness 
 
6.1.1 Approach to the software modules design 
The EOCS modules were written in Java SE, JDK 7u17, despite the security issue that 
had occurred in 2012 for JDK versions earlier than 7u10. The reasons for this selection 
were: Java has great capabilities to design graphical user interfaces, multitasking 
applications and very efficient procedural functions within LAN [114]. Another very 
powerful feature of Java is garbage collection. This is an automatic memory 
management process, where memory used by objects is de-allocated by the program 
when they are no longer needed. Java determines implicitly if an object is no longer 
needed when it has no more live references to it [23], [118]. Garbage collection 
prevents continuously increasing memory consumption - known as memory leak - 
where objects are constantly stored but cannot be accessed. This feature is a great 
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advantage over C++, although that C++ would communicate easier with native 
language programs in any operating system.  
Primarily, the EISI needed to invoke the EIS thus a Java program invoking a LabVIEW 
program. Building a DLL or an .exe file was not an important difference in LabVIEW but 
their invocation was different. Once a DLL file is loaded, the program will hang until 
completion of the DLL program. To overcome this obstacle, the DLL must be loaded on 
a dedicated thread (multitasking). The other option was execution of a Process object 
in Java. By implementing the execution of a Process, the Java program does not hang 
until the execution of the child program is completed. Instead, it continues executing 
the subsequent statements. However, the child program (.exe file) must be shut down 
explicitly, unlike the DLL approach. In this project, invocation of the EIS takes place by 
executing a LabVIEW .exe file as a Process object. When the parent program is closed, 
the child program will be closed explicitly.   
After invocation, it is essential to establish an interface to connect the EISI and the EIS 
for bidirectional handling of data. The TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) protocol of 
the Transport layer acts as the main mean for transmission under HTTP and FTP. 
However, UDP (User Datagram Protocol) may be preferred in some cases instead of 
TCP. TCP attempts to provide a reliable connection [74] and requires acknowledgment 
between sender and recipient. The shortcoming of this protocol is that it implements 
slower communications compared to UDP [74]. On the contrary, UDP does not apply 
acknowledgement but requires less overhead and can implement faster 
communications compared to TCP. It is used by application layer protocols such as RTP 
which transmits and receives real time data, including voice or image [74]. Data order 
and quality is not guaranteed upon delivery and require additional manual 
implementation from the developer. TCP was selected in order to reduce additional 
catering to ensure the exchanged data quality. 
One of the objectives of this round was the determination of the position of the 
MEOCS software module. EISI, EIS and ACAS need to be installed on the computer 
directly connected the gas turbine and the hardware. The MEOCS can be installed 
either on the same computer or on a remote one. Local installation may result in a 
very high CPU usage of the host computer, as it already requires considerable memory 
consumption to run the LabVIEW components. Separate installation of the MEOCS 
would imply the existence of inevitable latency present at the physical layer, which 
comprises of the wiring within the network and the interacting computers, as 
discussed in section 3.8.3. 
Wherever GUI’s are instantiated, the Singleton design pattern according to Gamma et. 
al. [49] was applied. The Factory design pattern was applied for the configuration of 
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the engine data to be transmitted to the next tiers. For this to be accomplished, the 
data configuration follows the guidelines of a Java interface, the concrete 
implementation of which will vary for different gas turbines.  
The program was also investigated for the latency of the command to reach the EISI, 
after reception from the user interface end, with the conduction of a simple 
comparative experiment [97]. Time was measured by implementing the nanoTime() 
function of Java System object, which returns the current value of the most precise 
available system timer, in nanoseconds [115]. Elapsed time until the response from the 
EISI was measured, and it was assumed that the time for the command to arrive at EISI 
was half of the total elapsed time. Box plots were designed to depict the results [97]. 
6.1.2 General test harness 
As indicated by the last objective of the current round, in parallel with the 
implementation of the core software modules, the General Test Harness (GTH) was 
designed, in order to be used for integration testing of the components. This was also 
built with Java SE JDK 7u17. This program simulates the operation of the EIS and the 
gas turbine integrated. It is invoked identically and it implements the same protocols 
of data transmission to the EOCS. The nominal values of the engine parameters were 
established after experimental sampling with the gas turbine running throughout the 
whole throttle range. RPM and EGT were corrected to ISASL conditions and the 
standard variation of the parameters were determined with the analysis of the 
variance of a single factor, as described by Montgomery [97] (throttle setting was 
considered to be the single factor). Only 13 full throttle cycles were conducted, as the 
gas turbine had a short time interval remaining until overhaul. 
6.1.3 Validation methodology 
Validation included unit testing of individual functions with JUnit [52], inspection of the 
code and control flow testing of complete functions. Integration testing was 
accomplished after integration of the individual functions and the use of the GTH. 
Control flow testing was applied during the integration testing, based on the derived 
control flow diagrams of the designed software components and the cyclomatic 
complexity suggested by Tom McCabe [147], in order to identify independent paths of 
execution. 
6.2 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment of this stage was accomplished with HAZOP. Only procedural risks 
were considered, as this round has not introduced anything that would imply the 
necessity for further physical risk assessment (Table B-11). 
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The risk assessment addressed amongst others, the clarity of the objectives, 
identification of software dependencies, and proper installation of the components. 
These observations directed to the interfaces between the currently introduced 
components (MEOCS and EISI) and the EIS, and also the location of the new 
components. The latter had to be considered, in order to optimise performance and 
flexibility. However, for a LAN application, the two components should be separately 
installed. On the contrary, for a web version, they could be either located together or 
separately. Hence the optimum solution was to design an interaction of MEOCS and 
EISI with Java RMI, allowing provisions for both options – remote or local installation - 
without the necessity for any modifications. 
6.3 Analysis, Design and Implementation 
Description of the design and implementation of this round was considered in four 
sections: one for the EIS adaptation, one for each module of the EOCS and one for the 
test harness (Figure 52). 
  
Figure 52 – Context model of EOCS and correlation with EIS 
6.3.1 EIS adaptation 
The EIS was configured with a TCP server to accept commands and a TCP socket to 
send the engine output data to the EOCS. Additionally, a new function was added to 
notify the remote user about the status of the system. This included the following 
messages: 
• SYSTEM OK 
• SYSTEM NOT READY 
• NO SERIAL INPUT 
• SWITCH SIGNAL ERROR 
• THROTTLE SIGNAL ERROR 
• SWITCH SIGNAL ERROR; SERIAL INPUT ERROR 
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• SWITCH SIGNAL ERROR; THROTTLE INPUT ERROR 
• SWITCH SIGNAL ERROR; THROTTLE SIGNAL ERROR; SERIAL INPUT ERROR 
The final output of the EISI towards EOCS was configured prior to transmission. The 
data were grouped into 4 main categories: system status, engine status, engine 
warnings and engine indications. They leave the EIS after a trivial configuration into 
double numbers of 6 digits, placed into specific order. They are then converted into a 
String variable from LabVIEW and sent to Java. Standardised configuration takes place 
in EOCS. As for the commands, they end up in the EIS as a String that is cast into an 
array of double variables. The first 6 digits of the string represent a flag number 
indicating to which control the command corresponds. The last 6 digits represent the 
new value of the desired control.   
6.3.2 EIS Interface  
This is a two package Java program interacting with the EIS. Upon start it instantiates 
an RMIServer() class object. This is the RMI server awaiting connection. All the other 
objects are instantiated after connection with the RMI client. The program was 
designed for multithread operation, with one thread dedicated to commands 
transmission (class ClientEIS) and another to engine data reception (class ServerEIS).  
The containing classes override the run() method of interface Runnable() and include 
appropriate TCP sockets and server sockets to communicate the data (Figure 53). 
 Once the engine data are received from the EISI, they are checked for correctness. If a 
corrupted set of data is received, it is replaced by a default correction value 
momentarily, preventing any Input/Output exceptions to occur. Consequently, via TCP 
connection sockets, they are transmitted to the next tier, which is the MEOCS (Main 
Engine Operation Control Software), after further configuration, as indicated by the 
MessageConfiguration() interface. The implementation of the configuration takes 
place in the class MessageImplementation(), where each group of information is 
flagged appropriately and so are the engine indications individually (Figure 54). As for 
the command input, after being received from the buffered reader of the EISI, it is 
checked for correctness and then sent towards EIS in the finalized form (Figure 53). 
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Figure 53 – UML Class diagram of EISI 
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Figure 54 – Gas turbine output message format 
6.3.3 MEOCS 
This module has been designed including an RMI client in order to bind to the RMI 
server which consequently invokes the EISI (Figure 55). 
 
 
Figure 55 – System RMI invocation sequence 
When the MEOCS client is disconnected, the EISI shuts down. Thus Java Shutdown 
hooks have been attached in the EISI so that upon closure to destroy the child process 
of the EIS, preventing the gas turbine from running unattended. The RMI clients and 
servers on each side are closed and the connection is released and available for the 
next user. The RMI server is restarted form an independent program, which monitors 
the operation through a handshaking TCP connection, in a new JVM instance. Also, a 
very simple LabVIEW VI (SignalClosure.vi) was designed on the EIS side, which is 
invoked by a shutdown hook upon closure, to reset the signals sent to the engine: 
throttle to 0% position and switch to auto stop position after 3 seconds delay. This 
feature will always shut down the engine safely after the remote user quits the client 
abruptly (Figure 56). 
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Figure 56 - System closure sequence 
At this stage, the MEOCS was designed as client with a Java GUI to represent the 
engine operation panel. The class that instantiates the GUI has been designed to 
adhere to the Singleton pattern, preventing multiple instantiation. That was 
accomplished by implementation of a private constructor and instantiation of an 
instance of the class object only if it is null (i.e. the GUI has not been previously 
instantiated) (Appendix E, Section E.4.15). It was designed for multithread 
configuration, with a dedicated thread for engine data reception (class 
MessageReceiver) and another for command transmission (class CommandSender). 
These classes both implement the Runnable Interface (Figure 57). 
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Figure 57 – UML Class diagram of MEOCS 
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The engine data output upon reception are configured in Java list arrays and maps, 
after being identified from their accompanying flags. That is how the GUI recognises 
them and assigns the appropriate values to the correct fields. The operation panel has 
been designed ergonomically and with clarity to prevent user confusion and misuse. 
The controls were situated on the left side of the panel, the main indications on the 
centre and the secondary engine indications along with ambient conditions were 
located on the right side. The caution panel was placed on the top of the panel whilst 
the emergency exit button on the bottom (Figure 58). 
  
Figure 58 – MEOCS GUI 
It was very important to ensure the solidarity of the operator during the engine run. To 
achieve that, an additional handshaking TCP connection was introduced between the 
MEOCS client and the EISI RMI server. The connection is closed right after the RMI 
binding and reopened only after closure, when the RMI server has been reset. Hence, 
when the GUI is loaded, no other user can access it. 
6.3.4 The General Test Harness 
This was developed primarily as a tool for integration testing of the various modules 
and also for the final validation tests of the final system. It was not intended to 
simulate the thermodynamic processes of the engine and simulate its performance. 
Thus, the data included were derived from experimental runs, as described earlier in 
this chapter. Also, the architectural design was not of such importance for this 
program, although the Singleton pattern was also applied to prevent multiple 
instantiation of the GUI. The layout was simple and it was based on the prototype 
program developed in round 0. 
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It maintained the same communication protocols as the EIS and transmits the engine 
output data using the configuration established in the EIS as well. It was designed to 
perform multithread operations, with one thread running the GUI and accepting the 
command input from the EISI, and the other to transmit the engine data back to the 
EISI, always according to the switch and throttle settings. It transmits constantly, 
similarly to the transmission rate of the engine and the EIS integration (Figure 59). 
 
 
Figure 59 – UML Class diagram of the General Test Harness 
The functionality was configured to allow for the following: 
• Implant system status errors 
• Implant engine ECU errors 
• Implant RPM and/or EGT exceedance 
•  Implant mains power supply loss 
All the above conditions can be cleared by the user and were considered to match all 
the possible outcomes from the original engine and the EIS. The indication fields of the 
harness include the actual EDT indication fields and all the messages that were also 
added to the MEOCS GUI (Figure 60). 
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Figure 60 – General test harness GUI 
6.4 Validation 
Unit testing was applied wherever possible. Methods with explicit return values were 
tested with JUnit generated test harnesses. Methods which required TCP connection 
were unit tested with the use of self-designed test harness, specifically one acting as a 
TCP client and another as a TCP server. There were also several methods which were 
only possible to be tested during integration of the methods and the engagement of 
the General Test Harness, due to dependencies on other elements. Such methods 
were the main functions, methods attaching shutdown hooks or void methods writing 
to text fields and areas. The constructors were tested by observation of the 
instantiated objects. The unit test coverage of the involved modules is shown in Table 
7.   
Table 7 – Unit testing of EOCS modules 
Module Total methods JUnit Self-designed 
test harnesses 
Integration tested 
EISI 18 8 2 8 
MEOCS 15 2 2 11 
Gen. Test Harness 10 4 3 3 
 
 After integration of the functions and the completion of the General Test Harness, the 
EISI and the MEOCS underwent control flow testing individually, with the test cases 
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defined with the estimation of the cyclomatic complexity, based on the derived control 
flow diagrams (Appendix C, Sections C.2.1- C.2.2). Consequently, the integration 
testing followed, where the EISI and MEOCS were integrated and operated against the 
General Test Harness, using all the previously derived test cases. Finally, the same test 
cases were also applied with the EIS and the actual gas turbine engaged.  
 
However, in order to obtain 100% decision coverage, the reception and presentation 
of all the possible engine and system outputs should be verified as well, although the 
individual methods for these functions were thoroughly tested during the preceding 
unit testing. For this reason, all tests applied during the EIS validation (Appendix C, 
Section C.1) were reapplied. Tests not possible to be simulated with the real engine 
(ECU warnings, system messages and exceedance values) were recreated with the help 
of the General Test Harness.  
 
Additionally, as throttle settings ranged from 0 to 100, the possible engine output 
would vary enormously. Hence during the validation runs of the gas turbine the 
operation was divided into groups of throttle setting values: throttle 0%, throttle 20%, 
throttle 40%, throttle 60%, throttle 80%, throttle 100% (partition testing). Boundary 
testing was also conducted for the following indications of the engines, in order to 
verify that the value depicted on the MEOCS GUI was expected and equal to those on 
the EIS panel and the engine EDT: 
- Throttle feedback 
- EGT readings 
- RPM readings 
- Fuel Pump Voltage 
- Supply Voltage 
6.5 Results – Discussion 
The objectives of this round were accomplished and successful interaction between 
Java and LabVIEW programs was established. The initial approach considered building 
the EIS in a LabVIEW DLL that would be loaded in a dedicated thread from the Java 
EISI, with the application of JNA. During the software process, the operating system of 
the connection PC was upgraded to Windows 7 64 bit and Java 64 bit was installed. As 
a result, the DLL could not be loaded, as it was built in 32 bit representation. It was 
then considered to upgrade LabVIEW from 2011 32 bit to 2012 64 bit, but research in 
the website and forums of National Instruments revealed that even with a 64 bit 
version of LabVIEW, the included VISA modules could only be built in a 32 bit DLL, 
which could not be loaded by Java 64 bit runtime.  Although a 32 bit version of Java 
could be installed, it was decided to make an approach which would be more 
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compatible for 64 bit versions of Java and LabVIEW, with the least effects to the 
already designed modules.  Thus, the EIS was built in an exe file and was executed as a 
Process object by Java. Since no data was required to be passed to the DLL during the 
invocation, this concept performed sufficiently. The only drawback was the fact that 
the child process needed to be destroyed explicitly when the EISI was closed. This was 
obtained with the attachment of a shutdown hook that destroys the EIS child 
application upon closure of the parent program.  
The inadequate recognition of the dependencies between the software components as 
an identified risk was avoided and appropriate communication was established 
between them.  There were no implications that would give rise to the cost of the 
project, as also indicated by the risk assessment of the phase. 
It was attempted to achieve the highest possible coverage of designed methods with 
JUnit, although this was not totally accomplished, as shown in Table 7. It was inevitable 
due to the inclusion of sockets exchanging information constantly, or other 
specificities, such as shutdown hooks. However, self-designed test harness contributed 
to overcome the problem. Moreover, after completion of the General Test Harness, it 
was possible for all methods to be validated, even if unit testing could not be applied 
without dependent programs engaged.     
The validation of each module was thorough and 100 % statement and decision 
coverage was obtained, guided by the control flow diagrams of the developed 
software modules. The cyclomatic complexity of each module - derived from the 
control flow diagrams after integration of the comprising methods - had a value of 10 
or less (Table 8), which is conventionally considered as the maximum desired value, in 
order to retain complexity of designed code under control. 
Table 8 – Cyclomatic complexity of designed software modules  
Module 
Cyclomatic complexity 
EISI 
7 
MEOCS 
10 
General Test Harness 
6 
 
Although several individual methods in the EISI and the GTH had high cyclomatic 
complexity values (due to switch conditions with many potential values, as a result of 
the engine and system output messages), these were treated as black boxes in the 
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final control flow diagrams. Their potential outcomes had all been exhaustively tested 
during the unit testing phase. 
The analysis for possible memory leaks for EISI and MEOCS has shown that after initial 
high objects creation, the surviving generations stabilised, as shown by the profiling 
tool of Netbeans, which was applied. The initial escalation was caused after the RMI 
invocation of the relevant Threads. The programs were executed for a period of time 
near an hour in order to observe memory consumption. The EISI object creation 
escalated upon start but later on stabilised (Figure 61). The heap size allocated was 
observed to be around 150 MB, also stable during runtime (Figure 62). The MEOCS also 
showed an escalation of surviving generations, as the GUI and continuous updating of 
text fields and areas causes object generation. However, it was stabilised after a while 
and the garbage collection functioned satisfactory at default settings (Figure 63).  The 
heap size and usage also appeared stable (Figure 64). Initially observed high numbers 
and increasing rate of surviving generations were reduced by setting String and other 
objects to null values, after their use in While loops. Null objects are more likely to be 
collected during regular garbage collection, rather than remaining as surviving 
generations. It can also be observed by the profiling graphs that the time spent in 
garbage collection – purple line - (Figure 61, Figure 63) was very low, preventing 
performance degradation (the JVM ceases other functions while performing garbage 
collection). 
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Figure 61 – EISI surviving generations 
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Figure 62 – EISI heap size and usage 
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Figure 63 – MEOCS surviving generations 
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Figure 64 – MEOCS heap size and usage  
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The estimation of the command latency experiment was conducted from 3 different 
computers: the local PC connected to the engine and two other buildings of the 
University campus, located approximately 1 and 1.5 kilometres away from the test 
house where the gas turbine was installed, within the same LAN. The latency from the 
local PC was negligible (less than 0.5 ms). For the other two locations, the data showed 
dispersion around 0.2 sec. There was no noticeable difference between the two 
locations, or even during the different time slots that the measurements were taken 
(Figure 65, Figure 66, Figure 67). 
  
Figure 65 – Box plot of command latency for time slot 09:00 – 10:00 
 
 
Figure 66 - Box plot of command latency for time slot 13:00 – 14:00 
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Figure 67 - Box plot of command latency for time slot 15:00 – 16:00 
The latency was inevitable, due to physical impedance of the network. However, it was 
noticeable and action for prevention of potential undesirable conditions was regarded 
as necessary. This issue was addressed in chapter 8.   
The final element to be discussed for this round was the configuration of the engine 
output. This was obtained by the implementation of several methods, each one of 
which receives the EIS output and identifies the appropriate values in the expected 
order. The implementation of these methods must not be concrete if other engines 
were also installed in the system. That is why they were defined in an interface as 
abstract methods. The method definitions will remain generic but their concrete 
implementation will be unique for each type of gas turbine included. The generic 
capabilities and prospective of the project will be discussed in chapter 10.   
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7 ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
This chapter describes the approach and implementation of round 3 of the Spiral 
process. It presents additional functionality to the system, in order to render it safer 
and friendlier to the user. By the end of this phase, a completed LAN prototype was 
available. 
7.1 Methodology 
The methodology applied in chapter 7 was guided from the objectives, shown in Table 
9. 
Table 9 – Objectives of round 3 
Addition of live camera image – examination of intercom capability 
Design of a reliable Trouble Shooting System on gas turbine side computer 
Acquisition of  fuel flow, mains supply voltage, ambient temperature and ambient pressure  
Installation of  additional warning and safety features on the engine side 
Completion of a fully functional LAN prototype 
 
7.1.1 Ambient parameters and mains power supply – Live image 
The live camera image was captured by a simple web camera with the use of JavaCV  
[56], an open source API which allows the implementation of openCV, in Java 
environment. Opencv is written in optimized C/C++ and it was designed for 
computational efficiency, with a strong focus on real-time applications [76]. UDP 
protocol was used for the transmission of the image through the network, in order to 
obtain fast transmission. UDP is often used 
for video, as it preferred to have a few packets missing or 
out-of-order rather than to have the full stream with lag and delay. Accuracy of the 
transmission was not crucial for the live image. The loss of a few frames would not 
have any impact as if a command was corrupted hence no additional work for the 
transmission quality was required. The differences between UDP and TCP were 
discussed thoroughly in section 3.7.5. 
Ambient temperature acquisition was obtained with a K type thermocouple connected 
to a NI 9265 C series module. Ambient pressure was acquired with the use of a digital 
barometer, transmitting the information through a serial bus to the connected PC. To 
monitor the mains power supply, an AC to AC transformer was used in order to reduce 
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the alternating voltage from ±240 Volts to ±9 Volts, rendering it safe to be captured by 
the NI 9215 C series module for analogue input. The processing of the ambient and 
power supply data takes place in the ACAS software module, which was implemented 
with LabVIEW and VISA (Virtual Instrument Software Architecture) – these tools were 
also used for the EIS module. For the ambient pressure reading, a reusable LabVIEW VI 
previously designed by the Department for an older project was used. The value 
acquired from this VI is then provided to the ACAS.  
Fuel flow acquisition was obtained with the installation of a Floscan 201-A6 fuel flow 
transducer. It requires a 12 Volts DC power source, provided by an AC to DC converter 
and it is suitable for small flows (0.3 – 3 GPH). The signal produced by the flow 
transducer is an open collector transistor output. The sensor will pull down to 1.0 volt 
with a 10-15k ohm pull up resistor installed [43]. According to the recommended by 
the manufacturer connection (Figure 68), the resistor was installed between the flow 
signal and the additional 5 Volts DC input, provided by an available wire from the ECU 
of the engine. The K factor was used as provided by the manufacturer without further 
calibration. Fuel flow was not considered as one of the highest priority readings of the 
gas turbine for safety purposes, thus accuracy was not very important at this stage. 
The processing of the fuel flow transducer output was obtained with a NI 9401 C series 
module for digital input/output. 
  
Figure 68 – Suggested connection of Floscan 201-A6 Fuel Flow Transducer [43]   
7.1.2 Peripheral features 
An addition to the existing EDT (Engine Data Terminal) was designed to accommodate 
a panel with warning and indication lights. Appropriate LED bulbs must illuminate to 
indicate to the observer of the EDT that the system is ready to function remotely. In 
case of an error signal produced from the connected computer, warning lights are 
illuminated, notifying the on-site observer to take manual control. Manual control can 
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easily be achieved by changing the position of the signal switches and the notification 
switch on the junction box. The latter informs the remote user that manual control has 
been established. In the extreme situation of a malfunction of the junction box, the 
wiring of the signal channels of the ECU can easily be detached from the junction box 
and re-connected with the original plugs of the manual control box wiring. Extra safety 
is provided with the installation of a master switch at the position of the adjacent 
computer observer station. The switch should receive a signal from the EIS and if 
closed, it returns an indication of the signal, allowing for remote commands to be 
accepted. Thus, if the gas turbine is under service or not in a situation to run, the 
master switch set to off position will prevent any remote operation, even if the 
application is running.  
All the above signals were analogue DC voltage signals generated by the NI 9263 C 
series module already installed and the circuitry was configured with gauge 22 wiring. 
The LED bulbs were installed in series, in accordance with LED installation instructions 
[86]. 
7.1.3 The Trouble Shooting System module (TSS) 
One of the most vital components of the whole application is the Trouble Shooting 
System (TSS). This system monitors the gas turbine and transmits messages to the user 
about relative or absolute limits exceedance. In the case of the Olympus engine, the 
critical parameters monitored are the RPM, the EGT and the mains power supply to 
the connected computer and hardware.  Relative limits were derived from the gas 
turbine control systems application of alarm rules, in order to detect values above 
certain limits during the engine operation. The rules applied in this case were the 
Western Electric rules, which are the most common in aviation control systems [78]. 
According to these, there are four unusual patterns of data points (Figure 69): 
• The Instability pattern 
• The mixture pattern 
• The stratification pattern 
• The trend pattern 
 
More details of the above patterns can be found in section 3.2.4. The most noticeable 
for the present study was the instability pattern, which means the existence of data 
points outside the control limits. They divide the control band into three zones where 
zone A is the area enclosed within 2 and 3 standard deviations (σ) of the parameter, 
zone B, which stays between 1σ and 2σ and C, between ±1σ. A guideline for the alarm 
generation is any point beyond zone A, 2 out of three consecutive points in zone A, 3 
out of five consecutive points in zone B and 8 consecutive points on the same side of 
the centreline [78].  
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Figure 69 – The Western Rules [78] 
The nominal values of RPM and EGT were established after experimental sampling 
with the gas turbine running throughout the whole throttle range. The standard 
variation of EGT and RPM were determined by variation of the throttle setting from 0% 
to 100%, in increments of 1%. Corrections for ISASL conditions were applied to the 
readings prior to processing [145]. Selected sample sets from the obtained data for 
each throttle setting were examined for distribution fitness. The fitness test was 
accomplished with the application of ExpertFit, a distribution fitting software tool 
developed by Averill M. Law and Associates. ExpertFit can determine automatically 
and accurately which of 40 included probability distributions best describe the given 
data [85].  
As observed from the general risk analysis, the loss of power supply to the computer at 
the gas turbine side, poses one of the main hazard threats to the system. This situation 
was mitigated with 2 actions: installation of a power stabiliser and by monitoring the 
mains power output. The stabiliser ensures the prevention of abrupt shut down in the 
occasion of power loss and allows for stable operation for a few minutes. In addition, 
by monitoring the power supply, the end user receives an indication on his caution 
panel and if he does not quit the application within 3 minutes, the engine will be shut 
down by the TSS and the program closed automatically.  
The TSS was written in Java SE, enabling easy data exchange with the other Java 
modules. Java Exchanger objects were used to synchronise the TSS and the EISI, so that 
they can exchange the necessary data: ambient and peripheral information towards 
EISI, and RPM with EGT towards TSS. TSS was also investigated for memory leaks and 
memory consumption with the use of the Netbeans IDE profiler. After integration with 
the EISI and MEOCS, the latter two were re-examined for potential memory leaks.  
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Moreover, all Java modules were inspected for several quality metrics, as described by 
Oliveira et. al. (2008) [109]. The parameters considered included:  
• Number of Lines of Code (LOC) 
• Average instability (I), which implies encapsulation, reusability and 
maintainability 
• Lack of Cohesion of Methods (LOCM) that indicates cohesion in classes 
• Average Cyclomatic complexity (VG), Nested Block Depth (NBD) and Weighted 
Methods per Class (WMC), which indicate complexity of the designed modules 
7.1.4 Validation Methodology 
Validation included unit testing of individual functions (JUnit) [52], inspection of the 
code, and control flow testing of complete functions. LabVIEW test Unit Framework 
was applied for unit testing of the LabVIEW functions and the physical signals were 
also measured with an oscilloscope. Integration testing was accomplished after 
integration of the individual modules, with the use of the General Test Harness. 
Control flow testing was applied during the integration testing, based on the derived 
control flow diagrams of the designed software components and the cyclomatic 
complexity suggested by Tom McCabe [147]. 
7.2 Risk Assessment 
The process has been examined for underlying procedural and physical risks. The 
physical risks were analysed by FMEA and FMECA. The NI hardware components had a 
given MTBF. For the electric and electronic components that did not have published 
MTBF, once they had been purchased from reliable manufacturers and complied with 
the Mil– HDBK - 217F standard, it has been assumed that they had similar MTBF 
standards. Any part that had been modified in the lab to match specific needs of the 
project has been assumed to have failure frequency of one level higher (Appendix B, 
Section B.5). 
The highest scoring physical risks reached the value of 9 (undesirable) according to 
FMECA and they involved looseness of cable connections and power supply to the 
individual components of the system. For these reasons, special care has been taken to 
secure the added wiring and devices. The issue of power supply instability or loss has 
been addressed in chapter 5. However, after completion of the TSS, the related risks 
will be alleviated.  
The cost was also addressed in the procedural risk assessment, as this round involved 
the procurement of new devices and components which could easily introduce cost 
that would deviate from the initial budget. In order to prevent unnecessary cost 
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increase, thorough market research took place along with very careful study of 
available specifications and manuals (Appendix B, Section B.5.1). Other elements 
considered were validation, software dependencies and hardware selection. The 
necessity for detailed physical risk assessment was also identified in the procedural risk 
assessment, leading to the FMECA analysis described previously. 
7.3 Analysis, Design and Implementation 
This section describes the analysis, design and implementation of all the hardware and 
software modules addressed by the objectives, the System Requirements and risk 
analysis for round 3 of the Spiral process. Sub – section 7.3.1 presents the Ambient 
Conditions Acquisition Software (ACAS) design and all the additional functions in the 
Engine Interface Software (EIS), sub - section 7.3.2 describes the peripheral hardware 
installation and sub - section 7.3.3 outlines the Troubleshooting System (TSS) design 
and implementation. 
7.3.1 The ACAS – Addition of other modules and adaptations  
Six new functions were implemented in the EIS.vi, 2 from which perform 
independently. One of them (UtilitiesSignalGeneration) generates the 10 Volts DC that 
is supplied to the two newly introduced switches: the PC observer’s position switch 
and the manual acknowledgement switch at the junction box. When these two 
switches are closed, signal feedback is provided to the newly introduced function 
(UtilitiesAcquisitionSignal). The first switch returns a 10 Volts DC signal to indicate that 
the observer is in position hence the system is ready. The latter switch returns 10 Volts 
DC signal to indicate manual control reception from the engine EDT observer. The 
UtilitiesAcquisitionSignal function is associated with the TCPClient function, which 
receives the signal acquired from the PC observer’s On/Off switch. The Manual 
Acknowledgment switch signal is supplied to another newly introduced function 
(ControlStatusConfiguration), which configures the final message that contains the 
status of the operation control. This can either be NORMAL, LOCAL OVERRIDE, 
MANUAL or MANUAL & LOCAL OVERRIDE. Additionally, the signal provided to the 
Manual Acknowledgement switch is branched to provide a permanent indication of 
signal existence to the EDT panel.  
A function for the generation of 10 Volts DC signal to the new indication LED’s on the 
EDT was also implemented (EDTWarning function). It generates a signal when an error 
of the command signals or the engine output reading function occurs. Finally, the 
FuelFlowRead function was implemented to read the pulse signal generated by the 
fuel flow transducer. After the signal is interpreted it is provided to the TCPClient to be 
transmitted through the network. Variables between the functions are passed via local 
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variables and are assumed public in the UML approach of the class diagrams design 
(Figure 71). 
The other group of LabVIEW components that was implemented included 3 VI’s (Figure 
72). The Barometer.vi and GeneralRead/Write.vi were reusable modules previously 
designed by the Department. AmbientSensing.vi was newly implemented (Figure 72). 
The latter includes the MainsSupplyInterfaceSystem (MSIS) function, which reads the 
AC voltage signal from the mains supply, after conversion to ±9 Volts DC. In order to 
disregard any temporary instabilities of the system, this function generates an alert 
only if the absolute value of the input signal has been under 1 Volt for more than 3 
seconds. The alert is then provided to the TCPClient function to be transmitted.  
A technical difficulty was discovered at this point, as the DAQ unit could not create 
analogue input virtual channels in different VI’s. Hence, in order to overcome the 
problem without additional equipment, the mains supply signal was acquired from the 
UtilitiesAcquisitionSignal function of the EIS.vi and provided to the MSIS via a LabVIEW 
global variable, in order to adhere to the concept that ambient and peripheral data 
should be acquired by the same LabVIEW VI and transmitted within the same package 
of data.  
The AmbientTemperatureSignal function acquires the signal of the K – Type 
thermocouple through a dedicated hardware module (NI 9265 module) and virtual 
channel. The ambient pressure is acquired by the reusable Barometer.VI and 
GeneralRead/Write.VI and provided as serial input directly to the PC via a USB 
interface. Consequently, temperature and pressure are passed via local variables to 
the TCPClient for transmission (Figure 72). The complete Hierarchy of the LabVIEW 
components included in the application is shown in Figure 70. 
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Figure 70 – LabVIEW projects and VI hierarchy 
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Figure 71 – The EIS and ACAS association UML class diagram 
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Figure 72 – The ACAS UML class diagram  
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A new thread was added to the EIS Interface (EISI), dedicated to the camera invocation 
and capturing of live image. The thread is instantiated upon the call to class 
CamCapture(), which has imported several JavaCV libraries. The web cam is started 
with a call to the the start() method of the grabber attribute, which essentially is an 
openCV FrameGrabber object. The grab() method of the grabber is then called to save 
the image as an openCV IplImage object. Consequently, the image is converted to an 
array of bytes and transferred on top of UDP to the Main Engine Operation Control 
Software (MEOCS).  
Accordingly, another thread was added to the MEOCS side for the reception of the live 
video stream. It is instantiated upon the call to the class CamReception(), which has 
imported the JavaCV library as well. The image is continuously received within a while 
loop as an array of bytes and consequently converted to a BufferedImage object 
before being displayed on a JavaCV Canvas frame. The Canvas frame has been 
configured to always remain on top of other open windows in the user’s screen, 
ensuring that the live video stream from the engine is always visible. The exit upon 
closure feature of the frame has been disabled so that it may only close when the main 
window of the user interface is closed. 
Two classes were added in the main package of the EISI to accommodate the data 
reception from the TSS. The TSSCall class loads the static central method of the TSS 
and runs on a dedicated thread. The other class introduced - also in a dedicated thread 
- was the TSSInfo(), which receives the data from the TSS on top of TCP and transmits 
them to the MEOCS. Moreover, an additional TCP socket was introduced in the existing 
ServerEIS() class to transmit the critical parameters to the TSS (Figure 73). The MEOCS 
was accordingly configured with a dedicated thread instantiated by one added class, to 
receive the TSS info and depict the information on the user interface. The user 
interface is only instantiated once and then passed as an argument to the two threads 
which receive data from the EISI, in order for the appropriate fields to be updated 
constantly (Figure 74). 
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Figure 73 – EISI configured for the TSS and camera reception 
  
Figure 74 - MEOCS configured for the TSS and camera reception 
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7.3.2 Peripheral Hardware 
The peripheral hardware installed consisted of the following: 
- An AC to AC converter connected directly to the NI 9215 module, providing ±9 
Volts AC voltage. 
- A 12 Volts AC to DC converter, connected directly to the Fuel flow transducer 
- Two on/off switches: one for the PC observer’s position to enable or disable 
command signals generation from the system and the other for the engine EDT 
observer to indicate that he has recovered manual control of the engine 
operation. 
- Four 3mm LED indicators. Two of them must illuminate when the system is 
running. Upon signal loss, either due to power supply loss, cDAQ failure or 
computer failure, they will cease to illuminate. The other two are illuminated 
upon signal error, which implies that the engine observer must switch to 
manual control. The LED pairs were installed in series with a resistor of 270 
Ohm connected after each one of them, as indicated by the LED wizard (Figure 
75). The Wiring diagram of the LED’s, the switches and the NI modules is shown 
in Figure 76. 
 
 
Figure 75 – LED configuration 
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Figure 76 – Peripherals wiring diagram 
7.3.3  The Troubleshooting System (TSS) 
The TSS architecture was derived from a simple use case analysis with the interacting 
modules as actors. The analysis was based on the required data exchange between the 
already existing software components and the TSS (Figure 78). A prerequisite for the 
successful interaction was the existence of a text file that includes the nominal values 
of the critical parameters for each throttle setting, ranging from 0% to 100%. The data 
was collected and then assessed with ExpertFit for distribution fitness (Figure 77). Six 
data sets were selected for each group: EGT and RPM. The groups were defined by the 
throttle setting value from 0% to 100% in increments of 20%: 0%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% 
and 100%. The distributions with the best fitness results were Normal and Weibull. 
However, Normal was by far mostly present (Table 10 – ExpertFit distribution fitness 
evaluation) hence the average values and standard deviations can safely be estimated 
by the following formulae: 
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Equation 4 – Average value of statistical sample 
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Equation 5 – Standard deviation of statistical sample 
  
  
Figure 77 – Example of ExpertFit distribution fitting evaluation 
Table 10 – ExpertFit distribution fitness evaluation 
Distributions  Best Fitting Results  Evaluation Result 
Normal 9 Good 
Weibull 2 Good 
Weibull & Normal (equal 
score) 
1 Good 
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Figure 78 – Use case analysis for the design of the TSS 
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The basic concept of the TSS was to receive ambient and peripheral data directly from 
the ACAS, correct the critical parameters (RPM and EGT) to ISASL conditions (Equation 
6, Equation 7, Equation 8 , Equation 9), compare them to the stored nominal values 
and then send the information to the EISI (Figure 79).  
 =  !"#  
Equation 6 – Referred temperature 
$ = %!&&."(  
Equation 7 – Referred pressure 
)*+,-. = )*+/$  
Equation 8 – EGT corrected (referred) to ISASL 
012,-. = 012/√$  
Equation 9 – RPM corrected (referred) to ISASL 
The necessary data from the engine output is provided to the TSS from the EISI, which 
is connected with the EIS. To obtain the data exchange, the EISI needed to include a 
new TCP server to receive data from the TSS and a TCP client to transmit information 
to the TSS. Respectively, the TSS required a TCP client and server to connect with the 
EISI, along with an appropriate TCP server to interact with the ACAS (Figure 80).  
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Figure 79 – Logic of the TSS 
 
 
Figure 80 – Sequence diagram of the TSS and the surrounding software modules 
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The proposed design for the TSS included a central class with a static function, which is 
invoked by the EISI and consequently initiates the sequence of the TSS, a class to read 
in the nominal data file, a thread to receive the ambient and peripherals data, a thread 
to receive engine data, a thread to connect directly to the EIS and shutdown the 
engine upon emergency detection, and finally, a class that constantly performs the 
conversion and inspection of the engine data (Figure 81). 
 
Figure 81 – Context model of the TSS 
 
When the mainTSS() static function of the class TSSCentral() is invoked, the threads are 
instantiated and the Exchanger objects are passed in order to have the necessary data 
available in all 3 threads. The class CompareInput(), which conducts the correction and 
comparison of the critical parameters, has all the Exchangers from the other threads 
passed to it as well hence has all the available data whenever required (Figure 82).  
The run() method of this class contains a while loop which constantly obtains data 
from the engine and ambient input threads. The class initially has the boolean 
compareMode attribute initialised to false. After that, the loop determines if the 
program has entered a compare mode. The check is done periodically every 10 
seconds and it is based on the throttle position. If the throttle setting hasn’t changed 
from the last position then the compareMode attribute is set to true. However, in 
order to encounter the extreme case of a rapid throttle movement ad repositioning at 
the previous setting, the throttle values are stored in an array after each loop and 
every 10 seconds the average value of the array elements is inspected. If the average 
converges to the previous throttle setting value, only then the program enters 
compare mode.  
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There are dedicated methods that check the relative exceedance of RPM, EGT, and 
also the absolute exceedance of RPM and EGT. The latter are checked continuously, 
even if the program is not in compare mode.  If a relative exceedance is observed the 
corresponding indication illuminates on the user interface of the MEOCS. When the 
throttle is moved by the user, the caution message ceases to exist, until the program 
re-enters compare mode and performs the checks again.  If a relative exceedance 
caution persists for 3 minutes without any command from the user, the 
AutomaticEngineShutdown() class is supplied with an alarm boolean and commences 
the safe shutdown of the engine and the program. 
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Figure 82 – UML class diagram of the TSS 
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Upon an absolute exceedance, the user is simply notified with a warning, and the 
automatic shutdown is informed appropriately to start the shutdown sequence. The 
mains power supply is also monitored continuously, even if the TSS is not in compare 
mode. The system allows 3 minutes to the user after power loss detection. If no action 
is taken, the AutomaticEngineShutdown() class is informed appropriately to start the 
shutdown sequence. The individual parameter check methods for relative exceedance 
are supplied with the nominal values List and each time they calculate the theta (θ) 
and delta (δ) parameters, based on the real time values of ambient temperature and 
pressure, and correct the received engine readings to ISASL conditions. After the 
completion of the checks, the ambient and peripherals information is transmitted via 
TCP to the EISI and consequently to the MEOCS to be displayed on the user interface. 
Finally, the TSS was inspected for memory leaks and with all the modules integrated, 
the system was inspected for CPU usage and memory consumption: firstly with all the 
components installed on the same PC and secondly with the MEOCS installed 
separately.     
7.4 Validation 
Unit testing was applied to as many designed methods as possible. Methods with 
explicit return values were tested with JUnit generated test harnesses. The LabVIEW 
functions were tested with LabVIEW UTF where possible. The functions that produced 
physical signals were measured with the use of an oscilloscope.  
Methods which required TCP connection were unit tested with the use of self-designed 
test harnesses: one acting as a TCP client and another as a TCP server. There were also 
several methods that were only possible to be tested during integration of the 
methods and the engagement of the General Test Harness, due to dependencies on 
other elements. Such methods were main functions, those attaching shutdown hooks 
or void methods writing to text fields and areas. The constructors were tested by 
observation of the instantiated objects. The unit test coverage of the involved modules 
is shown in Table 11.   
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Table 11 – Unit testing of designed modules 
Module Total methods LabVIEW 
UTF 
JUnit Self-designed 
test harnesses 
Integration 
tested 
EIS  6 5 N/A 1 0 
ACAS 4 2 N/A 1 2 
TSS 18 N/A 12 1 5 
 
 After integration of the methods of the TSS, control flow testing followed, based on 
the test cases defined with the assistance of the estimated cyclomatic complexity (VG). 
This was derived from appropriate control flow diagrams (Appendix C, Section C.2.3). 
The integrated control flow diagram of the TSS (Figure C-9) was relatively complicated 
with a high cyclomatic complexity. However, it was possible to reduce it to three 
simplified sections with cyclomatic complexity values less than 10 and perform 
successful testing for each section (Figure C-9, Figure C-10). With regards to the 
Introduced LabVIEW functions, 2 of them contained a more complicated logic and 
required to be validated also by control flow testing (Figure C-5, Figure C-6).  
 
Consequently, the integration testing followed, where the EISI, the MEOCS and the TSS 
were tested with the engagement of the General Test Harness (GTH) and all the 
previous control flow testing was repeated. Additionally, all the possible messages 
were recreated in the GTH and were successfully captured from the TSS and 
transmitted to the MEOCS user interface. The final stage of the validation of this round 
took place with the integration of all the LabVIEW components and the engine was 
operated as in the previous rounds. Special care was taken to perform boundary 
testing at the extreme throttle settings (0 and 100 %) and also at the absolute RPM 
and EGT limits definition. 
  
7.5 Results – Discussion 
The objectives of this round were accomplished with satisfactory results. The live 
camera image was captured and transmitted successfully, although the JNI call to the 
openCV native functions occasionally may have caused the JVM to crash during 
shutdown, leaving the signal resetting VI running. Although the exact native functions 
exceptions were able to be identified from the error logs of the JVM, no specific cause 
 120 
was able to be determined. Hence a safe and feasible solution to this problem would 
be to implement an additional LabVIEW function in this VI that would contain an 
invoke node and a Close Reference Express VI to shutdown if remained open. 
Additionally, the restarting of the RMI Server could be initiated with an external Java 
program, thus even if the current JVM instance has experienced an exception, the RMI 
Server will restart in a new JVM instance. The latter suggestion was implemented at 
the next round of the software process.  
The TSS was completed and all the required functionality was implemented. It was 
successfully integrated with the other existing and newly designed components. There 
was a high percentage of unit testing of the implemented methods (Table 12) and the 
control flow testing of the various modules achieved 100% statement and decision 
coverage during validation (Appendix C, Sections C.1.5, C.1.6 and C.2.3). The 
cyclomatic complexity of the modules was maintained in satisfactory levels, allowing 
for adequate testing (Table 12).   
Table 12 – Cyclomatic complexity of introduced modules 
Module Cyclomatic complexity 
TSS part A 6 
TSS part B 5 
TSS mains supply check 3 
EISI control status 
configuration 
4 
MSIS 3 
 
The operation of the TSS was based on the derived nominal values of RPM and EGT. In 
future development, the CompareInput() class of TSS can be modified and adhere to 
an Abstract Factory Pattern, which will enable even more parameters to be monitored 
as critical, in the case of inclusion of different types of gas turbines. In this case, the 
class will be based on a standard interface (similarly as in EISI) and the concrete 
implementation will depend on the specific engine requirements. Currently the 
nominal values of the critical parameters were established after 13 samplings from 
actual engine runs. As it was a long process and the engine had a low MTBO, the 
project had to rely on this small sample. However, the sample was proven satisfactory, 
as no unnecessary or false warnings were created during the real engine runs. The 
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validation of the TSS for detection of parameter exceedance was obtained through the 
GTH and successfully covered all the possible outcomes of the system. The corrected 
values of the statistical sample followed the expected trend throughout the operating 
envelope of the Olympus gas turbine (Figure 83, Figure 84). 
 
Figure 83 – Trend of RPM nominal values 
 
Figure 84 – Trend of EGT nominal values 
The fuel flow signal was captured but as no reference values were available, great 
accuracy was not achieved. However, fuel flow was not regarded as a critical 
parameter and the main objective at this stage was to demonstrate the capability of 
capturing the signal and transmitting it through the network, rather than accurate 
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representation of the fuel flow. Improved accuracy could be achieved by calibration of 
the transducer after completion of this project. All the other functions applied, 
operated as expected.  
The TSS was investigated for potential memory leaks and revealed a stable operation 
with a low number of surviving generations that stabilised within the first 5 minutes of 
operation (Figure 85).  Accordingly the heap size and usage were maintained at low 
levels with a stabilising trend (Figure 86). 
Surviving 
generations
(___) 
Relative 
time
In GC (%)
(___) 
Elapsed  time (min)
Figure 85 – TSS surviving generations  
 
Heap Size (MB)
Used Heap (MB)
Elapsed  time (min)
Figure 86 – TSS Heap size and usage 
The MEOCS and the EISI were re-examined for memory leaks at this round again, as 
interaction with the TSS was added along with live camera image streaming. The 
MEOCS without camera input engaged, presented an increasing trend during the first 
20 minutes until a sufficient garbage collection was performed by the JVM. From there 
on the operation was firmly stable with a very low population of surviving generations 
(Figure 87) and a heap size around 100 MB (Figure 88). The concentration of surviving 
object generations was caused mainly from increasing numbers of char [ ] objects, due 
to calls to Swing objects and Scanner objects. The former were involved with the user 
 123 
interface constant update and the latter with the mapping of the incoming 
information, in order for them to be recognized from the appropriate fields of the user 
interface.   
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Figure 87  - MEOCS surviving generations – without live camera image 
 
Heap Size (MB)
Used Heap (MB)
Elapsed  time (min)
 
Figure 88 – MEOCS Heap size and usage – without live camera image 
With the live camera stream engaged, the system appeared to stabilise earlier with 
around 60 surviving generations (Figure 89) and a noticeably higher heap (Figure 90), 
due to the continuous reception of byte arrays to display the image. In this case, byte 
[] objects were those with the highest surviving generations. However, it has been 
concluded that this high number has triggered the garbage collection earlier than in 
the previous configuration without the camera image, as there was a greater rate of 
unused objects concentration, resulting to earlier stabilisation of the operation.   
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Figure 89 - MEOCS surviving generations – with live camera image 
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Figure 90 – MEOCS Heap size and usage – with live camera image 
Similar observations were obtained from the EISI memory leak analysis. Without the 
camera engaged, the stabilisation occurred after nearly 25 minutes before 
continuation at a constant number of around 40 surviving generations (Figure 92) and 
a heap size of just above 50 MB (Figure 91).    
Heap Size (MB)
Used Heap (MB)
Elapsed  time (min)
Figure 91 – EISI Heap size and usage – without live camera image 
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Figure 92 - EISI surviving generations – without live camera image 
As with the MEOCS, the EISI with the live image thread engaged, stabilised much 
earlier (less than 10 minutes) than the configuration without the image (Figure 93). 
The heap size was accordingly stable, albeit a noticeably higher value (around 400 MB) 
(Figure 94).   
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Figure 93 - EISI surviving generations – with live camera image 
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Figure 94  - EISI Heap size and usage – with live camera image 
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The 3 Java SE modules were also analysed with respect to quality metrics, in order to 
investigate clarity, maintainability and reusability. The separation in individual 
specialised software components has prevented excessive number of Lines of Code 
(LOC) in one program. The core modules, EISI and MEOCS, had an abstractness of 0.54, 
indicating good extensibility and reusability. An average instability (I) around 0.25 was 
also observed in the EISI and the MEOCS, and 0.0 in TSS, implying   encapsulation, 
reusability and maintainability. It can also be seen that Lack of Cohesion of Methods 
(LOCM) was maintained relatively low, in an attempt to achieve cohesion in the 
designed classes. Avoidance of complexity was also obtained, indicating understanding 
of the applied algorithm. Evidence of low complexity - this is related to nested 
execution and element granularity and hierarchy - is the low average values of 
Cyclomatic complexity (VG), Nested Block Depth (NBD) and Weighted Methods per 
Class (WMC) (Table 13). 
Table 13 – Code quality metrics 
      LOC NCP A I LOCM NBD VG WMC 
EISI 1172 5 0.55 0.25 0.33 0 1 93 
TSS 963 6 0 0 0.6 2 2 70 
MEOCS 1243 4 0.5 0.25 0.32 0 1 61 
 
According to the defined architecture, the EISI and the TSS must be installed in the 
same PC. The MEOCS however may be installed either together with the other 2 
modules, or individually at a different computer within the LAN, without any 
modifications. The CPU usage when MEOCS and EISI were located separately was 
significantly reduced and maintained below 50% (Figure 95). The memory 
consumption was also significantly less. The option for separation is only available for 
the Internet version of the system, as discussed in the chapters to follow. For the LAN 
version, MEOCS must be installed separately. 
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Figure 95 - CPU usage and memory consumption on engine side PC 
At this stage, a fully functional LAN prototype was completed (Figure 96). The user 
interface represents a complete operation panel of the Olympus gas turbine. The 
controls were situated on the left side of the panel, the main indications on the centre 
and the secondary engine indications along with ambient conditions were located on 
the right side. The caution panel was placed on the top of the panel whilst the 
emergency exit button on the bottom. The live image was displayed on the right top 
corner but can be moved around or resized by the user at anytime. The live image 
window cannot be closed on its own. It closes only when the whole panel is closed 
(Figure 97).  
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Figure 96 – Configuration of LAN version 
 
 
Figure 97 - LAN user Interface 
The application was designed in a manner to ensure that only one user is allowed to 
run the engine at a time. This was obtained with the implementation of a hand shaking 
TCP connection between the RMI server and client. The connection remains open and 
awaiting for connection while the server is activated. It closes after connection with 
the client has been established and will re-open again after closure of the application, 
when the RMI server has been refreshed. The RMI refresh is an automated process. 
When the application is closed abruptly, the program ensures that the signals from the 
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EIS to the ECU have been set to values that enable the safe shut down of the gas 
turbine.  
There are two ways to run the engine within the LAN: 
• To have an installed MEOCS .jar executable file on any PC connected to the LAN 
(either wire or wireless) 
• To have a MEOCS .jar executable file in a shared folder within the network 
No modifications or adaptations of the MEOCS are required for either of the 
aforementioned options. Additionally, if the MEOCS is not installed locally with the 
EISI, it may be used as a switchboard to connect different gas turbines installed in 
different test houses, regardless if they are operating simultaneously. The 
prerequisites for this configuration are that each test house should have dedicated 
ports for RMI and data communication, and a dedicated operation panel. For the 
latter, the class which instantiates the panel, must be adapted to adhere to the 
Prototype pattern, where the required objects are created by using a prototypical 
instance and creating new objects by copying the prototype [49]. 
The physical risks (Appendix B, Section B.5.2) were sufficiently identified and the issue 
of supply power disruption has been significantly mitigated with the implementation 
of the TSS and the MSIS that monitor the mains power supply and take appropriate 
action when required. All of the hardware requirements were correctly identified and 
no complications or delays occurred due to wrong equipment procurement. Similarly, 
the software dependencies were satisfied and the validation was thorough and 
successful, indicating the problems discussed earlier in this section. Finally, the cost 
was maintained within the budget, as the equipment was purchased after careful 
market research and also by using existing components wherever that was possible. 
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8 INTERNET IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter describes the methodology and implementation of round 4 of the Spiral 
process. The main purpose of this round was to render the application accessible 
through the Internet. Basic Internet tools such as HTML, JavaScript, web services and 
AJAX were combined herein, in order to obtain a fully functional and reliable real – 
time remote application.  
8.1 Methodology 
The methodology applied in chapter 8 was guided from the objectives, shown in Table 
14. 
Table 14 – Objectives of round 4 
Create a host website 
Create a web application(s) to contain the application 
Design appropriate API to invoke the methods of MEOCS  
Design a safe and ergonomic user interface for web browsers 
Secure the application 
Deliver live video and/or sound stream through the Internet 
 
8.1.1 Host website and web applications 
There were several approaches considered for the implementation of the containing 
web application. These were narrowed down to PHP and Java EE frameworks. PHP is a 
scripting language for web development [138] and provides capabilities for dynamic 
web pages. The drawback of this option would be the requirement for installation of a 
Java bridge in several points to interface the Java SE methods of the MEOCS with PHP. 
A Java bridge is a Java EE application that requires a Java EE or Servlet to run [133]). 
Although this approach would exploit the capabilities of PHP, it would add serious 
complexity to the whole application, thus rendering it more prone to bugs and faults. 
The other potential option was the Java EE frameworks. At this point two sub options 
were considered and discussed: The Java Servlet and Java Server Pages (JSP), and the 
JSF frameworks. The Java Servlet and Java Server Pages (JSP) frameworks are by 
default enabled when a Java EE web application is created in Netbeans IDE.  According 
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to Oracle [115], Servlets are the Java platform technology of choice for extending and 
enhancing web servers. They provide a component-based, platform-independent 
method for building web-based applications, without the performance limitations of 
CGI programs. Also, Servlets have access to the entire family of Java APIs, including the 
JDBC API to access enterprise databases and can also access a library of HTTP-specific 
calls, receiving all the benefits of the mature Java language, including portability, 
performance, reusability, and crash protection.  
JSP technology is an extension of the Servlet technology created to support authoring 
of HTML and XML pages and allow easier combination of fixed or static template data 
with dynamic content.  
The second sub option if using Java EE, was the JavaServer Faces (JSF) framework. This 
is a server-side component framework for building Java technology-based web 
applications and consists of [111]: 
• An API for representing components and managing their state; handling events, 
server-side validation and data conversion; defining page navigation; 
supporting internationalization and accessibility; and providing extensibility for 
all these features 
• Tag libraries for adding components to web pages and for connecting 
components to server-side objects 
From the developer’s point of view, JSF consists of a collection of XHTML pages [153] 
and one or more JSF managed beans [66], which are lightweight container-managed 
objects (Plain-Old-Java-Objects, known as POJO) with minimal requirements. They 
support a small set of basic services, such as resource injection, lifecycle callbacks and 
interceptors [111]. Heffelfinger (2011) considers the JSF as ‘a standard web application 
framework available in any Java EE compliant application server’ but he does not imply 
that JSP, Servlet or other Java EE compatible frameworks are obsolete. JSF is regarded 
as a tool to provide easy steps for developers to create web pages, compared to the 
JSP and Servlet based Java EE frameworks. 
Eventually, after trial attempts, which will be discussed in section 8.5 of this chapter, 
Java EE 6 with JSP 2.1 and Servlet technology as the supporting framework were 
selected for the development of the required web application. Glassfish 3.1.2.2 was 
chosen as the web server to contain the applications. This is the Java EE reference 
application server and it is by default embedded in the Netbeans IDE [66]. The Apache 
Tomcat [136] would be another option. Tomcat is a Servlet container that implements 
the part of Java EE that specifically relates to 
Servlets, thus additional parts of Java EE would need to be loaded 
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from external libraries. Using Glassfish reduced the work load of setting up the 
application. The implementation of the various web pages was selected to be 
accomplished with HTML 4.0.1 [154], as some older browser editions do not support 
all the HTML 5 features [155]. 
8.1.2 Service invocation 
After the rejection of the JSF option, the web service approach was studied, with two 
sub options available: WSDL web services or RESTful web services. WSDL web services 
(also known as XML web services) require an interface described in a machine-
processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the web service in 
a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages, typically conveyed using 
HTTP with an XML serialization in conjunction with other web-related standards [143]. 
RESTful web services do not adhere to any particular web service protocols but 
represent an architectural design of services, abstracted from HTTP 1.1, as defined by 
Fielding (2000) [40]. It was discussed in chapter 3 of this Thesis that both approaches 
have many similarities, with REST proven to be more efficient with regards to flexibility 
and control. The WSDL services introduce dependency on vendors and open source 
projects [119]. As a general conclusion, RESTful services could be applied for tactical, 
ad hoc integration over the web and WSDL services to be preferred in professional 
enterprise application integration scenarios, with a longer lifespan and advanced QoS 
requirements. 
In the current project, flexibility was required, as the perspective was to enable 
interaction with external applications in future development. Also, as continuous data 
exchange and requests would take place between the clients and the server, it would 
be beneficial to reduce the overhead required for the accomplishment of the 
transactions, resulting to reduction of the server load and response time. For these 
reasons, a RESTful approach would be appropriate. However, for increased security 
control, the WSDL approach would be more efficient. Hence it was concluded that a 
hybrid approach would be the best solution. Thus each one of the MEOCS static 
methods were mapped to a particular REST root resource that handles all the possible 
HTTP request types for that method only. Each root resource is a separate JAX – RS 
REST web service, where JAX – RS is the Java API for RESTful Web Services defined in 
JSR 311 [77]. Instead of having a fully RESTful API with each root resource contained in 
its own web application and the client in a separate one, they were all contained in the 
same web application allowing for enhanced security, which will be discussed at 
section 8.1.4. The application was not tightly committed to the proposed API, as at any 
stage it could easily be redefined in a more RESTful form and the security approach 
could be revised.     
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8.1.3 User Interface and live video transmission 
The user interface was designed to be a practical and ergonomic gas turbine operation 
panel. It has followed the guidelines applied in the LAN prototype for separation of 
functions in three major groups: controls on the left, indications on the centre (with 
the most critical on top) and cautions/warnings on the right side of the page. It was 
designed on a JSP page with the use of HTML 4.0.1 [154] and CSS. CSS (Cascading 
Styling Sheets) [156] is a style sheet language used to define how to display HTML 
pages. CSS can either be embedded in an HTML page or provided as an external file. 
Functionality to the page was added with the implementation of a corresponding 
JavaScript file. JavaScript is a scripting language used widely in contemporary web 
pages in order to add functionality and dynamic features [157]. It appeared in 
Netscape browser in 1995, and has been adopted by the ECMA a standard association 
since 1997 described by the ECMA-262 standard [33] .The control buttons and slider 
were implemented with the addition of YUI Library components and widgets. YUI is a 
JavaScript and CSS library for building interactive web applications [159], accessible 
either online or from the application server, if downloaded and installed. The buttons 
were designed with the use of YUI button widget, a mixed-module approach to 
providing a simple-to-use button that normalizes and enhances the web browser's 
default button component [160].  The throttle slider was created with the use of a YUI 
slider widget, a user interface control that allows the user to adjust values in a finite 
range along a horizontal or vertical axis. Typically, the Slider widget is used in a web 
application as a visual replacement for an input box that takes a number as input 
[161]. The indications of RPM and EGT were designed to be displayed on gauges, 
implemented with the use of gauge widgets from the Google Code Playground API’s 
[58], which are a section of the Google Charts [57]. The Google Code Playground API’s 
are also JavaScript and CSS libraries available online. 
The acquisition of the engine and system output data from the browser operation 
panel, and the commands transmission are obtained with the implementation of Ajax 
(Asynchronous JavaScript XML) requests [143]. Appropriate XMLHTTP requests are 
sent to the REST root methods in very short intervals (2 per second) asynchronously, 
and upon reception of the reply, when the page is in stable condition, the required 
fields are updated with the information, without refreshing the whole page. 
The web version of the program differs from the LAN prototype in the way the live 
camera image is captured and transmitted. A media server was installed to transmit 
the image via RTMP (Real Time Messaging Protocol), which requires constant 
streaming of the image to be available. For this particular project WOWZA media 
server version 3.5 was engaged [158], due to ease of configuration and 
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implementation, although it is not open source software. However, this can be 
replaced in the future with an open source media server, such as Red5 [59]. The 
operation panel has included an embedded flash player that receives the video stream 
and displays it. For this project Flowplayer was used, an open source JavaScript library 
player [44]. The player library has been downloaded and installed locally in the domain 
of the web application. Flowplayer is also available in HTML 5 version. 
The user can access the application through a separate Java EE web application, where 
the engine specifications are listed and access to other related information is available. 
The host web application consists of HTML 4.0.1 pages and has been designed to 
include provisions for future expansion of the application to include recorded engine 
performance data logs and operation information of various gas turbines. Finally, in 
the main web application, a training page was also created, which contains all the 
elements of the operation panel. However, it is inactive and only provides detailed 
information about the function of every element on the panel. 
8.1.4 Security of the application 
The web application was configured in a modular manner. The lowest tiers of the 
architecture are not exposed directly to the Internet, as they remain situated behind 
the firewall of the University. An apache HTTP server has been configured as a Reverse 
Proxy [135] and installed as the front end to the web applications. Virtual hosts have 
been designed to map the requests and redirect to the web applications. The virtual 
servers can be installed in the De-Militarised Zone (DMZ) of the IT Department of the 
University and accessed through the VPN tunnel. The web applications can be 
deployed in the Glassfish HTTP container behind the firewall. The application 
implements the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol for data exchange. This is a 
cryptographic protocol that provides encryption of the data flowing between the end 
parts. Additionally, the back end of the web application (glassfish side), implements a 
form-based user authentication. Although this method requires noticeable work to be 
accomplished during implementation, it provides encryption of the transmitted 
password when the page has been set up to use HTTPS (HTTP over SSL) [66], as done in 
this case.  
The Apache reverse proxy was configured to rely on OpenSSL to provide the 
cryptography engine, by using the built-in mod_ssl module of the server. However, 
during the time of writing, OpenSSL had a known vulnerability to the CVE-2014-0160 
bug (Heartbleed exploit) [137]. This is a serious weakness in the OpenSSL 
cryptographic software library, which allows stealing the information protected, under 
normal conditions, by the SSL/TLS encryption used to secure the Internet [148]. An 
alternative recommendation would be to configure the reverse proxy to provide 
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cryptography with the use of Network Security Services (NSS). NSS is available under 
the Mozilla Public License and supports SSL V2 and 3 [99]. This would be achievable 
with the use of mod_nss, which is an SSL provider derived from the mod_ssl module 
for the Apache web server and uses the Network Security Services (NSS) libraries [38]. 
The configuration of the web applications with a front and back end also enables 
flexibility of the program, as the main HTTP container (Glassfish) can be hosted 
anywhere conveniently and secured, behind the firewall. Hence the application can be 
easily accessible for administrators, provided that it is installed in physically secured 
areas, preventing any potential insider attacks.  
8.1.5 Validation methodology 
The Validation process included unit testing of individual JavaScript functions (with 
QUnit), inspection of the code, and control flow testing of complete functions (both 
JavaScript and root resources integrated with the MEOCS). QUnit is a JavaScript unit 
testing framework, used by the jQuery, jQuery UI and jQuery Mobile projects. It is 
capable of testing any generic JavaScript code. QUnit was originally developed by John 
Resig as part of jQuery and in 2008 it received its own home, name and API 
documentation, allowing for generic JavaScript unit testing. It depended on jQuery 
unitl 2009, when it was modified to run completely standalone [79]. 
Wherever unit testing with QUnit was not feasible, the introduced functions were 
tested against the General Test Harness (GTH) with the HTTP container (Glassfish) 
running, by adding them incrementally on the developed web pages. Every new 
function was integrated after being successfully unit tested. Integration testing was 
accomplished after combination of the individual modules and with the engagement of 
the GTH. Control flow testing was applied during the integration testing, based on the 
derived control flow diagrams of the designed software components and the 
calculated cyclomatic complexity [147]. 
8.2 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment of this round was accomplished with HAZOP. Mainly procedural risks 
were considered, as this round has not introduced hardware that would imply the 
necessity for further physical risk assessment, apart from the instability of Internet 
connection. The power supply loss risk has been mitigated in the previous rounds 
hence it was not addressed again. The Internet security was a combined risk addressed 
at round 0 and security has been identified as one of the objectives of the current 
round. Hence Internet security was not readdressed in this round’s risk assessment 
(Appendix B, Section B.6). 
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The risk assessment addresses the clarity of the objectives and also the identification 
of software dependencies. Cost Analysis was always considered and the new element 
added in this round was the risk of disruption of Internet connection. 
8.3 Analysis, Design and Implementation 
This section describes the newly added components along with the adaptations to the 
existing ones. The first sub-section presents a proposal for the hosting website. The 
next section describes the necessary final adaptations made to the EISI and the MEOCS 
to enable their interaction with the web application and the root resources. 
Consequently, the main web application was presented along with the user operation 
interface, concluding with several other features added to the application. 
8.3.1 The host website 
A dedicated Java EE web application was created to accommodate the host website. It 
is a simple combination of HTML pages with general information about the whole 
Internet Gas Turbine application and specific information about the Olympus gas 
turbine, which is in use. The landing index.jsp page was configured as the welcome 
page with a navigation bar to link to the other pages. The user will be able to navigate 
and find operational and performance data for the Olympus. Although these features 
have not yet been installed in the application, the pages have been designed with 
provisions to accommodate them in the future. There was a page dedicated to the 
specification of the Olympus (Figure 98), and the user can also find links to the 
operation manual and the manufacturer’s website. The same configuration will be 
maintained for other gas turbines to be added in the future (Figure 99).    
 
Figure 98 – Specification web page 
From the page of Test House 10, the user can select to visit the Olympus operation 
application. If more gas turbines are added in the future in Test House 10, the user will 
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be able to navigate to the corresponding application from this page. Similar hierarchy 
was proposed for other Test Houses to be connected to the project in the future. 
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Figure 99 – Web pages of the host website 
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8.3.2 The main web application 
The web application (InternetGasturbine) has been designed to incorporate a life cycle 
with 6 potential states, not all sequential. The initial state was assumed to be that 
when no activity is present, other than the servers ready to accept connection. The 
following state is the idle state, where the landing page has opened and the program 
awaits selection from the user to execute the engine operation application. The user 
reaches this state after he has navigated from the appropriate test house web page in 
the host website, provided that he has logged in successfully (Figure 100).      
 
Figure 100 – State machine of the web application 
If the existing state is idle, the user can then select to run the engine, hence proceed to 
state ‘run’. The transition to this state would only be possible if the engine is not 
already in use from another operator. Following the ‘run’ state, should the program 
detect a connection problem, it must transit to the ‘internal error’ state, 
programmatically. Selection of exit request on any window will result to transition to 
the initial state, as with a logout request (Figure 100).  
The web application hierarchy contains 5 main folders, from which: one contains the 
web pages, one the source packages, one the libraries, another the REST web services 
and finally one contains the generated configuration files. The web pages folder 
includes general pages and several structured folders for dedicated files (Flowplayer, 
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JavaScript files, observer files, operator files, simple user files and training pages) 
(Figure 101).  
 
Figure 101 – Hierarchy of the main web application 
The Apache reverse proxy was configured with virtual hosts to allow access of the 
application through HTTPS over SSL. With the Apache server as a front end, the 
application was then contained in Glassfish as the back end behind the firewall. The 
final architecture of the application comprised of 5 tiers, including the end remote user 
and the gas turbine with the related hardware (Figure 102). With the reverse proxy 
configuration, the proposal of this project was to install the Apache SSL virtual host in 
the DMZ of the IT Department, accessible through the VPN and the Glassfish container 
somewhere physically secured behind the firewall. The EISI, the TSS and the EIS 
modules are required to be installed in the test house computer, along with the 
camera and the media server.  
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Figure 102 – Architecture of the integrated application 
Apart from the SSL encryption and the suggestion for access through the VPN, the back 
end application has also been secured with a second layer of verification, through a 
form – based authentication by enabling a security realm. 
8.3.3 Functionality and the REST API 
The functionality of the main user interface web page was added by JavaScript 
methods and widgets. There were six YUI widgets required to create the controls of 
the engine and two Google API’s widgets for the design of the RPM and EGT gauges. 
The controls create AJAX requests to send the commands to the resource. AJAX was 
also implemented to request data output from the server side, in order to allow 
update of the involved fields only, without triggering the refresh of the whole page. 
Hence two functions were required for these tasks and additionally two more to 
update the gauge widgets. Finally, a flash player function was embedded to receive the 
live video and sound stream (Figure 103). 
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Figure 103 – Context diagram of the user interface JavaScript functions and widgets 
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For clarity, the functionality was included in a separate JavaScript file, called as an 
external script from the operation panel page. This file essentially was a JavaScript 
client for the root resources implemented to access the Java SE static methods of the 
MEOCS. In total, 6 individual requests are generated from the client during the 
lifecycle. Each request is directly mapped to a corresponding root resource (Figure 
104), which consequently calls the appropriate MEOCS static method to either change 
a local resource or retrieve it. The requests that need to alter a resource are provided 
as POST requests and those that simply retrieve one are given as GET requests (Figure 
105). The 2 data acquisition AJAX requests are transmitted programmatically every 500 
ms, invoking the data acquisition process at the engine ECU, and the peripheral 
sensors and hardware components. 
 
Figure 104 – UML class diagram of designed REST web services – No association between 
them 
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Figure 105 – Layout of the REST approach for resource retrieval 
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8.3.4 Adaptations of existing modules 
The adaptations of the Engine Operating Control System (EOCS) were located mainly in 
the MEOCS and the EISI, and also a new monitoring program was added (Figure 106). 
The monitoring program upon start opens a TCP connection and transmits a 
handshake signal to the RMI server. If the server is not running, the socket exception in 
the monitoring program will trigger a restart of the RMI server and consequently – 
before shutting down programmatically – the already existing RestartServer 
application, which in turn will restart the monitoring program (Figure 107).  
 
Figure 106 – UML class diagram of the monitoring program 
 
 
Figure 107 – Sequence diagram of the RMI server restarting process 
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There were not any serious modifications required for the EISI. A web version was 
created as a new branch in the repository. The main difference from the LAN version 
was the addition of 2 new classes and the disengagement of the Camera Capture 
Thread. The first class added (RestartInfo) runs on a dedicated thread upon start of the 
RMI server and provides a TCP communication port with the newly introduced 
monitoring program to indicate operation of the server. The second class added 
(RefreshServer) is instantiated upon the creation of the Registry instance when the 
RMI action (Figure 108) method is invoked. This class runs a thread with a TCP channel 
awaiting a closure command from the MEOCS. Upon reception of the closure 
command it unbinds the RMI Registry and initiates the shut down sequence (Figure 
108). Finally, a method for checking the throttle command for rapid input 
(throttleCheck) was added in the ClientEIS() class, after being exhaustively unit tested 
with JUnit. This feature was removed from the MEOCS where it was installed in the 
LAN prototype. 
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Figure 108 – UML class diagram of EISI web version 
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The MEOCS module had to undergo the most noticeable modifications. The Java GUI 
was disengaged and the throttle checking function was moved to the EISI. Instead of 
triggering the transmission of a command as an action event, the CommandSender() 
class now performs this task after the startCommand() static method (Figure 109) is 
called from  the corresponding root resource. As for data reception, the sent TCP 
package remains in readiness until the two appropriate static methods in classes 
TSSInfo() and MessageReceiver() are called from their corresponding root resources 
(Figure 109). The response to the respective TCP clients in the EISI triggers the 
sequence for the transmission of a new set of data output. The difference from the 
LAN prototype in these tasks is that the data is not constantly received inside while 
loops.   
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Figure 109 – UML class diagram of the MEOCS web version 
 150 
8.3.5 The operation panel web page 
The operation panel page was designed as the main interaction interface of the 
remote user with the server end. It was designed ergonomically with control, 
indications and warnings placed in 3 separate columns (Figure 110). The page was 
designed to allow the panel to be totally visible in any type of screen, without the need 
for the user to scroll down. RPM and EGT indications - as the most critical parameters - 
have been placed on top of the indications column and they are presented both in 
digital and gauge form, allowing the user to visualize the permissible operating range 
of the parameters and prevent limits exceedance. The reception of a command on the 
server side is acknowledged by the illumination of a green indication underneath the 
corresponding control widget. For the throttle, if a new setting greater than 20 % from 
the previous is selected, the command will be rejected at the server side and the 
response will trigger the illumination of a red indication light under the throttle. 
 
Figure 110 – Operation panel web page 
8.3.6  Additional Functionality 
An important feature that was added in the application was the ability to commence 
the shutdown sequence if there is a disruption or delay in the Internet connection. This 
task is triggered after timing out of the server sockets in the EISI threads for data 
reception, at the engine side. As described in the previous section, the response from 
the MEOCS server sockets triggers the sequence for the acquisition of a new set of 
data. Hence a delay in the arrival of the response (greater than 7 sec) triggers the 
timeout exception of the sockets, followed by the system shutdown. The timeout 
checks take place in 2 threads of the EISI (Figure 108). The expiration time of the 
sockets was selected without any particular guidelines other than high sensitivity 
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required for the system to prevent unattended operation of the gas turbine. A lower 
expiration time would render the system extremely sensitive causing problems in the 
start up sequence, and time greater than 10 sec was regarded as insufficiently long. 
The web application has been configured from the web.xml file to timeout in 5 
minutes rather than 30, which was the default setting for a Glassfish web application. 
Additionally, if there is no command for 3 minutes, the corresponding socket in 
ClientEIS() class of the EISI will time out, preventing the user from leaving the 
application to run unattended. Every time a server side closure exception or shutdown 
is triggered, the shutdown hooks in the EISI cater for the safe shutdown of the engine 
and reset of the system. The browser operation panel is hidden from the user and the 
AJAX requests of the page are disabled, in order to prevent non deliberate DoS to the 
remote ports engaged. These actions also take place if the browser JavaScript client 
detects that the received data are not in the expected form, or if the XMLHTTP 
response status is other than 200.       
Finally the live video stream was successfully captured and transmitted with the 
WOWZA media server to the embedded flash player of the operation panel web page. 
The video is also accompanied by sound and it is captured in a simple chat mode of the 
media server, through an ordinary web cam. The RTMP transmission was also proxied 
through the Apache reverse proxy and transmitted to the client through an HTTP 
virtual host. There has been no interference with the SSL port used for the main 
application. 
8.4 Validation 
Unit testing was applied to as many designed methods as possible. Java SE methods 
with explicit return values that were newly added were tested with JUnit generated 
test harnesses. The REST web services were individually assessed prior to integration 
by implementing simple JavaScript clients that sent the required requests. Finally, the 
created JavaScript functions were tested with the design of appropriate QUnit test 
harnesses. Methods which required TCP connection were unit tested with the use of 
self-designed test harness, specifically one acting as a TCP client and another as a TCP 
server. There were also several methods that were only possible to be tested during 
integration of the methods and the use of the General Test Harness, due to 
dependencies on other elements. The unit test coverage of the involved modules is 
shown in Table 15 (This table also includes the unit tests of the EISI and the MEOCS 
modules, which were accomplished at previous rounds).   
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Table 15 – Unit testing of designed modules 
Module Total 
methods 
QUnit JUnit Self-designed 
test harnesses 
Integration 
tested 
EISI 26 N/A 9 5 12 
MEOCS 22 N/A 3 5 14 
REST services 18 N/A 0 18 0 
Interface 
functionality 
12 4 N/A 6 2 
 
Control flow testing was then applied to the JavaScript client with the REST web 
services integrated in the web application. The testing commenced with YUI widgets 
added and tested incrementally, before adding and testing all the other JavaScript 
methods. After integration, all the control flow tests applicable to each JavaScript 
method were repeated. The test cases were defined with the estimation of the 
cyclomatic complexity, based on the derived control flow diagrams (Appendix C, 
Section C.3).  
 
The testing was initially accomplished against the GTH. After successful integration, all 
possible warning and error scenarios were recreated with the use of the GTH, before 
performing actual runs of the gas turbine. The test runs of the gas turbine followed the 
guidelines of the previous rounds tests, with incremental increase of the throttle 
settings in intervals of 20%, reduction in a similar manner and also rapid reduction and 
increase.  
8.5 Results, Discussion 
The objectives of this round were successfully accomplished despite the initial 
approach problems of the web applications. A useful host website was created, which 
is a simple design without any complicated embedded functionality. All the required 
information are available there, along with referrals and links to the gas turbine 
manufacturer, and to Cranfield University. It was designed without unnecessary effects 
and the navigation bar that links to the other pages was located centrally with self 
explanatory buttons (Figure 111). 
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Figure 111 – Welcome page of host website 
The web application that contains the MEOCS and the functionality was initially 
attempted to be designed with a JSF framework. JSF implements XHTML pages, which 
are usually recommended for presentation oriented web applications. The JSF facelets 
would be beneficial for the display of the operation panel web page, provided that the 
required functionality would be supported by the managed beans. At the early stages 
of the web application development, it was observed that it was not feasible to 
provide parameters and data to the managed beans in order to transfer them to the 
appropriate Java SE methods. For this reason, the approach was diverted to the design 
of a service oriented application with the JSP Servlet framework.  
The REST style API was designed to accept the client requests and invoke the SE 
methods. It is flexible and reduces the overhead that would be required for a WSDL or 
Servlet approach. However, there is much functionality - such as data or users filtering 
– that could still be added with introduction of new Servlets in future development. 
The simplicity of the introduced REST web services will also allow the execution of the 
server side Java SE methods from other relevant external applications, as discussed in 
Chapter 10. Although in a more REST approach it is usually common to use GET 
requests rather than POST, it was observed in this case that for data acquisition in 
Internet Explorer, the response was returned from cache with status 304, preventing 
the supply of refreshed engine and peripheral data to the Internet user. In this project 
cache was not of interest. Although this might contradict the philosophy of the HTTP 
protocol, as addressed by Fielding, the application was designed not to operate with 
data from cache. For this reason, requests that alter the status of the server side Java 
SE resources were implemented as POST requests. An alternative to this would be to 
implement GET requests with an embedded JavaScript function to add a random 
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number to the request URL, preventing response from cache. However, for simplicity, 
the POST approached was preferred. 
The interface has functioned as expected during this primary stage of testing, although 
it has shown high sensitivity to connection disruptions and to erroneous data 
reception from the server side. However, for all the observed disruptions, the system 
has responded appropriately as expected and the server is always aware about the 
status of the client (running, closure or lost connection). At this stage, a licensed media 
server was used, do to ease of configuration. This feature increased the total cost of 
the application, but it was the only element that was added to the cost increase in this 
round. In chapter 11, alternative suggestions for open source media servers are 
discussed.    
The configuration of the application to run over SSL enabled the capability of data 
encryption and in combination with the disabling of cache, the exchanged data is not 
easily available for potential hackers to obtain and decode, in order to perform a 
malicious command transfer to damage the gas turbine. The addition of the reverse 
proxy as a front end allows the main containing server to be positioned behind the 
firewall of the University, reducing the risk for port scanning and potential exploit 
attack or DoS (Figure 112 – Arrangement of front and back end servers). Moreover, the 
form based authentication of the Glassfish domain combined with the proposed access 
through the University VPN added a double level security authentication, preventing 
exposure to unauthorised users. 
 
 
Figure 112 – Arrangement of front and back end servers 
The training page that was designed was totally based on the operation panel, and the 
YUI and Google widgets. The functionality of the operation panel was omitted and 
images in the form of question marks were placed adjacently to all the page elements. 
It was based on the simple concept that should the user hovers the mouse over the 
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question mark images, the corresponding title of that image appears with detailed 
explanation of the functions of that particular element (Figure 113). 
 
Figure 113 – Training web page 
The validation of the web applications and the individual JavaScript functions was 
accomplished in 5 major web browsers and 3 different operating systems, in various 
editions (Table 16).  There was a high percentage of unit testing of the implemented 
methods (Table 15 – Unit testing of designed modules) and the control flow testing of 
the various modules achieved 100% statement and decision coverage during validation 
(12.2C.3). The cyclomatic complexity of the JavaScript modules was maintained in low 
levels, allowing for adequate testing (Table 17).  
Table 16 – Operating systems and web browsers used to test the application 
Browsers  
Operating 
Systems 
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Table 17 – Cyclomatic complexity of JavaScript methods  
Module 
Cyclomatic complexity 
YUI button functions 
5 
YUI slider functions 
5 
Peripherals read function  
4 
Engine read function 
3 
Quit function 
4 
Logout function 
3 
The main web application (InternetGasturbine) was investigated for potential memory 
leaks and revealed a stable operation with a low number of surviving generations that 
stabilised within the first minutes of operation (Figure 114).  Accordingly, the heap size 
and usage was maintained in low levels with a stabilising trend (Figure 115). The 
application was invoked several times and redeployed deliberately but maintained a 
stable population of few surviving generations of objects. 
 
Surviving 
generations
(___) 
Relative 
time
In GC (%)
(___) 
Elapsed  time (min)
 
Figure 114 – Surviving generations and garbage collection of InternetGasturbine web 
application 
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Heap Size (MB)
Used Heap (MB)
Elapsed  time (min)
 
Figure 115 – Heap size and usage of InternetGasturbine web application 
The web application and the revised Java SE modules were also analysed for quality 
metrics, in order to investigate clarity, maintainability and reusability. The separation 
in individual specialised software components has prevented excessive number of 
Lines of Code (LOC) in one program. The core modules, EISI and MEOCS had an 
abstractness of around 0.54, indicating good extensibility and reusability. An average 
instability (I) of 0.17 was also observed in EISI and MEOCS, indication of encapsulation, 
reusability and maintainability. It can also be seen that Lack of Cohesion of Methods 
(LOCM) was maintain relatively low, in an attempt to achieve cohesion in the designed 
classes. Avoidance of complexity was also achieved, indicating understanding of the 
applied algorithm. Evidence of low complexity was the low average values of 
Cyclomatic complexity (VG), Nested Block Depth (NBD) and Weighted Methods per 
Class (WMC). Abstractness was not important for the web application, as the REST web 
services were designed for retrieval of particular resources. The two last programs in 
Table 18 were simple single class applications, hence the relatively higher NBD can be 
explained, as they contained all there logic in the main method.  
Table 18 – Quality metrics of designed software components 
      LOC NCP A I LOCM NBD VG WMC 
EISI 1385 6 0.54 0.17 0.34 0 1 109 
MEOCS 1263 4 0.5 0.17 0.33 0 1 54 
WebApp 475 6 0 1 1.11 0 1 23 
RestartServer 74 1 0 0 1 2 1 4 
Monitor App 104 1 0 0 1 2 1 5 
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The provisions that were implemented with regards to the Internet connection 
disruptions have addressed one of the main elements of the risk analysis for round 4. 
The components dependencies were also considered and with the existence of 
alternative approaches, the required functionality was eventually obtained. 
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9 ACCEPTANCE VALIDATION 
This chapter describes and discusses the final round (round 5) of the Spiral software 
process, which includes the general high level validation of the integrated Internet 
application. It adheres to the principles of the Spiral approach, with definition of the 
objectives and the risk assessment of the process prior to any operation. 
9.1 Objectives – Risk Assessment 
The objectives that guided this round are shown in Table 19 
Table 19 – Objectives of round 5 
Revision and finalisation of the System Requirements 
Identification of the various states of the application 
Derivation of test cases according to the application states transition   
Conduction of high level Requirements Validation based on formal methods  
Ensure total Statement and Decision coverage testing of the application  
Conduction of a preliminary probabilistic analysis of reliability of the introduced software 
components 
 
Risk assessment of this stage was also accomplished with HAZOP, with procedural risks 
only considered. This round was not an implementation round as the previous ones 
hence there were newly introduced risk elements, regarding the validation 
methodology and approach to this process. The most noticeable risks were related to 
the validation method selection, the derivation of the proper test cases and the 
coverage of the validation. These were all issues that could occur due to the restriction 
of time, lack of experience and ambiguities of the system requirements. The 
suggestions for mitigation included revisiting and finalising of the requirements - 
according to the functionality that was eventually accomplished and to conclude which 
features should be suspended for later development. Additionally, research was 
recommended for formal validation approaches in other safety critical software 
systems and if possible, in the aviation industry as well. 
The risk assessment finally addressed the clarity of the objectives once again, along 
with the cost, which was also considered in all the previous rounds. In this round, the 
cost could have increased if a non open source software tool was selected for the 
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validation - as a result of lack of experience - or the application of a method unsuitable 
for the current project (Appendix B, Section B.7). 
9.2 Methodology 
This section was divided in two sub–sections. The first describes the methodology 
applied for the requirements and final testing procedures of the acceptance validation, 
whilst the second focuses on the methodology applied for the probabilistic analysis of 
reliability. 
9.2.1 Requirements testing and final testing methodology 
The distinction between requirements testing and final testing was based on the fact 
that the former covered the satisfaction of the system requirements whilst the latter 
tested functionalities not predicted by the system requirements, but were necessary 
to be tested in order to obtain 100% statement and decision coverage of the 
application. The term ‘final’ testing is also used by Hinderman et. al. (2007) [69]. They 
were both accomplished in parallel, integrated under the term “Acceptance 
Validation”.  
Model checking was selected for the conduction of the acceptance validation. As 
discussed in 3.5.5,   this is a formal verification technique [11] and it is commonly 
applied in critical software systems. In contrast to simulation, formal verification 
methods do not rely upon the dynamic response of the system, but perform static 
analysis on a formal mathematical representation of the system, in order to check it 
for correctness with respect to a given specification. Model checking has been gaining 
popularity in aerospace systems design and verifications the last years [4]. Gargantini 
et.al. [50] - in their work for a specification-based method for constructing a suite of 
test sequences, where a test sequence is a sequence of inputs and outputs for testing 
a software implementation – suggest that model checking may be used for the 
derivation of test cases for black – box specification testing of an application. It is a 
powerful approach for the formal verification and validation of software. It 
automatically provides complete proofs of correctness, or explains, via counter-
examples, why a system is not correct [11]. Hence it was selected due to the ability to 
depict the application with a robust mathematical representation and derive precise 
test cases, instead of relying on the accuracy of simulation approaches.  
NuSMV 2.5.0 was selected as the model checking tool for the general validation. 
NuSMV is an open source symbolic model checker branched from SMV (Symbolic 
Model Verifier). The advantage of SMV against explicit model checking according to 
Kim et. al (1999), is that the latter allows free variables to represent environmental 
inputs, instead of modelling the system environment explicitly, as required in the former [83]. 
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NuSMV has been developed jointly by FBK-IRST and by Carnegie Mellon University 
[37]. It allows for representation of synchronous and asynchronous finite state 
systems, and for the analysis of specifications expressed in Computation Tree Logic 
(CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [25]. From the discussion in 3.5.5, it was 
concluded that CTL can be highly exhaustive in path analysis, which was a priority for 
this project hence it was manly applied, apart from very few cases, where the 
investigation of a possibility transition to particular states along time was questioned.        
The generation of test cases was accomplished with an approach widely met in 
automated test case generation applications with NuSMV. An example of this 
approach can be seen in the work presented by Kadono et. al., about using the NuSMV 
Model Checker for test generation from statecharts [80] (Figure 116). In their approach 
the test cases were generated from the counterexamples produced by NuSMV, with 
regards to the failed specifications. They applied CTL with the use of three temporal 
operators: AG, AX and EF: AG holds in state s if g holds in all states along all 
computation paths starting from s.  AX holds in state s if g holds in all next states to s 
and EF holds in state s if g holds in some state along some computation path starting 
from s [80]. 
   
Figure 116 – Statechart and NuSMV program [80] 
For this project, the integrated system was assumed to be a finite UML state machine 
with the complex internal processes as black boxes, which were consequently 
modelled in individual finite state machines. All the derived state machines were used 
to define the corresponding NuSMV variables and the specifications to be tested. The 
negation of the tested specifications has driven the model checker to produce analytic 
counterexamples, from which the test cases were derived.  In this project, AG, AX and 
EX were applied for CTL. According to the NuSMV manual [25], EX holds in a state s if 
there exists a state s΄ such that a transition goes from s to s΄ and the condition is true 
in s΄. As for LTL specifications, G, F and X formulae were applied, which, according to 
the NUSMV manual, are defined as shown below: 
• G:  p is true at time t if p is true at all times t΄≥t 
• F:  p is true at time t if p is true at some time t΄≥t 
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• X:  p is true at time t if p is true at t+1  
9.2.2 Probabilistic analysis methodology 
The methodology applied for the probabilistic analysis of reliability relied on Markov 
equations, which is an approach based on a state diagram and applicable in risk 
assessment of power systems [87]. Li (2005) describes it as extremely useful for 
modelling the outage of individual components, but difficult to be applied in large 
systems. Indicatively, a system of N components of 2 states each would require 2N 
states to be modelled. A finite Markov chain may be defined as a finite Markov Process 
for which the transition probabilities pij (n) do not depend on n, hence denoted pij. A 
Markov chain is described by the transition Matrix P with entries pij [82]. A Markov 
chain with a discrete set of times is known as discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) [36]. 
Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54] have indicated a classification of DTMC’s in two categories: 
• Irreducible: A DTMC is said to be irreducible if every state can be reached from 
every other state. 
• Absorbing: A DTMC is said to be absorbing, if there is at least one state i, from 
which there is no outgoing transition. A DTMC upon reaching an absorbing 
state is destined to remain there forever. 
 
Trivedi (1982) [139] describes how the transition matrix P of an absorbing DTMC for a 
system with n states can be reduced to a new (n-1) x (n-1) sub-stochastic matrix Q with 
at least 1 row sum less than 1, describing the probabilities of transition only among 
transient states, and a column vector C (). 
 
4 = 5− −78 − −9− − :
—<= 
Equation 10 – Reduced transition matrix 
Consequently, the k step transition probability matrix can be written as: 
 
4> = ?− − 7>8 − −@− − :
′

 —<A 
Equation 11 – k step transition probability matrix 
where C
΄
 is a column vector with elements of no further use. The (i,j)th entry of matrix 
Qk denotes the probability of arriving in transient state sj  after exactly k steps starting 
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from also transient state si. As described by Trivedi (1982) [139], it can be shown that ∑ BCDC  converges as t tends to infinity, implying that the inverse matrix (I-Q)-1 exists. 
This is called the fundamental matrix M and it is a source of very useful information 
about the DTMC. Let Vj be the average number of executions of a state sj in a run of the 
program. Since execution commences at state s1 the average times of execution (or 
times visited) for the jth state would be: 
 Vj = m1j  
Equation 12 - Average number of executions of a state sj 
The general approach to the reliability analysis of this application has followed the 
concept of the work presented by Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54], which referred to 
reliability prediction and sensitivity analysis, based on software architecture. The study 
of Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54] included 3 sections. The first has used the mean time of 
execution and the mean number of visits of each state to determine performance of 
the system, whilst the second used the same parameters to define the reliability. The 
third section of the work included a sensitivity analysis of performance and reliability 
against variation of time spent in each component, and the alteration of mean visits, 
which essentially depicts the workload of the components. Having assumed reliabilities 
of individual components to be known, Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54] stated that the 
overall reliability of the examined system for single execution is given by: 
 = ∏ E
,
     
Equation 13 - Overall reliability for single execution 
The number of visits to each component is a random variable, implying that reliability 
also is a random variable. With the use of Taylor series they concluded that the 
expected reliability of the system is given by: 
 = F∏ G	
, + 
 I	
,J(KLM)
, N

 O    
Equation 14 - Expected reliability of a system 
By ignoring the second order architectural effects Equation 14 can be reduced to the 
following expression: 
  ≈ ∏ 	
,

   
Equation 15 – Reduced form of expected reliability of a system 
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From the results of the study of Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54], it was observed that the 
difference of reliability estimation was of 3rd decimal magnitude. Thus for the 
preliminary reliability analysis of the designed application, Equation 15 was considered 
to be adequate and hence applied. When the failure rate is constant, the reliability 
function can be expressed exponentially in terms of time t and failure rate θ [29]: 
 0(P) = QRD 
Equation 16 – Reliability function 
The above approach for reliability estimation was also applied from Meedinya et. al. 
[93], in their study about architecture-based reliability evaluation, under uncertainty of 
software systems. In their study they have included the consideration of workload, the 
computational load of software components executing a requested task, the execution 
initiation probability, the data size and the next step probability. They also considered 
two sources of failure, the execution failures and the communication failures. One of 
the additions to the Gokhale et. al. (2002) [54] approach was the implementation of 
Monte Carlo simulation to draw samples from the probability distributions of the input 
parameters, in order to achieve the required quantitative metric of the quality of the 
system. A dynamic stopping criterion terminates the Monte Carlo simulations when 
sufficient samples have been taken to achieve the desired accuracy. At a later stage, 
Meedeniya et al have extended their work by application not only to reliability 
evaluations but also to a variety of probabilistic properties [94]. 
Another concept that was considered for the reliability analysis of this application was 
the work of   Littlewood (1997) [89], who has introduced conservative stopping rules of 
operational testing for critical safety systems. Littlewood has examined demand based 
systems and continuous time systems. For the current application, the demand based 
systems and particularly the proposed pfd-based stopping rule. This approach refers to 
the probability of failure on demand (pfd) for systems or applications of a system that 
is only required to function under a certain set of inputs. For the currently tested 
application, the function of shutting down and refreshing of the servers upon network 
connection loss, was examined with the pfd stop rule proposed by Littlewood. 
Littlewood (1997) [89] has assumed that successive demands are statistically 
independent Bernoulli trials. Let p be the probability of failure on demand. Thus, given 
p, the number of failures in n demands, reliability R has a Binomial distribution: 
4(	 = 	T) = :T	UT	(
 − 	U) − 	T	  
Equation 17 – Reliability in terms of pfd 
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And particularly: 
4( = 8) = (
 − U)    
Equation 18 – Probability function of R=0 in terms of pfd 
Within the Bayesian framework one may represent a priori knowledge about the 
parameter of interest, here p, by the prior distribution: 
 
V(U) = UWX
(
U)YX
Z(W,Y)    
Equation 19 – Beta distribution function of parameter p 
Where B(a,b) is the Beta function and a>0, b>0 are chosen by the observer of the 
experiment to represent his belief about p prior to seeing any test results. If the 
system has executed n demands, and has seen r failures, the posterior distribution of p 
is Beta(a+r,b+n-r), with a=b=1 due to the lack of previous existing information: 
V(U|T, , 
, 
) = UT(
U)XTZ(
+T,
+−T)   
Equation 20 - Beta distribution function of parameter p with a=b=1 
Littlewood (1997) [89] then computed n1 by asking what was the minimum number of 
demands that, if executed without failure, would allow to conclude that the system 
had met its pfd target. For P≥0.99, equation 16, in a more generic form becomes: 
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4I	\ < \8 	J ≥ 
 − _   
Equation 21 - Probability of failure p to be less than a required value p0 
From Equation 20, n1 is the smallest value of n for which the following equation is 
satisfied: 
` (
−U)aUZ(
,
+)U88 ≥ 
 − W   
Equation 22 - Condition for having the smallest value of runs n1 
If the system is placed on test and failure actually occurs after s1 (<n1) demands, then 
n2 is computed, the number of further demands that must now be executed failure-
free to satisfy the reliability requirement, as follows. The posterior distribution for p 
immediately following the failure on the s1th demand is: 
V	(U|
, b
, 
, 
) = \(
\)c
X
d(,c
)   
Equation 23 - Beta distribution function of parameter p after failure at s1 demands 
The above has now become the prior distribution for p for the further testing to be 
conducted. To compute n2, the posterior distribution after seeing n2 further demands, 
all executed failure-free, is required. This is: 
 
V	(U|
, b
 + , 
, 
) = \(
\)c
efX
d(,c
gf)    
Equation 24 – Calculation of new value of runs n2 
This process continues. In general, if the jth failure has just been seen, and the failures 
occurred on the s1th, (s1+s2)th, . . , (s1+s2 . . . +sj)th demands, a further nj+1 demands 
should be required to be executed failure-free, where nj+1 is the smallest value of n for 
which: 
` Uh(
−U)∑ b+−hh
 aUZGh+
,∑ b+−hh
 N ≥ 
 − WU88   
Equation 25 - Condition for having the new smallest value of runs nj+1 
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9.3 Requirements testing and final testing 
The main state machine sm0 of the application was derived from the mode 0 of the 
functional requirements (4.2.3), describing the basic functionality of the 
InternetGasturbine web application. The various states and transitions were defined 
with regards to the functional requirements included in this mode. The nested 
individual requirements represent a state transition. The main state machine was then 
used as a dashboard from which several less abstract state machines were derived to 
represent the other 5 modes of the functional requirements. Consequently, the state 
machines became the framework for 6 corresponding NuSMV models. The NuSMV 
specifications were built in a manner to describe sequential transitions between states 
and their negation produced the required test cases for each individual functional 
requirement. There were a total of 168 test cases derived. In several occasions there 
were test cases applicable in more than one requirement. The details of the analysis 
for each mode individually are shown in Appendix D.    
For mode 0 the start state and the end state were identical (servers running and ready 
to accept) (Appendix D, Section D.1.1). The transitional state run was branched to state 
machine sub1 (Appendix D, Section D.1.2), which describes the states and transitions 
of mode 1and 2: the engine start functional requirements. This state machine was 
further more analysed to sm2 (Appendix D, Section D.1.4 ), describing mode 3 (engine 
running), sm3 (Appendix D, Section D.1.4) describing mode 5 (engine stop), sm4 
(Appendix D, Section D.1.5) describing mode 4 (trouble shooting) and finally sm5 
(Appendix D, Section D.1.6), which represents specifically functional requirement 4.3 
of mode 4 (Figure 117). 
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Figure 117 – State machine for mode 0 of System Requirements 
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The designed NuSMV models indicated thoroughly all the potential state transitions of 
the integrated application. In order to increase the coverage and in pursuit of 100% 
statement and decision coverage, there were extra requirements added in the 
validation tables, beyond the functional requirements of the SRS document. These 
extra requirements were denoted as ‘additional’ in the tables. The testing of the extra 
requirements was accomplished with the derived test cases as well.   
9.4 Probabilistic analysis of reliability 
The application was investigated for the expected reliability of the data acquisition and 
command transmission functionalities. The data acquisition is triggered by requests 
from the client to the methods that connect to the assigned ports. The reception of a 
data package is acknowledged by the reception method on the MEOCS side and the 
response to the transmitting socket (EISI side) initiates the transmission of the next 
package. The response ends as reception confirmation to the ECU or the NI modules 
connected with the other sensors. The hardware components and the ECU were 
assumed as one single integrated component for this analysis, as their reliability is 
mostly known from the manufacturers and has been addressed in risk assessment 
during the previous rounds. The command request was also assumeed to end up in the 
same integrated hardware component. The system was assumed as a absorbing finite 
DTMC.  
In order to apply Equation 15, the individual reliability of the each components was 
required. There was lack of sufficient information of prior distribution due to the fact 
that the components were newly designed. Hence the approach to establish individual 
reliabilities was empirical with a total time of operation around 100 hrs, although not 
continuous. The observed failures were expressed as a failure rate of failures per hour. 
The failure rate was assumed to be constant hence Equation 16 could be applied to 
estimate reliability of individual components. For the components that showed no 
failures, they were assumed to have a failure rate of 10
-4
, as generally agreed for a 
practical limit of a failure rate in the range of 10
-2
 /h or 10
-4
/h [60], discussed in 3.4.3. 
Faults that were repeated during start up of the system (mainly due to LabVIEW delay 
on the very first run each time the system started) were not considered, as they would 
not reappear if the system was running continuously. The components which the 
derived DTMC comprised are shown in Table 20 and Figure 118. 
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Table 20 –The components of the derived DTMC 
Component  Description Reliability 
s1 Reverse Proxy  0.99 
s2 Glassfish Web Server 0.99 
s3 Command REST service  0.99 
s4 Engine data REST service  0.99 
s5 Peripheral data REST service 0.99 
s6 MEOCS command thread  0.99 
s7 MEOCS engine data thread  0.99 
s8 MEOCS peripheral data thread 0.99 
s9 EISI command thread  0.99 
s10 EISI engine data thread  0.99 
s11 EISI peripheral data thread 0.99 
s12 EIS switch signal generation  0.99 
s13 EIS throttle signal generation  0.99 
s14 EIS data reception 0.37 
s15 ACAS data reception 0.37 
s16 Integrated hardware 0.99 
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Figure 118 – DTMC of the application 
The process was considered from the Reverse Proxy onwards (Figure 118), as the client 
computer was a remote independent component, not directly linked with the internal 
reliability of the application. When a request reaches the Glassfish server, the request 
will be dealt with through 3 possible routes, as they are directed through the same 
port, hence processed one at a time. The command request could be distributed even 
more, as it could be either sent to the switch or the throttle generation LabVIEW 
function. The probabilities of transition are shown in Table 21 – Transition probabilities 
between the components of the DTMC. 
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Table 21 – Transition probabilities between the components of the DTMC 
p1,2 = 1   
p2,3 = 0.33 p2,4 = 0.33 p2,5 = 0.33 
p3,6 = 1   
p4,7 = 1   
p5,8 = 1   
p6,9 = 1   
p7,10 = 1   
p8,11 = 1   
p9,12 = 0.5 p9,13 = 0.5  
p10,14 = 1   
p11,15 = 1   
p12,16 = 1   
p13,16 = 1   
p14,16 = 1   
p15,16 = 1   
 
The transition probabilities were assumed to be equally distributed in every 
distribution node. This would depend on the actual workload of the components but 
as there was no experimental data yet available, equal probabilities were assumed. 
The model was then tested for sensitivity to the variation of the transition 
probabilities, after the distribution nodes. From Table 22, a 16x16 table transition 
matrix P was derived, from which the reduced 15x15 Q matrix was defined. 
Consequently, the inverse matrix (I-Q)-1 was calculated, providing the fundamental 
matrix M. According to Equation 12, the elements of the first row of M represent the 
average times of visit of the respective components (Table 22). 
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Table 22 – Reliability and average number of visits of components  
Component  Average number of 
visits (mi) 
Individual Reliability 
(Ri) 
Expected Reliability 
(	) 
s1 1 0.99 0.999 
s2 1 0.99 0.999 
s3 0.2 0.99 0.998 
s4 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s5 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s6 0.2 0.99 0.998 
s7 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s8 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s9 0.2 0.99 0.998 
s10 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s11 0.4 0.99 0.996 
s12 0.18 0.99 0.998 
s13 0.02 0.99 0.999 
s14 0.4 0.37 0.672 
s15 0.4 0.37 0.672 
s16 1 0.99 0.999 
 
From Equation 15 (having ignored the second order architectural effects), the 
expected reliability of the system was calculated (Table 22). 
A crucial feature of the designed application was the capability to detect a delay from 
the client to request data, and consequently shut down the engine and the program 
safely. This feature was considered to be tested with the proposal of Littlewood (1997) 
[89], described in 9.2.2. With the assumptions adopted in Littlewood’s approach, 
within the Bayesian framework, assumed desired pfd <10-3, and P = 1-α ≥ 0.99, the 
implementation of Equation 22 has produced a minimum value of n1 = 4602.   
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9.5 Results – discussion 
The System Requirements had been through the last revision during round 4. After 
that stage the feasibility of all the requirements was reconsidered and tasks that were 
time demanding or involved major redesigns were suspended for future development. 
One of the most noticeable functions not accomplished was the design of a database 
installed on the server connected to the gas turbine. The database was planned to 
include files with performance parameter recordings, faults, errors and operation time. 
As this task would extend the completion time of the project with a negative knock on 
effect on the thorough validation process, it was postponed to be implemented at a 
later stage. Revisit of the System Requirements is one of the main characteristics of 
the Spiral Model that distinguish it from other more concrete models, such as the 
Waterfall model. After the initial draft of the System Requirements was released, every 
round included the inspection of feasibility through the objectives determination and 
appropriate revision of the requirements until their final form after round 4.   
The application, as a total, had a high level of complexity, which was a restrictive factor 
in representation of the system with a single state machine. Hence the derivation of 
simpler sub state machines was inevitable. The functional requirements were used as a 
guideline for the sub state machine classification. The functions described by each 
functional requirement were presented as nested state machines within the main 
state machine (sm0), describing the state transitions of within the InternetGasturbine 
web application. This approach analysed the system in sub-systems of significantly less 
complexity, with their internal states easily distinguished and defined.    
The technique of negation of the NuSMV specifications produced explicit 
counterexamples (Figure 119) that outlined the required procedures for inter-state 
transitions. The counterexamples were then matched to the corresponding nested 
functions within the examined functional requirements, to provide the required test 
cases and validation tables (Appendix D, Sections D.2, D.3). The detailed 
representation of the state transitions allowed for the observation of several 
functionalities that were not included in the functional requirements hence provided 
additional test cases to capture all the possible paths of execution of the application. 
Prior to the acceptance test, during every individual round of the Software Process, the 
unit testing and the integration testing had ensured 100% statement and decision 
coverage of the individual modules. Thus the acceptance validation essentially was an 
approach to integrate and revise all the previous testing. At this point, the desired 
100% statement and decision coverage of the total application was achieved.     
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Figure 119 – NuSMV counterexample 
The reliability analysis was conducted in a very short period of operating time (100 
hrs). The gas turbine and interface hardware components were assumed as an 
integrated component with known reliability. This assumption was necessary in order 
to consider the application as a whole. Further analysis of the components would 
result in a very complicated DTMC model, not assessable. One of the known 
disadvantages of Markov analysis is that it cannot be applied to complicated systems 
hence the target of this analysis was to demonstrate the simplest possible approach to 
study the reliability of the designed application through a DTMC model.  
The short period of running the application revealed occasions of Input / Output 
exceptions in the ServerEIS thread and the AmbientIn thread at the EISI side, during 
the start up of the application. The problem was raised by the delay (magnitude of 
around 1000 of ms) of the LabVIEW EIS and ACAS programs to instantiate. The issue 
was alleviated with the insertion of a 500 ms delay in the instantiation sequence prior 
to the EIS start up. These problems were encountered once during the runs hence the 
individual reliabilities of the EISI engine data and ACAS data threads were estimated 
from Equation 16 to be 0.37. These 2 components were the bottlenecks of the 
application due their low reliability. Consequently the total system Expected Reliability, 
calculated from Equation 15 was found to be: 
E[R] = 0.483 
The DTMC model underwent sensitivity analysis to the variation of the workload 
(expressed in terms of transition probability) after component 2 (Figure 118). Initially 
the transition probability p2, 3 was varied and, p2, 4 and p2, 5 were assumed equal. In the 
second case, s2, 4 was considered to be the control variable and the other two assumed 
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equal. The analysis (Figure 120) has shown that increasing the probability of transition 
to s3 would increase the expected Reliability, as that branch includes components with 
relatively high reliabilities. Increased transition to s4 or s5 (bottlenecks) would reduce 
the expected reliability. However, the absolute gradient of Reliability variation after 
linear regression indicated a higher sensitivity (improvement) when transition is 
favoured towards the flawless branch through s3, rather than when the branches with 
reduced reliability were preferred. This fact can be attributed to the independence of 
the paths (independent threads) that does not allow multiple interactions between the 
individual components, thus increasing the overall expected Reliability of the system.  
 
 
Figure 120 – Sensitivity analysis with probability transitions s2, 3 and s2, 4 varied 
The sensitivity of the model to the variation of the individual reliability of one single 
component was also examined. One of the less reliable components was considered as 
the control variable. The improvement of the total expected Reliability was significant, 
with a gradient of around 0.52 (Figure 121), after linear regression. 
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Figure 121 - Sensitivity analysis with Reliability of s14 varied 
Finally, the minimum required runs (calculated from Equation 22) to test the reliability 
on demand of the network connection loss functionality were not able to be 
accomplished during the development of the Thesis (over 4,500 runs required). At the 
time of writing, this function required further testing with the release of a beta version 
of the application. 
In order to obtain a more detailed Reliability estimation, the components would 
require a separation into nested sub components, in order to obtain simple DTMC’s for 
smaller groups. This approach would be applicable after a sufficient amount of time of 
operation, when necessary data will have been collected. Additionally, the software 
modules may be detached from the hardware components in order to allow a separate 
reliability evaluation for the reusable software and for the tightly coupled hardware 
equipment. The total Reliability of the integrated system may depend on the hardware 
reliability as well but in a generic approach with different gas turbines, the reusable 
software components of the application should be investigated for expected Reliability 
independently from the hardware components.     
Finally, all the risks of this round identified in the risk assessment (Appendix B, Section 
B.7) were successfully encountered, and the round was concluded with a successful 
acceptance validation process where the desired coverage was achieved and no extra 
costs addition to the project.  
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10 DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES 
This chapter presents the capabilities of the application for future development and 
interaction with other applications. The suggested modifications are presented in an 
abstract manner and the final section of the chapter discusses some potential 
applications on the long term.  The subject of this chapter has resulted from the non 
functional requirement of generic capabilities of the application, set in the SRS 
document. There was no concrete planning for this requirement hence all the possible 
generic configurations were discussed herein.  
10.1 Addition of different gas turbines 
In order to attach a different gas turbine, the main modification required would be the 
adaptation of the LabVIEW EIS (Engine Interface Software) module. The TSS 
(Troubleshooting System) would only require a different input file to contain the 
nominal values and standard deviations of the critical parameters for the new gas 
turbine. Additionally, the user interfaces for both LAN and web versions would need to 
be modified according to the gas turbine features. In Figure 122, the required 
modifications are shown, classified by the cluster of components where they belong. 
Each software module was depicted as a UML component and then the packages and 
classes (or LabVIEW functions) to be modified are shown. In some cases the hierarchy 
was presented down to the methods of the classes to be modified. For the web 
application, the web pages were shown within the highest level folder that contained 
them. The modifications are explained in Table 23.  
It can be noticed from the modifications layout that the LabVIEW EIS component was 
the only module tightly coupled with the gas turbine at the back end. The majority of 
the components could be reusable with any other gas turbine type. The components 
that require modifications were very few, proportional to the total application, with 
limited changes. 
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Figure 122 – Modifications required to accommodate a different gas turbine 
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Table 23 – Modifications legend for accommodation of a different gas turbine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.2 Configuration with multiple test stations and gas turbines 
The application was designed with the ability to accommodate several gas turbines 
simultaneously.  The commands are sent to the engine sequentially and the system 
currently can accept 100 commands defined only by an index number (flag) assigned 
to them by the user interface. The interpretation and allocation takes place at the last 
software component before the engine ECU, which, as discussed in 10.1, is the only 
component that is tightly coupled with the gas turbine (the EIS module). Additionally, 
the application can accommodate a gas turbine installed in an integrated test cell, 
provided that the data produced by the sensors in the engine and the peripheral 
hardware is distributed in the 2 major groups of data: one for the gas turbine readings 
(regardless of their number) and the other for the data acquired from the ambient and 
peripheral sensors.    
 There were 2 approaches considered for a multi-engine configuration. Option A 
suggested the design of individual web applications for each connected gas turbine. 
Index Modification Description 
0 Array of input storage increased number of indexes as required – Nested case 
structure to include additional cases  
1 Function altered according to the engine control unit and sensors output. 
Could be other than serial input: analogue or digital. 
2 Function altered to produce required signal according to the new gas turbine. 
3 Function altered to produce required signal according to the new gas turbine. 
4 Additional functions may be added if more than one signals are required 
5 All method definitions maintained as indicated by MessageConfiguration() 
interface. Re-implemented according to engine output format. 
6 New file added with values corresponding to new gas turbine 
7 Modified to include necessary controls and indicators  
8 Modified to update new indicators  
9 Modified to include necessary controls and indicators  
10 Modified reading() function to update new indicators  
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Each web application would import an instance of the MEOCS, which would then 
invoke the appropriate server at the gas turbine end (Figure 123). This option would 
provide a more flexible design, presenting a more REST-compatible API and reduced 
demand per unit time for each web application (in the case of multiple gas turbines 
operating simultaneously). Thus, this option would favour increased reliability on 
demand.  
Option B proposed a single web application, which should include libraries with all the 
necessary operation panel pages and the corresponding JavaScript files (Figure 124). 
The MEOCS here would be used as a dashboard which connects the client to the 
desired gas turbine at the back end. Although this approach may be more prone to fail 
in case of excessive simultaneous demand, it considered to be adequate, as the 
application is not expected to be accessed simultaneously by more than a few tens of 
users. The main advantages of this option are that it would be more efficiently secured 
under a single entity (one web application) and also that the access to all the individual 
engines could be monitored and controlled centrally, with one or two Servlets. 
The modifications required (Figure 125) are expected to be identical for both options, 
apart from the web application, which in Option A it would contain only those pages 
required for the single related gas turbine, whereas in Option B the web application 
would contain a library of gas turbine pages. From the modifications list (Table 24), it 
can be seen that the system may easily be configured, without major redesign. 
It is noticeable that the AMT Netherlands Olympus used in this project is configured to 
accept electric signals from the ECU to manipulate the controls. If a differently 
configured gas turbine was connected, there would be an additional requirement to 
install actuators to the controls, in order to convert the electric signals to mechanical 
transition. Although in contemporary gas turbines the control unit may override the 
mechanical signal to control the throttle position, there are certain features that 
cannot be overridden (for extra safety purposes), such as in the PW-F100 engine, 
where a mechanical switch pressed by the throttle lever during movement enables 
fuel flow above the idle position.   
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Figure 123 – Multi GT configuration – Option A 
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Figure 124 - Multi GT configuration – Option B  
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Figure 125 - Modifications required to accommodate multiple gas turbines 
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Table 24 - Modifications legend for multiple gas turbines configuration 
 
 
 
Index Modification Description 
0 Array of input storage increased number of indexes as required – Nested case 
structure to include additional cases  
1 Function altered according to the engine control unit and sensors output. 
Could be other than serial input: analogue or digital. 
2 Function altered to produce required signal according to the new gas turbine. 
3 Function altered to produce required signal according to the new gas turbine. 
4 Additional functions may be added if more than one signals are required 
5 All method definitions maintained as indicated by MessageConfiguration() 
interface. Re-implemented according to engine output format. 
6 New file added with values corresponding to new gas turbine 
7 Add gas turbine type index in the constructors of the listed classes – Add list 
with sockets and ports  
8 Modified to include necessary controls and indicators -  prototype class 
cloned accordingly 
9 Modified to update new indicators -  prototype class cloned accordingly 
10 Current main method declassified as main – identified as static 
11 New class introduced to contain main method and landing GUI. Selection of 
gas turbine as an event to invoke the static method of class MEOCS with the 
corresponding index 
12 List with addresses of remote methods, sockets and ports included 
13 Add gas turbine type index in the constructors of the listed classes – Add list 
with sockets and ports 
14 Library of jsp operation panels (for Option B only) 
15 Library of JavaScript functionality pages (for Option B only) 
16 All root methods of listed RESTful web services to accept gas turbine index 
parameter from the operation panel 
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10.3 Integration with the WebEngine 
Interaction of the Internet Gas Turbine with the TURBOMATCH engine would provide 
an integrated experimental platform that would allow the user to adapt his created 
performance simulation model to the actual gas turbine, based on real time engine 
data. TURBOMATCH is a very powerful performance simulation tool and the 
WebEngine enables the creation of models remotely, through a regular web browser. 
The validation of a model would always be easier and more accurate if the user could 
make direct comparisons of simulated and real output accomplished against the real 
engine. A simulation model many times is based on ideal conditions and assumptions 
thus it cannot simulate accurately every single gas turbine of the same type. Therefore, 
adaptation of a created model to actual readings from a particular gas turbine would 
enhance the accuracy of the model.  
The proposed collaboration of the two applications would be feasible with simple 
additions. A RESTful root resource needs to be added to the InternetGasturbine 
application, such that would it accept requests from the WebEngine client. 
Consequently, the root resource would invoke a local data acquisition method, which 
would utilise the already existing methods to retrieve the data from the engine and the 
environment. With PCN as the handle of the model, TURBOMATCH would require the 
PCN of the gas turbine and any other available measurement – in this case the EGT, 
thus T6. PCN could be calculated from the InternetGasturbine if the design point 
rotational speed is known Equation 26 
PCN = RPM/RPMDP    
Equation 26 – Gas turbine shaft speed 
Multiple samplings would allow the acquisition of valid values, clean from any 
instantaneous peaks or drops. Hence after a loop of sampling, the average values 
could be returned to the REST resource and consequently back to the WebEngine 
client (Figure 126). 
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Figure 126 – Retrieval of data from the Internet Gas Turbine 
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A different approach was also suggested, with which the accuracy of the 
TURBOMATCH model could be examined at Off Design conditions (Figure 127). This 
time, the settings of the model should be passed to the actual engine, which 
consequently will adjust the RPM according to the setting of the PCN handle of the 
model. A restriction posed here would be the ambient conditions where the engine is 
operating, hence the model must be designed in conditions to match those of the 
engine environment – Tamb and Pamb set as the values acquired from the engine 
environment. When the InternetGasturbine receives the request, the method that 
conveys the commands will be called iteratively until the actual engine PCN (Equation 
26) has approached the model PCN sufficiently. The criterion for this would be the 
value of the absolute difference ΔPCN between the obtained engine PCN and the model 
PCN. Convergence would occur if ΔPCN achieved a value less than a very small number 
ε, of magnitude 10-3 (Equation 27). 
Δjkl = |1mnopD#qrst − 1mnu-tsv| < w 
Equation 27 – Convergence of gas turbine PCN to TURBOMATCH model value 
 After convergence has been achieved, the InternetGasturbine would return the 
performance match matrix V, a column vector which in this study would comprise 2 
elements, PCN and T6 (Equation 28). 
x = yz{|}~Xz{|}z{|}	}~X	}	}   
Equation 28 – Performance match matrix 
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Figure 127 – Adaptation of engine state according to the WebEngine model 
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The first approach was simulated with an experiment that involved the design of a 
simple Java EE 6 web application, where a web page including an HTML form, sent 
AJAX POST requests after a button event to the InternetGasturbine and acquired the 
engine and ambient data. The data were displayed in dedicated fields of the web page. 
A restriction that was encountered was the fact that AJAX does not allow cross domain 
requests. The problem was overcome by installation of the 2 applications in the same 
domain, as virtual hosts under the same virtual server of the configured reverse proxy. 
Although the main applications HTTP containers (Glassfish) were installed in different 
computers, the AJAX requests were accomplished flawlessly. Practically, instead of 
assigning a clean URL to each of the applications (www.webengine.com and 
www.Internetgasturbine.com), they should be accessed under a central common host: 
www.common-host.com/webengine  
and 
 www.common-host.com/Internetgasturbine 
Another technique for enabling cross-domain requests is JSON-P. In 2005 JSONP (later 
dubbed JSON-P, or JSON-with-padding) was formally proposed as a way to leverage 
this property of <script> tags to be able to request data in the JSON format across 
domains. It works by making a <script> element (either in HTML or inserted into the 
DOM via JavaScript) that requests to a remote data service location. The response is 
the name of a function pre-defined on the requesting web page, with the parameter 
being passed to it being the JSON data being requested. When the script executes, the 
function is called and passed the JSON data, allowing the requesting page to receive 
and process the data [51]. However, JSON-P has essentially been a loose definition by 
convention, when in reality the browser accepts any arbitrary JavaScript in the 
response. This means that authors who rely on JSON-P for cross-domain Ajax are 
vulnerable potential threats, as a malicious web service could return a function call for 
the JSON-P portion, but slip in another set of JavaScript logic that could hack the page 
into sending back private user's data [51] 
The capability of configuration of the InternetGasturbine to be accessed by multiple 
observers – WebEngine clients simultaneously and acquire or transmit data, was 
considered. This situation was successfully simulated by creating a new jsp page 
containing the gas turbine operation panel, with the controls omitted. The 
IneternetGasturbine application could only start one instance of the server side 
operation control modules (as expected) but the observer clients could monitor the 
operation without interventions. The observers’ browser clients could invoke the 
MEOCS static methods for data acquisitions and the server was not affected by any 
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closure actions or network disruption from the observers.  Only the central user who 
had instantiated the process could shut down the application.  
The main drawback observed, was the inability of the application to detect a 
disconnection of the central user, as the server side data acquisition methods were 
constantly invoked by the observers and were not allowed to time out. To overcome 
this weakness, it is suggested that a ping function was added to the main operation 
panel web page. This function would transmit ping requests to the server in predefined 
time intervals (5 sec would be sufficient), hence if the main user has lost connection, 
the server would be informed and proceed to the shutdown of the application, 
regardless if the observers are still connected.   
10.4 Practical Applications 
The integration of the Internet Gas Turbine application and the TURBOMATCH 
WebEngine would form a powerful experimental tool to be used from overseas 
students and engineers. It would also provide a useful tool for preliminary estimation 
of performance of modelled gas turbines with similar architecture to those included in 
the application. Additionally, the combined application could be used as a central 
performance and health monitoring station, from where the user can run gas turbines 
of his fleet remotely and establish a performance base line to monitor each gas turbine 
individually. The application would also enable the monitoring and testing of aircraft 
installed engines remotely, from specialised staff at the base, without the need to 
transfer them at the location of the aircraft and the engine.  
In a more generic version, the Internet gas turbine application could be developed to 
operate UAV’s or drones through the Internet. There are 2 approaches for this option. 
The easiest approach would be to control a conventional remote control console 
through the Internet. The final software module in this case would produce and 
interpret appropriate radio signals rather than generating electrical signals, and 
reading physical signals from the ECU (Figure 128). However, the most challenging 
approach would be to utilise the capability of Wi-Fi connection in flight, which is a 
currently applicable and constantly expanding feature [53]. In this case, the back end 
server and the engine side modules (EISI and EIS) would be installed on an appropriate 
device with Wi-Fi connection on board the UAV. These would then be connected to the 
necessary hardware modules, interfacing the control unit of the vehicle (Figure 129). 
 
 192 
 
Figure 128 – UAV operation through conventional radio controls 
 
Figure 129 - UAV operation through on flight Wi-Fi connection   
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11 RESULTS - DISCUSSION 
This chapter summarises and discusses the obtained theoretical and experimental 
results of the project. Experimental values were not analytically presented herein, as 
they have been presented and discussed in the Results section of chapters 4-9. The 
optimisation of different aspect of the application was also considered here.   
11.1 SRS – General risk assessment 
The System Requirements Specification (SRS) was constructed in accordance with 
standard IEEE-1012-2004. Following the elicitation of the functional requirements, the 
general risk assessment of the project was conducted. The most common risk 
identified was the loss of power supply at the test house where the gas turbine is 
installed, accompanied by a combination of other undesirable individual events that 
included several types of Internet-based threats. Two main end events were identified 
and all the individual event combinations were isolated with the application of minimal 
cut sets. Eight minimal cut sets were produced for the first end event and 16 for the 
second. The ETA that followed indicated that the worst potential consequence would 
be major damage of the gas turbine, without involvement of personnel injuries; hence 
the risk of the project was assessed as acceptable. Subsequently, a prototype program 
was developed and used to indicate the feasibility of the proposed application. The 
acceptable general risk and the feasibility of the functional requirements concluded 
the feasibility study of the system. The aforementioned tasks were a part of round 0 of 
the Spiral Model software process. Moreover, the designed prototype program was 
utilized in round 2 for the construction of the General Test Harness of the application. 
11.2 Implementation 
The implementation phase was composed of rounds 1 to 4 of the Spiral approach. 
During these rounds, the gas turbine was connected and interfaced with a computer, 
the core module of the operation control software was designed and, the LAN and web 
prototypes were completed.  
11.2.1 Round 1 
The local interfacing produced an adjacent PC operation station with a LabVIEW 
interface, with all the available parameters of the engine successfully acquired. There 
was 100% match of the RPM and also less than 1% deviation in EGT acquisition; the 
deviation was caused due to the different accuracy of the engine EDT and the LAbVIEW 
indications. A slight deviation between the generated throttle signal and the throttle 
slider position was observed, which was attributed to the fact that the required signal 
was analogue, hence not feasible to obtain precise correspondence between slider and 
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signal. The deviation was restored at throttle settings above 10% and had no effects to 
the operation of the system. The function that read in the engine data produced a 
cyclomatic complexity VG = 20, much higher to the conventionally acceptable value of 
10. This value was attributed to the high number of output messages from the engine 
and the necessity to translate them into plausible indications, resulting in the design of 
complex case structures in LabVIEW. However, the function was thoroughly tested 
with unit testing techniques and treated as a black box from then onwards. 
11.2.2 Round 2 
Round 2 of the Spiral focused on the design of the core program that would control 
the operation, by interacting with the previously designed LabVIEW Engine Interface 
Software (EIS). The cyclomatic complexity of the created modules was maintained at 
the value of 10 and lower. Individual methods were tested with unit testing techniques 
and the overall integrated system up to that point was successfully tested at 100% 
statement and decision coverage. The examination for potential memory leaks caused 
by the Java SE modules revealed satisfactory functionality of the automatic garbage 
collection procedure, with maximum momentary time spent in garbage collection 
found around 0.1%. The trend of surviving generations of objects was maintained 
constant after initial build up and peaks. When the two components (MEOCS and EISI) 
of the core software module were installed in separate computers within the LAN of 
the University campus, a latency of around 200ms for the command to arrive at the 
EISI was observed. The latency was negligible when the components were installed 
together. This was the inevitable effect of the physical impedance and the latencies in 
the network stack, which could not be avoided. 
11.2.3 Round 3 
In round 3, the Troubleshooting System (TSS) was designed and implemented, enabling 
real time monitoring of the gas turbine operation and providing automatic handling of 
any parameter exceedance. This feature has downgraded the importance of latency 
between the modules and also mitigated one of the most noticeable observed 
underlying risks: the mains supply power loss. The fuel flow signal was captured but as 
no reference values were available it is not acquired with great accuracy. Accuracy 
could be improved by calibration of the transducer after completion of this project.  
The cyclomatic complexity of the modules was maintained below 10 and the surviving 
generations of objects of all the Java components followed a stable trend after initial 
peaks. Under no circumstances the time spent in garbage collections exceeded 0.1%. 
The quality metrics of the Java modules presented satisfactory results. The separation 
in individual specialised software components has prevented excessive number of 
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Lines of Code (LOC) in a single program. The core modules had an abstractness of 0.54, 
indicating good extensibility and reusability. An average instability (I) around 0.25 was 
also observed in the EISI and the MEOCS, and 0.0 in the TSS, implying   encapsulation, 
reusability and maintainability. It can also be seen that Lack of Cohesion of Methods 
(LOCM) was maintained relatively low, in an attempt to achieve cohesion in the 
designed classes. Avoidance of complexity was also achieved, indicating understanding 
of the applied algorithm. Evidence of low complexity was the low average values of 
cyclomatic complexity (VG), Nested Block Depth (NBD) and Weighted Methods per 
Class (WMC).  
By the end of this round a fully operational LAN version of the applications was 
completed. 
11.2.4 Round 4 
The web application was successfully tested in 5 major browsers and 4 operating 
systems, with 4 different versions of Windows. The JavaScript functionality has 
performed as expected in all the testing environments. The application was configured 
to run over SSL with cache disabled. It was secured with a form based authentication 
and configured with a reverse proxy at the front end. To enhance security, it was 
proposed for the reverse proxy to be accessed through the University VPN.  
The embedded flash player required the shockwave flash player plugin to be activated 
in the browser. In order to increase the independence of the application from third 
party plugins or add-ons, it would be recommended to embed the HTML5 version of 
flowplayer as well in the operation panel web page and allow the user to make a 
dynamic selection of which form to enable. The compromise to this would be the fact 
that HTML5 would not be compatible with older versions of Internet Explorer (<8).   
There was a high percentage of unit testing of the implemented methods and the 
control flow testing of the various modules achieved 100% statement and decision 
coverage during validation. The cyclomatic complexity of the JavaScript modules was 
maintained in low levels. Also, the Java EE web application was found to perform with 
a low number of surviving generations with trend that stabilised within the first 
minutes of operation. The code quality metrics of the Java SE components have not 
been affected by the inevitable adaptations. Low abstractness observed in the Internet 
Gas Turbine web application was not important, as the RESTful web services were 
designed as individual resources, which could be called from other applications in 
future development.  
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11.3 Validation 
The functional requirements structure provided the framework for the requirements 
testing. Model checking provided the necessary test cases to test each individual 
function of the functional requirements. For this reason the operation of the 
application was represented with state machines. This was feasible with the 
consideration of less complicated sub-machines to express each functional 
requirement individually. The state transitions within the derived state machines 
revealed functionality that was not predicted the SRS document. The additional 
functionality was also tested in order to obtain maximum coverage of validation. A 
total of 110 test cases were derived and all the possible state transitions were tested 
(Figure 130). Every module and integrated group of components had already been 
tested for 100% statement and decision coverage, hence with the requirements - final 
testing the complete application could be considered to have achieved that goal as 
well. The validation in stages was one of the advantages of an iterative software 
process, such as the Spiral Model, which was applied for this project. It would not be 
feasible with a linear model software process to achieve such a high coverage of 
validation with the current application, due to the very high cyclomatic complexity if it 
was considered as an integrated application, testable only upon overall completion.     
 
Figure 130 – Excerpt from the acceptance validation tables 
The reliability analysis was based on experimental data obtained from a very short 
period of operation during the acceptance validation phase. Although the results could 
 197 
not be considered totally representative of the Expected Reliability (discussed in 
Section 9.4), the approach was an analytical demonstration of reliability assessment 
with the application of DTMC models. With the proposed assumptions, the Expected 
Reliability was found to be:  
E[R] = 0.483 
The value of the Expected Reliability seems low but it is not representative, as sample 
runs were very few (100) hence 1-2 faults that occurred affected the overall reliability 
noticeably. However, this was an indicative value that established a point of reference 
to conduct a sensitivity analysis that demonstrated how the alteration of the workload 
of the individual components could affect the total reliability. As the main paths of the 
operating function were designed to be independent, only transition towards those 
that included bottlenecks, would affect the reliability negatively.  
The minimum required runs to test the reliability on demand of the response to 
network connection disruption, were calculated at a number around 4,600. This result 
occurred by adapting the example of Littlewood (1997) [89] for pfd<10
-2
 applied in a 
nuclear station control software, which is considered as a safety critical system 
application. The runs could not be accomplished during the development of the Thesis 
and required further testing after a beta version release of the application. 
11.4 Installation and data handling 
The LabVIEW components were built with version 2011 SP1 for Windows 7 64 bit 
operating system. It is noticeable that all the latest versions of LabVIEW do not receive 
full support for all toolkits and drivers in operating systems other than Windows 
(Windows 7 and Windows Server). The Java modules were built with JDK 1.7.17 for 
Windows 64 bit, however the packages could easily be cloned in different JDK versions 
for other operating systems, such as 32 bit Windows or Linux. Similarly, the Java EE 6 
modules could be adapted for other operating systems. Hence the main restriction in 
operating platforms was posed by the LabVIEW components, which cannot run on 
other OS except Windows 7 with full capabilities. The above restriction implied that 
the EIS, the EISI and the TSS should be installed on Windows 7 64 bit, as they are all 
required to be on the same computer. The MEOCS and the InternetGasturbine web 
application could be configured for different OS, provided that they were both 
designed for the same platform. 
The application can be easily distributed in 2 compressed folders (.zip or .rar): One 
must include the executable files for the 2 LabVIEW programs – EIS and SignalClosure 
(ACAS is invoked within the EIS.exe file) - and the jar files for EISI, TSS, Restartserver 
and WatchDog Java programs. The compressed files must be extracted in the same 
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folder. The second compressed folder must include the InternetGasturbine web 
application .WAR file, which should be extracted and deployed in a Glassfish server 
instance. The .WAR file has already imported an instance of MEOCS during build. As for 
the Apache Virtual host, this must be added in the httpd-ssl configuration file of an 
Apache server. Analytically, the size of the required files for the LAN and the web 
versions are listed in Table 25. 
Table 25 – Size of execution files  
Module (executable 
and configuration 
files) 
Size 
Local LAN  Web 
EIS  488 KB 706 KB 706 KB 
SignalClosure  N/A 460 KB 460 KB 
WatchDog N/A 16 KB 16KB 
RestartServer N/A 12 KB 12 KB 
EISI N/A 2.76 MB 717 KB 
MEOCS N/A 2.72 MB 307 KB 
InternetGasturbine N/A N/A 3.56 MB 
 
It can be observed from Table 25 that the size of the required files was not significant 
and if the components were installed separately, then the space occupied on the disk 
would be even more reduced. 
The transfer of real time data was handled with Buffered Readers set at their default 
size (8,192 characters in Java) and TCP as the transport layer protocol. The data was 
handled satisfactorily with not any necessity to increase the size of the buffers. The 
exchanged data was of 0.1 KB magnitude and not more than 200 characters. It can be 
seen that with the default size of the buffers much larger packets of data could be 
successfully handled with very low latency values. The request – response latency of 
course depends on the network quality and the distance as well. Operation within the 
campus network showed an average latency of 14.29ms of the requests to be 
executed and return a response (Figure 131), with all the components and servers 
installed in the same computer. Analysis of an average latency value request (Figure 
132) has shown that the amount of time waiting was around 14ms and the execution 
2ms. The observation of latency variation would become more detailed after release 
and trial of the application under actual circumstances, something that was not 
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possible during the development. However, as latency is inevitable, the implemented 
real time monitoring of the engine operation (TSS) reduces the significance of the 
delay in the data transfer.   
 
Figure 131 – Request latency 
 
   
Figure 132 – Latency analysis 
Details of the installation procedure, prerequisites and execution of the application are 
outlined in Appendix F. 
11.5 Optimisation of different aspects of the application 
The application was optimised mainly for safety and security. It was designed for 2 
additional human observers to monitor and interfere if necessary, although their 
presence was not requisite for the operation of the system. The placement of the local 
PC observer required the extension of the LabVIEW engine interface (EIS) in order to 
accommodate total functionality for controlling the operation if necessary. The 
extension of the EIS has increased the load of the CPU and added latency to the data 
flow. On the contrary, it has enhanced safety, as Internet operation may be overridden 
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at any time by the observer. The operation of the gas turbine was not very flexible, as 
the system does not accept rapid throttle increase (>20%). Higher settings increase 
could only be achieved incrementally with inputs less than 20%. 
Access to the system is limited and authorisation to register can only be granted by the 
administrator locally at the server end. This implies a restricted number of users and 
an application not accessible unless permission granted by an authorised 
administrator. Also, the configuration for operation over SSL has raised some issues 
with online access to remote libraries, such as YUI. A small delay was inevitably added 
to the loading time of the web page.  
Reliability was another element highly considered, hence the implementation of TCP 
protocol for real data transmission. TCP caters for the quality of the transmitted data 
packages without the necessity for overhead design on behalf of the developer. 
Additionally, the data packages were checked at every reception point and if not found 
in the appropriate form, the application reused the last valid package received.  
To optimise for performance, the following modifications would be required: 
• Abolishment of the observer station. This would reduce the workload of the 
local computer, as engine output would not require to be processed for local 
display. Consequently, the response time to the remote user would be 
reduced. To compensate for the reduction of observers, it would be 
recommended to design and install an automated transition from remote to 
manual operation mode. This would require a signal generation to be provided 
to an automatic relay switch to be activated to change the source of the signals 
towards the ECU (from computer to manual control unit). Moreover, the 
default position of the relay switch when not loaded could be configured to 
switch to the manual control unit, upon power supply loss. 
• Implementation of UDP for the transport layer where real time data is involved. 
This would reduce the latency of data exchange between the different layers. 
The disadvantage for this approach would be the necessity for the verification 
of the quality and the order of the received data, with possible consequences in 
reliability.   
• Installation of all the components in the same computer. This approach would 
reduce any latency added due to the internal network quality and impedance. 
The drawback would be the increase of the workload of the containing 
computer, posing requirement for higher processor efficiency. Also, this 
configuration would also disable the capability of installation of the back end 
server behind a firewall, with the front end server (reverse proxy) ahead of the 
firewall. 
 201 
Optimisation for flexibility: 
• Removal of the restriction of throttle increase. This would add significant risk to 
the integrity of the gas turbine, especially if it is operated by inexperienced 
users. It would be an effortless modification that would allow the application to 
be used in more realistic situations, where harsh testing and rapid power 
increase may be required. This version of the application should only be 
addressed to experienced professional gas turbine operators.    
• Increase of the time to shut down upon network connection loss. Also, increase 
of the inactivity limit, which currently was set to 3 minutes without acceptance 
of any type of commands. 
• Formation of a resource API of higher abidance to the RESTful configuration, by 
distribution of the designed root resources in more than one web applications. 
This would increase the ease of interaction with other external applications, 
but the security would not be as efficient as it is currently, where access to all 
the resources is granted through a centralised authentication approach. 
The security of the application could be additionally enhanced with the installation of 
an Intruder Detection System (IDS) to monitor the servers of the application for 
unauthorized access and misuse. There are open source IDS systems available, such as 
Snort, which is based on signature-detection.  
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12 CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER WORK  
The final chapter of the Thesis presents the overall conclusions of the project. 
Additionally, several recommendations were outlined, for future improvement of this 
application. 
12.1 Conclusions 
The design took into account the main features of operation and safety of a gas 
turbine, and combined them with Internet security and performance elements to 
eventually produce a system that operates successfully and reliably, at least for the 
short period of time that it has been experimentally operated. With the involvement of 
common open source Internet design tools, the final application had obtained a very 
good approximation of real time remote operation of an aero gas turbine (The term 
approximation was used, due to inevitable network latency existence). The cost of 
development was maintained in low levels and the final outcome provided an 
inexpensive tool for aero gas turbine remote operation - due to the Internet 
accessibility. The system included basic features to ensure physical safety and 
mitigation of Internet-based risks. It forms a guideline for future extensions, where 
security can be enhanced and safety will be ensured by more automated functions, 
replacing currently introduced additional human observers.  
12.1.1 Risk mitigation 
The software process was an adaptation of the Spiral Model – a combination of 
iterative development and the systematic approach of the Waterfall model. The 
process was mainly risk driven and commenced with a very thorough generic risk 
assessment, with the application of FTA. The analysis identified the most crucial 
underlying risks, such as the loss of power supply, the network connection disruption 
and the various Internet threats (Table 26). The combined application of initial FTA and 
HAZOP provided a thorough identification of the risks, accompanied by specific actions 
required for mitigation.  
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Table 26 – Most significant risks and mitigation actions 
Risk source Mitigation action 
Loss of power supply Power stabiliser and monitoring of mains 
supply – Safe shutdown when power loss 
detected 
Network connection loss Automated action upon detection of 
connection disruption 
Internet threats Form-based authentication and encrypted 
information over SSL, main web application 
behind firewall via reverse proxy 
Hardware malfunction Visual indications on extended indication 
panel for engine observer 
Misuse Prevention of abrupt user inputs by server, 
acknowledgment of command reception by 
server 
Loss of intercommunication or camera image Automated shutdown if system inactive for 
more than 3 minutes, 2 observers placed to 
monitor the system 
Junction box failure Simple and reliable construction of junction 
box. Even in failure, system easy to switch by 
interchanging commands wiring to ECU. 
 
The evolution of the software process took place in predefined phases (rounds), where 
more detailed risk analysis was applied, adapted to the specific needs of each round. 
The individual round phase applied HAZOP to identify the procedural risks and define 
mitigation actions or alternative approaches. The procedural risk analysis prevented 
the occurrence of unnecessary actions and delays during the development, always 
with alternative options available. Wherever required, there was physical risk 
assessment also involved, with the application of FMECA, addressing the criticality of 
the application. This was necessary in the rounds of the software process that included 
installation or modification of hardware components. Wherever failure rates from the 
manufacturers were available, they were used for risk score calculation. For the 
equipment that did not state explicit failure rates, they were assumed to failure rates 
conforming to MIL – HDBK – 217F. The hardware components that were modified 
were assumed to have one level of risk higher than that whilst unmodified. After 
completion of the software process, all the identified mitigation actions had been 
implemented.    
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12.1.2 Quality factors 
The design has strongly abided to the quality factors outlined by ISO 9126 standard for 
software product quality. Abidance to the most important factors was outlined herein. 
12.1.2.1 Functionality 
The final application has covered the majority of the functionality that was planned by 
the initial version of the functional requirements. Due to time restriction and priority 
to safety, security and reliability, several functions were suspended for later 
development. However, the suitability of the final design has satisfied over 90% of the 
initially required functions. The data recording system was the only major functionality 
that was not implemented, but this has not affected the overall application and it can 
be added later on.  
The required safety features were enabled, reducing the potential for rapid throttle 
commands from the user, unattended operation of the gas turbine after the remote 
client has been disconnected or closed. The throttle cannot be increased more than 
20% in a single transition. The main operation panel is only accessible through a root 
resource retrieved by the user after successful authentication and a POST request. It 
cannot be accessed directly by entering the URL of the service with a default GET 
request. Additionally, the URL leading to the path of the operation panel in the server 
domain is not accessible directly, as a local redirection to the landing page of the 
InternetGasturbine web application has been configured in the back end server.   
The acquisition of the engine output data was highly accurate with deviations less than 
1%, mainly due to the sensitivity difference of the EDT and the designed program, as 
the latter accommodated representation of higher accuracy of the parameters. The 
fuel flow was the only parameter not captured accurately, due to the lack of reference 
data. However, the importance at this stage was the caption of the indications and the 
transmission through the network, which was successful. Accurate fuel flow would be 
necessary for diagnostics or trend analysis but was not considered a high priority 
safety parameter for the operation of the engine at the current stage.  
Acquired data is presented to the Internet user with very small latency (a few ms), 
every 0.5 sec. Thus a very good approximation to real time transmission has been 
obtained with the use of standard Internet technology. A higher pace would not be 
realistic in cases of very far placed clients or slow connection. The latency was 
inevitable, due to physical impedance and process of the data, but not crucial, as the 
system is monitored in real time by the implemented TSS, which detects absolute or 
relevant exceedance of the critical parameters EGT and RPM, and performs actions 
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automatically if required. Additionally, connection disruption or delay can be detected 
by the program on the server side and the system will shut down safely.  
The most significant undesired event of power supply loss was addressed with two 
approaches. The first was by connection of a power stabiliser to ensure sufficient time 
of power supply in case of disruption, in order to safely shut down the engine and the 
system. The second was by monitoring the supply with the TSS and if loss is detected, 
the user will be notified. If the warning remains for 3 minutes without any action from 
the user, the system will shut down automatically.    
The application has been designed with the capability to show interoperability with 
external applications, such as the TURBOMATCH WebEngine. A simple experiment 
conducted, indicated the necessary approach to obtain cross domain AJAX requests 
from an external application to the resources of the InternetGasturbine that acquire 
the engine and operation environment parameters. 
In terms of security, the application was configured to run over SSL with a reverse 
proxy as the front end, allowing the main container to be installed behind an internal 
framework. It was also suggested to be accessed through the VPN tunnel of the 
University to provide an additional layer of protection along with the enabled form 
based authentication. With the servers placed in physically secured areas, the insider 
attack potential would be reduced significantly. 
The elicitation of the requirements has complied with IEEE - 830 - 1998 Standard about 
Recommended Practice for Software Requirements Specifications. The validation has 
followed elements of IEEE-1012-2004 Standard for Software Verification and 
Validation and the validation targets were based on the DO-178B document about 
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification. 
12.1.2.2 Reliability 
The overall reliability of the basic software components was estimated with a Discrete 
Time Markov Chain (DTMC) model, at a value at around 0.48. However, the time 
period for the collection of the experimental data was very short (approximately 100 
hrs), hence the result cannot be considered to be objective. Although the system was 
new with nearly all of the components newly designed, it has shown a satisfactory 
level of maturity with low frequency of software faults during the testing period.  What 
was most important in this study was the demonstration of a method that would be 
adequate, if applied after a sufficient period of operation after the completion of the 
Thesis, to establish the objective reliability of the system. For any fault that occurred, 
the application presented the expected fault tolerance and recoverability, 
demonstrated by the performance of the application self refresh sequence, which 
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functioned properly whenever required and within seconds the system had recovered. 
Also, the engine had safely shut down with all the settings at the predefined default 
values. 
Elements of the project that contributed to the overall reliability were: 
• The low cyclomatic complexity (<10) of the modules. 
• Not excessive number of lines of code (LOC) of the individual modules, due to 
modularity. 
• Existence of error messages in certain occasions, such as when internal server 
errors occur, connection loss or system occupied. However, the message 
system can still accept significant improvements.  
12.1.2.3 Usability and efficiency 
The application was designed in a simple manner in order to be understandable with 
enhanced learn-ability. The host web site had a straightforward presentation with all 
the enclosed pages listed clearly in a centrally placed navigation bar (Figure 133).  
 
Figure 133 – Welcome page and navigation bar  
Links to the manufacturer were available and also a complete operation manual of the 
connected gas turbine could be found in the server domain. The user is guided through 
the pages and finally, the engine operation panel web page was designed 
ergonomically with all the elements grouped in three columns:  controls, indications, 
warnings and cautions. The names of all the elements are evident on the page, 
reducing the required effort to operate the engine, thus enhancing operability. Finally, 
a very descriptive training page was introduced, which was a replica of the operation 
panel – without the functionality – with detailed descriptions of each element upon 
mouse hovering (Figure 134). 
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Figure 134 – Training panel  
The time for processing the input and output were of the magnitude of a few 
milliseconds. The start up and refresh times had values less than a second and could be 
improved if the YUI library for the control elements was installed locally in the server 
domain, instead of being loaded online. The application thus requires only two 
external resources to run (YUI library and Google api’s – gauges). All the other 
necessary resources are found locally on the server. Hence the application has 
performed well up to this point in terms of efficiency.  
12.1.2.4 Maintainability and Portability 
Maintainability may be expressed in terms of analyse-ability, changeability, stability 
and testability. The modularity of the application supports the maintainability, as each 
module can be investigated and debugged individually in order to detect faults. Fault 
removal or changeability is possible without affecting the other components, as long 
as the interfaces between them are not altered. After the application had reached the 
final stage before acceptance validation, it showed general stability to all the applied 
modifications, as regression testing proved that the components not modified, were 
not affected by the changes. Additionally, the testability was satisfactory, due to the 
existence of the General Test Harness, where all the conditions of operation could be 
simulated and tested. Elements that enhanced maintainability were: 
•  The low cyclomatic complexity (<10) of the modules. 
• Not excessive number of lines of code (LOC) of the individual modules, due to 
modularity. 
• Existence of error messages in certain occasions, such as when internal server 
errors occur, connection loss or system occupied. However, the message 
system can still accept significant improvements.  
• The access to equipment (engine) manuals and application operation 
information (training page) 
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The application could be considered as 50% portable, as the web application related 
components and MEOCS are adaptable to different operating platforms with 
reasonable effort. The gas turbine server side components (EIS, ACAS, EISI, TSS) are not 
adaptable, as they must be installed on the same computer and the LabVIEW 
components (EIS and ACAS) would not have the full functionality they do in Windows, 
in a different operating platform. 
12.1.3 Reusability 
With regards to reusability, the following were concluded:  
• The LabVIEW EIS module is tightly couple with a particular gas turbine each 
time hence not reusable. 
• EISI is highly reusable. It requires redesign only of the methods that read the 
engine output coming out from LabVIEW according to an interface class 
(Abstract Factory Pattern). 
•  MEOCS, TSS and InternetGasturbine web application are reusable. The TSS 
only requires a new input file with the engine nominal values for a different gas 
turbine. 
• The LAN version requires cloning of the user interface accordingly (Prototype 
Pattern) to accommodate more gas turbines. 
• The web version requires a library of user interfaces to accommodate different 
gas turbines. 
The individual components were accompanied with detailed documentation that 
provided the necessary instructions for addition of more or different gas turbines. All 
the modules were stored in a repository, available for future access and development.  
12.2 Future work 
The final section of this chapter presents recommendations for the improvement and 
further development of the application. These mostly refer to tasks that could be 
accomplished in the short term and do not involve collaboration with external 
applications, as described in chapter 10. 
Configuration of the reverse proxy to provide cryptography with the use of Network 
Security Services (NSS), as suggested in section 8.1.4. This action would enhance the 
security application against the Heartbleed vulnerability of OpenSSL, until the security 
of the latter is stabilised. 
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The release of a beta version should be the next step prior to any further 
developments. This would be the most efficient approach to establish the expected 
Reliability of the application objectively. With operation under sufficient time, accurate 
failure rates may be determined and used in the Markov analysis. For a more 
representative result, the components of the designed DTMC should be analyzed into 
more simple DTMC models and the expected Reliability of the sub models would 
produce the individual Reliabilities of the 17 components of the DTMC presented in 
this Thesis. The reliability analysis can also take into account the randomness of 
workload or time spent in each component and perform the Monte Carlo analysis 
introduced by Meedeniya (2011) [94]. Additionally, the beta release would allow the 
critical functions to be tested for probability of failure on demand (pfd), as proposed in 
section 9.4, with accomplishment of the required number of runs. The extensive 
evaluation of expected Reliability would also reveal any bugs that might have not been 
detected during the relatively short period of testing. 
Having the application operational would allow the observation of the software 
behaviour, when operated from a long distance or even overseas. The observation of 
the latency would be necessary to adjust the functionality of the client and the 
sensitivity of the program to the network delays. The frequency of the requests from 
the client to the server, to acquire the engine and peripheral data, could be 
dynamically adjusted after periodical checks of the network latency from the client 
page. The client would require to send periodical requests to a bandwidth tool 
installed at the server side and the bandwidth value of the connection returned would 
then be used to adjust the interval of the setInterval() functions of the JavaScript 
client.    
 The design and implementation of a Data Recording and Storage System would 
enhance the functionality, as it would allow interoperability with diagnostics and trend 
analysis applications. The external applications would then be allowed to interoperate 
with the current application by acquiring data and processing them accordingly. The 
operation and fault logs of the connected gas turbine would also be available to the 
remote user, hence they would provide a thorough insight of the engine and how far in 
terms of severity the run could reach. The proposal introduces an SQL database 
installed on the computer connected with the gas turbine. The data that will be 
received from the EISI module will be provided to a new module that will contain JDBC 
elements. The data will then be logged into a text file (by calling methods from the 
FileWriter() class) that will consequently be stored into the database (Figure 135).    
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Figure 135 – Data Recording and Storage System 
The request for a specific type of engine log will be sent to the appropriate RESTful 
root service, which will invoke the corresponding method in the MEOCS and from 
there, connection to the respective Data Recording and Storage system (DRSS) will 
retrieve the desired file and transfer it via FTP back to the client (Figure 136).  
 
 
 
Figure 136 – Request to DRSS 
Although the application produces several error messages, there are even more 
required to cover as many aspects of error generation as possible. Increased error 
messages would enhance the reliability, the maintainability and the usability of the 
system. Additional error files should also be created when the operation terminates 
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execution due to network disruption, parameter exceedance or power supply loss. The 
files generated are suggested to be stored in the local data base, where they will be 
accessible from the remote user. Another feature that would increase the usability 
would be the installation of a real time messenger on the operation panel, between 
the Internet or remote user and the local station PC observer. Although the complexity 
of the application would increase, the probability of confusion between the user and 
the observers would be prevented, increasing the safety of the application. 
The portability of the application could be improved if the gas turbine side software 
modules were designed with different programming languages, in order to obtain 
capability of operation in platforms other than Windows. The National Instruments 
hardware used for this project could be programmed with MATLAB or C++ instead of 
LabVIEW. C++ does not require a virtual machine to run on any platform and MATLAB 
runtime is compatible with Windows, Linux and MAC platforms. 
Due to the SSL configuration, the YUI library is loaded online from an SSL friendly 
library instead of the original YUI library URL. This task has introduced a few 
milliseconds delay on loading that may cause internal exceptions at the server side 
modules and terminate the execution. The problem can easily be encountered by 
installing the YUI library locally in the Glassfish server domain to reduce the time 
required to load it. 
The cost of the application as a whole could be reduced additionally, if the WOWZA 
media server installed for the live image and sound transmission was replaced with an 
open source media server. Red5 media server is suggested, which is an open source 
tool, based on Java (such as WOWZA) and has similar capabilities. Additionally, the 
definition and latency of the transmitted live image could be improved by replacement 
of the web cam in use, with an RTSP camera. The operation panel embedded 
JavaScript Flowplayer is a flash player that requires the shockwave flash plugin to be 
activated in the browser. The application would become more flexible if the existing 
HTML5 version of Flowplayer was installed as an option for the user to select, 
according to the desired browser version capabilities. 
In order to increase the automation of the application, the manual battery switch on 
the engine could also be combined with an electromechanical relay that would 
operate from a signal generated in LabVIEW (EIS). This feature was currently simulated 
by a boolean parameter in the program, but it could easily be implemented, provided 
that the current DAQ unit (NI cDAQ 9174) was replaced by an NI cDAQ 9178, which is 
an 8 slot chassis and would allow for the installation of the additional NI C series 
modules required.   
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The integration with the TURBOMATCH WebEngine is feasible and it would provide a 
powerful experimental and performance simulation platform for gas turbines. The 
interoperation can be established with the suggestions presented in section 10.3. 
Additionally, the capabilities of the application could be expanded by addition of 
multiple and different gas turbines, as indicated in sections 10.1 and 10.2.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A Functional Requirements 
This is an excerpt from the System Requirements Specification Document, produced in 
accordance with IEEE Std 830 – 1998(R2009), ‘IEEE Recommended Practice for 
Software Requirements Specifications’. Due to the length of the SRS, only the User’s 
Requirements and the analysis of the Functional Requirements section were included 
herein. The former were distinguished in Functional and Non – functional. The latter 
were presented in structured natural language. 
A.1 User’s Requirements 
A.1.1  Functional Requirements 
1. The system shall enable the start and total operation of the gas turbine from: 
 - A nearby physically connected PC station 
  And/or 
 - A remote user through Internet connection or LAN 
The control shall allow rapid and precise selection of the throttle settings. Throttle shall 
advance in increments of 1% ranging from 0 to 100%. However variation of throttle position 
shall not be totally uncontrollable. Excessively fast rate above 20% total range/sec should be 
prohibited. 
 Rationale: The structure of the system will allow operation of the engine either from the PC 
station or from a remote PC through the Internet. The flexibility of the throttle control is 
required in order to obtain the whole range of operation in which the engine would be 
subjected if manually controlled.  
2. It shall Record and log the total time of operation of the gas turbine and also record 
the time of operation above 90% RPM. 
 Rationale: Operating time recording and logging is crucial for the maintenance and the 
life of the engine and it is integrated to the operation procedure. 
3. The input and output of the software is shown in the following table: 
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Engine Input (Software Output) Engine Output (Software input) 
Throttle angle Measurements 
Start/Shut down command Exhaust Gas Temperature 
 Shaft Speed RPM 
 Fuel Flow (Not via ECU) 
 Condition 
 Throttle angle 
 Fuel Pump Voltage 
 Status of switch 
 ECU supply voltage 
 ECU errors 
 
* Additionally ambient temperature and pressure will be acquired for utilization   within the 
Engine Operation Control Software  
* Electrical and fuel supply are controlled by the Automatic Start Unit through the ECU, hence 
we do not need to intervene. Also, electrical connection and fuel tank supply inevitably 
must be applied manually.  
4. The system shall monitor the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) errors and allow the operator to 
take appropriate actions. The errors are: 
 - Start – up sequence error or low RPM error 
 - Switch input channel failed 
 - Regulator (throttle) input channel failed 
  - Exhaust temperature error 
 - High RPM error (RPM > 118,000) 
 - pump battery empty 
Rationale: The error indications of the ECU notify the operator of the actual state of the 
embedded engine control system and inform him to quit the operation. 
5.  The system shall monitor the engine RPM, Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT), the fuel 
pump voltage and the fuel flow and provide the readings to the user clearly on the screen. Any 
exceedance of operation limits shall be visually highlighted and allow the remote operator to 
take proper action. Also, the remote user or the PC station user will have the ability to apply 
instant emergency stop of the engine operation from his/her station. If there is no response 
from the user within 5 seconds the software will proceed to the AUTOSTOP selection of the 
switch and shut down. The limits are: 
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  - RPM < 26,000 RPM or > 118,000 RPM 
  - EGT < 300 
o
C or > 850
 o
C 
Rationale: It is indisputably necessary for the remote user to have a real time and plausible 
depiction of the engine operation parameters. It is a major issue of safety when something is 
not operating properly and required action needs to be taken immediately. 
6. Whenever RPM, EGT or fuel flow exceed predefined normally expected values 
throughout the throttle angle range, the software shall notify the user and if no response, idle 
the engine for 3 minutes and then proceed to shut down. However, once the user responds, 
he will be able to continue operating the engine. Predefined values to be confirmed (2 
standard deviations of mean measured value at each throttle setting position). Values to be 
determined experimentally 
Rationale: This is an automation feature which not only will notify the user if an abnormal (but 
not hazardous) condition exists, but will also protect from further deterioration in case of lack 
of notice from the user.  
7. It shall enable the recording of the measurement readings of the engine for selected 
increments of time on demand of the user. These are RPM, EGT and fuel flow. The recorded 
data shall be maintained and provided to related software systems which will conduct 
Diagnostics or Trend Analysis of the engine. 
Rationale: Diagnostics and Trend Analysis are very essential applications for the assurance of 
proper maintenance, safe operation and long life of the gas turbine. Automatic creation of the 
required data files will allow the maintenance staff to conduct the procedures with more ease 
and accuracy. 
8. The system shall enable intercommunication between the users and also provide live 
picture of the gas turbine test house to the remote user during operation. 
Rationale: Safety during the remote operation of the engine will be enhanced when the 
participating individuals can have, a common clear picture and the ability to communicate and 
co-ordinate their actions. 
9. The system by default shall shut down (AUTOSTOP mode) the gas turbine in the event of 
electric power or connection disruption. The electric supply voltage must be monitored by 
appropriate hardware installation and in case of instability detection the system shall proceed 
as stated before. If there is no response from the user for 3 minutes, the engine will shut 
down.  
Rationale: Automatic termination at the occurrence of power or connection disruption will 
prevent any confusion between the participating individuals, who while attempting to 
determine and evaluate the outstanding problem, may lose tracking of the engine operation 
and become prone to applying erroneous or contradicting control orders.  
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A.1.2   Non – Functional Requirements 
10. The system shall comprise of reliable, robust software and stable network connection. 
Rationale: The whole project may be considered as a critical system, thus requires critical 
software design procedures. Robustness will allow for accuracy in the control of the gas 
turbine via the net. Stability and reliability will assure constant control of the behavior of the 
engine with the least probabilities of hazard occurrence.  
11. Manual controllability of the engine shall be available during remote operation at any 
time. 
Rationale: This feature will prevent undesirable conditions should any loss of network control 
occurs. In any case, the control will be continued manually before the situation becomes 
irreversible. 
12. The software shall be secure enough to prevent undesirable access and malicious 
alterations. 
Rationale: Any exposure of the software could lead not only to improper function of the 
system, but also to hazardous events. Therefore, securing the software and the data transfer is 
a matter of major concern. 
13. The system shall operate strictly with the presence of 2 individuals, when operating 
from the nearby PC station, or 3 when operating remotely through the Internet. One shall be 
in the area of the engine in the test house, another in the PC station, and finally, one at a 
remote PC, if Internet or LAN operation has been selected. The system shall not allow the 
operation to commence unless it is assured that all 2 (or 3) members of Staff are in position.     
Rationale: Human presence in every level of control will provide the capability to maintain 
control of the engine from a lower level, if connection with a higher level is lost. In the worst 
case, the presence of a member of Staff in the physical area of the engine test house will be 
able to take over the controls if total connection with the other 2 levels occurs. 
 14.  The system must be able to perform on Windows XP onwards and LINUX. 
Rationale: These are the main OS of the PC’s on University campus. 
15.  The designed software must comprise of easily decoupled components in order to 
obtain a reusable core that can communicate with various interfaces, connecting other gas 
turbine types and collaborating with external applications for performance simulation or 
diagnostics. 
Rationale: The application must have provisions for generic applications, as it will be expanded 
in the future to include other gas turbines as well and also allow integration with the 
TURBOMATCH WebEngine Internet application for remote gas turbine performance 
simulation. 
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A.2 Functional requirements analysis - Mode 0: Web Application 
Pre-conditions: Web servers ready  
A.2.1 Functional Requirement 0.1: Authentication 
 SYSTEM 
User Input Response 
User name - Password Enter main page  
Web Application 
No. Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. User Authenication User name  <UserName> String Boolean – TRUE Show Introduction Page 
Password <Password> String Boolean – TRUE 
2. Authenication Failure User name | 
Password 
<UserName> & <Password> String Boolean - FALSE Show Login Error  Page 
3. Program Execution Link selection  <run> http Request xmlHttp – call service Run Program – Show Operation Panel 
4. Data Reception Link selection <read> http Request xmlHttp – call service (repeat every 
0.5 sec) 
Display Default Values 
5. Logout Link selection <logout> http Request xmlHttp – call service Close Operation Panel - Show Logout  Page 
6. Server Error Server → Browser: 
Engine Data 
<DataInput> String if<DataInput>not correct Close Operation Panel - Show Error  Page 
7. Connection Loss Browser → Server: 
Data Reception 
<TimeBetweenRequests> Integer If  
<TimeBetweenRequests> > 7 
Close Operation Panel - Show Error  Page 
8. Deny Multiple Users Link selection  <unique_user> http Request xmlHttp – <unique_user> != TRUE Show Return Page 
A.2.2 Functional requirement 0.2: System monitoring 
SYSTEM 
User Input Response 
Camera → ON Show live video 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No. Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Live video Camera Stream: 
ON 
<liveImage> Boolean If TRUE Display video 
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A.3 Functional requirements analysis - Mode1: Engine start – No malfunction 
Pre-conditions: No engine problems during start 
          Mechanical connections successful 
                Authentication successful 
A.3.1 Functional requirement 1.1: Engine Start 
Client and Web application 
No. Method User Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Start Request Start Switch → ON <Command> 
<Flag> 
xmlHttp request If <Flag>=2 & <Command> = 
3 
Engine Running at Idle 
Display: Throttle Position 
               EGT 
               RPM 
               Fuel Pump Voltage  
Engine Operation Control Software 
No. Method Input from User Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
2. Start Command Start Switch → ON <Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
If <Switch> = 3 (<Switch>=3) → Engine Interface Soiware 
Engine Interface  Software 
No. Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
3. Generate Start Signal Start Switch → ON <Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
If <Switch> = 3 Analog dc signal 5V  → ECU port input C 
Analog dc signal 0V   
→ ECU port input D 
 
4. RPM Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B: data 
Normal Set Data 
byte 2 
<RPM> Double Engine Idle <RPM> → EOCS 
5. EGT Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 3 
<EGT> Double Engine Idle <EGT> → EOCS 
6. Throttle Position Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 4 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Idle < ThrottlePos > → EOCS 
7. Vout Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 5  
<Vout> Double Engine Idle <Vout> → EOCS 
8. Fuel Flow Acquisition Flow meter 
transmitter: Open 
collector 
transistor output 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Idle <FuelFlow> → EOCS 
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9. Engine Status Information ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 3 – bit1, bit2 
<Engine Status> String Engine Idle <Engine Status> → EOCS 
10. Time Count Time Counter <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = 0 <TimeOperating> = +<TimeOperating> → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No. Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
11. RPM Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<RPM> Double Engine Idle 
 
<RPM>  → EOCS 
12. EGT Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<EGT> Double Engine Idle <EGT>  → EOCS 
13. Throttle Position 
Transmission 
Parameter from 
EIS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Idle <ThrottlePos>→ EOCS 
14. Vout Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<Vout> Double Engine Idle <Vout>→ EOCS 
14. Fuel Flow Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Idle <FuelFlow>→ EOCS 
15. Engine Status Information 
Transmission 
Parameter from 
EIS 
<Engine Status> String Engine Idle <Engine Status> → EOCS 
16. Time Logging Parameter from 
EIS 
<TimeOperating> Double Refreshed every second Log in database 
Client and Web application 
No. Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
17. RPM Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<RPM> Double Engine Idle Display on Operation Panel Indicator 
18. EGT Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<EGT> Double Engine Idle Display on Operation Panel Indicator 
19. Throttle Position Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Idle Display on Operation Panel Indicator 
20. Vout Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Vout> Double Engine Idle Display on Operation Panel Indicator 
21. Fuel Flow Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Idle Display on Operation Panel Indicator 
22. Engine Status Information 
Display 
Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Engine Status> String Engine Idle Engine Status Panel: Started – Idle Calibrated 
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A.4 Functional requirements analysis - Mode2: Engine start – Malfunction present 
Pre-conditions: No engine problems during start 
                    Mechanical connections successful 
                             Authentication and Configuration Identical as previous mode 
A.4.1 Functional requirement 2.1 – Engine Start 
Client and Web Application 
No. Method User Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
 
1. Start Request Start Switch → ON <Command> 
<Flag> 
xmlHttp request If <Flag>=2 & <Command> = 3 
ECU error present 
Engine Does not Start 
Display: Error Messages 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No. Method Input from User Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
2. Error Start Command Start Switch → 
ON 
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
If <Switch> = 3 (<Switch>=3) → Engine Interface Soiware 
Engine Interface  Software 
No. Method Input Parameter Type Condition 
 
Response 
3. Error Start Signal Generation Start Switch → 
ON 
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
If <Switch> =3 Analog dc signal 5V  → ECU port input C 
Analog dc signal 0V  → ECU port input D 
4. Start Error 1 Generation ECU serial output 
port B data: Error 
Set Data byte 2 – 
bit1 
<StartError1> String Engine Not Started <StartError1> = switch channel not present → EOCS 
5. Start Error 2 Generation ECU serial output 
port B data: Error 
Set Data byte 2 – 
bit2 
<StartError2> String Engine Not Started <StartError2> = throttle channel not present → 
EOCS 
6. Start Error 3 Generation ECU serial output 
port B data: Error 
Set Data byte 2 – 
bit5 
<StartError3> String Engine Not Started <StartError3> = supply low error → EOCS 
7. Engine Status Information ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 3 – bit1, bit2 
<Engine Status> String Engine Not Started <Engine Status> → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No. Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
8. Transmit Start Error 1 
 
Parameter from 
EIS 
<StartError1> String Engine Not Started <StartError1> = switch channel not present → Web 
App 
9. Transmit Start Error 2 Parameter from <StartError2> String Engine Not Started <StartError2> = throttle channel not present → 
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EIS Web App 
10. Transmit Start Error 3 Parameter from 
EIS 
<StartError3> String Engine Not Started <StartError3> = supply low error → Web App 
11. Engine Status Information 
Transmission 
Parameter from 
EIS 
<Engine Status> String Engine Not Started <Engine Status> → EOCS 
Client and Web Application 
No. Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
12. Display Start Error 1 
 
Parameter from 
EOCS 
<StartError1> String Engine Not Started Engine Warning Panel: switch channel not present 
13. Display Start Error 2 
 
Parameter from 
EOCS 
<StartError2> String Engine Not Started Engine Warning Panel: throttle channel not present 
14. Display Start Error 3 
 
Parameter from 
EOCS 
<StartError3> String Engine Not Started Engine Warning Panel: supply low error 
15. Engine Status Information Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Engine Status> String Engine Not Started Engine Status Panel: Switch on/auto 
 
A.5 Functional requirements analysis - Mode3: Engine running 
Pre-conditions: Engine has started up successfully 
A.5.1 Functional Requirement 3.1: Acceleration  
 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input from User Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
1. Proper Throttle Advance  Throttle Lever → FWD <Command> 
<Flag> 
xmlHttp request If <Flag>=3 & {<Command> 
(final) – <Command> 
(previous) < 20} 
 
(Throttle = n, n∈ {0,100}) → EOCS 
2. Rapid Throttle Advance Throttle Lever → FWD <Command> 
<Flag> 
xmlHttp request If <Flag>=3 & {<Command> 
(final) – <Command> 
(previous) > 20} 
(Throttle = n, n∈ {0,100}) → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
3. Throttle Increase Proper Parameter from Web App <Throttle> Int [100] 
{For (i=0, i<100, 
i++) 
Throttle[i] =i} 
If  (Throttle[final] – 
Throttle[previous])<20 
 
(Throttle = n, n∈ {0,100}) → EIS 
4. Throttle Increase Rapid If  (Throttle[final] – 
Throttle[previous])>20 
Error message → Web App 
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Engine Interface  Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
5. Throttle Increase Signal 
Generation 
From ECS: Throttle Lever → 
FWD 
<Throttle> Int [100] 
{For (i=0, i<100, 
i++) 
Throttle [i] =i) 
If  (Throttle[final] – 
Throttle[previous])<20 
Analog dc signal 0 - 5V  
→ ECU port input D  
( ∀ Throttle[i]++, analog dc signal +0.05V) 
6. RPM Acquisition ECU serial output port B data: 
Normal Set Data byte 2 
<RPM> Double Engine Idle <RPM> → EOCS 
7. EGT Acquisition ECU serial output port B data: 
Normal Set Data byte 3 
<EGT> Double Engine Idle <EGT> → EOCS 
8. Throttle Position 
Acquisition 
ECU serial output port B data: 
Normal Set Data byte 4 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Idle < ThrottlePos > → EOCS 
9. Vout Acquisition ECU serial output port B data: 
Normal Set Data byte 5 
<Vout> Double Engine Idle < Vout > → EOCS 
10. Fuel Flow Acquisition Flow meter transmitter: Open 
Collector signal  
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Idle < FuelFlow > → EOCS 
11. Time Count Time Counter <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last value <TimeOperating> = +<TimeOperating> → EOCS 
12. Time Count High RPM Time Counter Above 100,000 
RPM 
<TimeOperatingAbove> Double <TimeOperatingAbove> =0 <TimeOperatingAbove> = +<TimeOperating> → 
EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
13. RPM Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<RPM> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
<RPM> → Web App 
14. EGT Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<EGT> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
<EGT> → Web App 
15. Throttle Position 
Transmission 
Parameter from 
EIS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
< ThrottlePos > → Web App 
16. Vout Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<Vout> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
< Vout > → Web App 
17. Fuel Flow Transmission Parameter from 
EIS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
< FuelFlow > → Web App 
18. Time Logging Parameter from 
EIS 
<TimeOperating> Double Refreshed every second Logged in database 
19. Time Logging High RPM Parameter from 
EIS 
<TimeOperatingAbove> Double Refreshed every second Logged in database 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
20. RPM Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<RPM> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
21. EGT Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<EGT> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
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22. Throttle Position Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
23. Vout Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Vout> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
24. Fuel Flow Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Stabilised after 
acceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
25 Rapid Throttle Notification Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Rapid Throttle> String Engine has not changed 
state 
Display on Browser Indicator 
 
 
A.5.2 Functional Requirement 3.2: Deceleration 
Pre-conditions: Engine has been previously accelerated and stabilized successfully 
Client and Web Application  
No Method Input from User Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
1. Throttle Decrease  Throttle Lever → 
RWD 
<Command> 
<Flag> 
xmlHttp request If <Flag>=3 } 
 
(<Command>  = n, n∈ {0,100}) → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input from User Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
2. Throttle Decrease Proper Throttle Lever → 
RWD 
<Throttle> Int [100] 
{For (i=0, i<100, i++) 
Throttle[i] =i} 
Transmit <Throttle> 
(<Throttle> = n, n∈ {0,100}) → EIS 
Engine Interface  Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
3. Throttle Decrease Signal 
Generation 
From ECS: 
Throttle Lever → 
RWD 
<Throttle> Int [100] 
{For (i=0, i<100, i++) 
Throttle[i] =i} 
Generate signal Analog dc signal 0 - 5V 
→ ECU port input D  
( ∀ Throttle[i]--, signal  -0.05V) 
4. RPM Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 2 
 
<RPM> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Double (RPM, EGT, Vout, FuelFlow) and Integer (ThrottlePos) → 
Engine Operation Control Software 
5. EGT Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 3 
<EGT> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
<RPM> → EOCS 
6. Throttle Position 
Acquisition 
ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 4 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
<EGT> → EOCS 
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7. Vout Acquisition ECU serial output 
port B data: 
Normal Set Data 
byte 5 
<Vout> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
< ThrottlePos > → EOCS 
8. Fuel Flow Acquisition Flow meter 
transmitter: 
Open Collector 
signal 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
< Vout > → EOCS 
9. Time Count Time Counter 
input 
<TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last 
value 
<FuelFlow > → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
10. RPM Display Parameter from 
EIS 
<RPM> Double Engine Stabilised after 
deceleration 
Display on Client Screen – Refreshed every 25ms 
 
 
11. EGT Display Parameter from 
EIS 
<EGT> Double Engine Stabilised after 
deceleration 
Display on Client Screen – Refreshed every 25ms 
12. Throttle Position Display Parameter from 
EIS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Stabilised after 
deceleration 
Display on Client Screen – Refreshed every 25ms 
13. Vout Display Parameter from 
EIS 
<Vout> Double Engine Stabilised after 
deceleration 
Display on Client Screen – Refreshed every 25ms 
14. Fuel Flow Display Parameter from 
EIS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Stabilised after 
deceleration 
Display on Client Screen – Refreshed every 25ms 
15. Time Logging Parameter from 
EIS 
<TimeOperating> Double Refreshed every second Logged in database 
Client and Web Application  
No Method Input  Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
16. RPM Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<RPM> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
17. EGT Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<EGT> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
18. Throttle Position Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<ThrottlePos> Integer Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
19. Vout Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<Vout> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
20. Fuel Flow Display Parameter from 
EOCS 
<FuelFlow> Double Engine Stabilised after 
decceleration 
Display on Browser Indicator – Refreshed every 0.5sec 
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A.5.3 Functional Requirement 3.3: Parameter Logging 
Pre-conditions: Engine is running successfully 
SYSTEM 
User Input Response 
 
Record Record parameter – save in Data Storage System 
End Recording Stop Recording parameters 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action 
 
Response 
1. Record Stable Command: 
Record 
<Record> 
 
String If RPM = Const for t ≥ 30 
sec 
 
Record <RPM>, <EGT>, <FuelFlow>, <Tambient>, <Pambient> → .txt 
file to Data Storage System 
2. Record Unstable Command: 
Record 
<Record> 
 
String If RPM ≠ Const Stop Recording – Display message 
3. End Recording Command: End 
Recording 
<EndRecording> String If Recording in process Stop Recording – Display message 
 
A.6 Functional requirements analysis - Mode4: Trouble Shooting 
A.6.1  Functional requirement 4.1: Protection when absolute operating limits exceeded 
Preconditions: Engine running with no abnormalities previously detected 
SYSTEM 
Input Response 
Engine parameters If parameters exceed absolute values display warning message and shutdown 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. RPM To TSS From EIS: RPM <RPM> 
 
Double Constantly - <RPM> → TSS, every 25ms 
- Refreshed every 25ms 
2. EGT To TSS From EIS: EGT <EGT> Double Constantly - <EGT> → TSS, every 25ms 
- Refreshed every 25ms 
Trouble Shooting Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
3. RPM Absolute Check From EOCS: 
RPM 
<RPM> 
 
Double If 30,000< RPM <118,000 Boolean <RPM absolute Warning> True → EOCS 
Integer <Switch> =2→ EIS 
4. EGT Absolute Check From EOCS: 
EGT 
<EGT> Double If RPM >30000 & 
EGT>850 
Boolean <EGT absolute Warning> True → EOCS 
Integer <Switch> =2→ EIS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
5. RPM Warning Generation From TSS: 
Boolean 
Parameters 
<RPM absolute Warning> Boolean If TRUE Boolean <RPM absolute Warning> True → Web App 
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6. EGT Warning Generation From TSS: 
Boolean 
Parameters 
<EGT absolute Warning> Boolean If TRUE Boolean <EGT absolute Warning> True → Web App 
Engine Interface Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
7. Emergency Shutdown Start Switch → 
AUTO 
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
<Switch> =2 Analog DC signal 2.5V   → ECU port input C 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
8. RPM Absolute Display From EOCS: 
Boolean 
Parameters 
<RPM absolute Warning> Boolean If TRUE - Display RPM absolute warning on browser indicator 
- Shut down engine and program 
9. EGT Absolute Display From EOCS: 
Boolean 
Parameters 
<EGT absolute Warning> Boolean If TRUE - Display EGT absolute warning on browser indicator 
- Shut down engine and program 
 
 
A.6.2 Functional requirement 4.2: Protection when relative limits exceeded 
Preconditions: Engine running with no abnormalities previously detected  
              Temperature measured in degrees Centigrade 
              Pressure measured in Pascals 
              Fuel Flow measured in Kgr/sec 
SYSTEM 
Input Response 
 
Engine parameters If parameters exceed relative values display warning message and if no event in 3 minutes then shutdown 
Ambient Conditions Acquisition System (ACAS) 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Ambient Pressure Acquisition Serial Input RS232 
from sensor 
<AmbPressure> 
 
Double Refreshed every 60 sec <AmbPressure> → TSS 
2. Ambient Temperature Acquisition Digital Input from 
thermocouple 
<AmbTemp> Double Refreshed every 60 sec <AmbTemp> → TSS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
3. RPM To TSS From EIS: RPM <RPM> Double If <Throttle> = const for t = 5 sec - <RPM> → TSS, every 25ms 
- Refreshed every 25ms 
4. EGT To TSS From EIS: EGT <EGT> Double If <Throttle> = const for t = 30 sec - <EGT> → TSS, every 25ms 
- Refreshed every 25ms 
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5. Throttle Position to TSS From EIS: Throttle 
Position 
<Throttle> Integer <Throttle> = const for t = 5 sec - <Throttle> → TSS, every 25ms 
- Refreshed every 25ms 
Trouble Shooting Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
6. Ambient Pressure Deviation From ACAS: 
Ambient 
Temperature 
<AmbPressure> 
 
Double - <δ> = <AmbPressure>/101,325 
- Recalculated every 60 sec 
<AmbPressure>, <δ> → EOCS 
 
7. Ambient Temperature Deviation  From ACAS: 
Ambient Pressure 
<AmbTemp> Double -< θ> = <AmbTemp>/15 
- Recalculated every 60 sec 
<AmbTemp>, <θ> → EOCS 
 
8. Throttle Position Check From EOCS: 
Throttle Position 
<Throttle > 
 
Integer For (i=0, i<50, i++), 
Check <Throttle[i]> 
Determine <Throttle[i]> 
9. RPM Correction and Check From ECS: 
RPM 
<RPM> Double - <Throttle[i]> = Known 
- <RPMc> = <RPM>/<√θ> 
- If <RPMc> > {RPM(mean at 
<Throttle[i]>) +2σ}  
Boolean <RPM relative warning> = True → EOCS 
10. EGT Correction and Check From EOCS: 
EGT 
<EGT> Double -<Throttle[i]> = Known 
- <EGTc> = <EGT>/<θ> 
- If <EGTc> > {EGT(mean at 
<Throttle[i]>) +2σ}  
Boolean <EGT relative warning> = True → EOCS 
11. Shutdown Engine when relative 
exceedance present 
Relative Warnings 
and Elapsed Time 
<RPM relative warning> 
<EGT relative warning> 
<Elapsed Time> 
Boolean 
Boolean 
Integer 
If (<RPM relative warning> | 
<EGT relative warning>) = TRUE &  
(<Elapsed Time>) ≥180 sec 
Integer <Switch> = 2 → EIS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
12. RPM Caution Transmission From TSS: 
Boolean Parameter 
<RPM relative warning> Boolean If TRUE -Display Warning message 
- Log in Database 
- As per FR 5.2  
13. EGT Caution Transmission From TSS: 
Boolean Parameter 
<EGT relative warning> Boolean If TRUE -Display Warning message 
- Log in Database 
- As per FR 5.2  
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
14. Ambient Pressure Display From EOCS: 
Double Parameter 
<Ambient Pressure> Double Refresh every 0.5 sec Display Ambient Pressure indication on browser 
15. Ambient Temperature Display From EOCS: 
Double Parameter 
<Ambient Temperature> Double Refresh every 0.5 sec Display Ambient Temperature indication on 
browser 
16. RPM Caution Display From EOCS: 
Boolean Parameter 
<RPM relative warning> Boolean If TRUE Display RPM relative warning indication on 
browser 
17. EGT Caution Display From EOCS: 
Boolean Parameter 
<EGT relative warning> Boolean If TRUE Display EGT relative warning indication on browser 
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A.6.3 Functional requirement 4.3: Local Protection 
Preconditions: No other exceedance present. 
SYSTEM 
Input Response 
External power value 
Network Connection condition 
If either parameters fall below a predefined value give respective warnings. If no event in 30 seconds 
shutdown 
Main Supply Interface System (MSIS) 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Power Supply Voltage Acquisition Analog AC Signal  <Voltage> 
 
Double Refreshed every 25ms <Voltage> → TSS 
Engine Interface System (EIS) 
2. Physical command signal loss NI9263 signals  <Command_signal_loss> Boolean Refreshed constantly Boolean <Manual_Warning> = True, indication on 
Observer Panel and Double <warning_light> = 9 
volts → EDT -  indicators 3 & 4 illuminated 
3. Physical signal loss NI DAQ 9174 signal <Signal_loss> Boolean Refreshed constantly Boolean <Manual_Warning> = True, indication on 
Observer Panel & EDT   indicators 1 & 2 cease to 
illuminate 
4. Engine output loss Serial Input  <Engine_input> Boolean Refreshed constantly Boolean <Manual_Warning> = True, after 10 sec: 
Double <Switch> = 2.5 
5. Observer Operation Control Input from Observer <Observer_switch> Boolean <Observer_switch> = 
TRUE 
String <Operation status> = “Observer” → EOCS 
Trouble Shooting Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
6. Power Supply Voltage to TSS From MSIS 
 
< Mains_loss > 
 
Boolean 
 
If (< Mains_loss >) < 1 Volt 
for t>3 sec  
Or 
<Voltage> > (TBD)  
 
Refreshed every 25ms 
Boolean < Mains_loss > : TRUE → EOCS 
 
7. Power Supply Emergency shutdown Parameter From TSS 
& <time> 
<Mains_loss > 
<time> 
Boolean 
Integer 
(<Mains_loss >) 
= TRUE & (<time>) ≥ 180 sec 
- <Throttle> = 0 → EIS 
 
- <Switch>=2 → EIS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
8. Power Supply Warning Transmission From TSS: 
Boolean Parameter 
< Mains_loss > Boolean If TRUE < Mains_loss > → Web App 
9. Observer Operation Control 
Transmission 
Input from EIS <Observer status> String Transmit constantly String <Operation status> = “Observer” → 
Web APP 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
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10. Power Supply Warning Display From EOCS: 
Boolean Parameter 
< Mains_loss > Boolean If TRUE Display Warning message on browser 
indicator 
11. Observer Operation Control Display Input from EOCS <Observer status> String Update every 500 ms Display on browser indicator 
 
A.7 Functional requirements analysis - Mode5: Engine Shutdown 
A.7.1  Functional requirement 5.1: Normal Shutdown 
 Preconditions: No abnormalities observed. 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Normal Auto Stop From User: 
Start Switch: AUTO 
OFF  
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> = 2 (<Switch>=2) → EOCS Soiware 
2. Normal Off From User: 
Start Switch: OFF 
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> = 1 (<Switch>=1) → EOCS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
3. Normal Auto Stop From Web App  <Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> = 2 (<Switch>=2) → Engine Interface Soiware 
4. Normal Off From Web App <Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> = 1 (<Switch>=1) → Engine Interface Software 
Engine Interface Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
5. Auto Off Signal Generation Start Switch → AUTO 
OFF 
<Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> =2 Analog dc signal 2.5V→ ECU port input C 
 
6. Off Signal 
Generation 
Start Switch → OFF <Switch> Integer  
(1 – 3) 
 <Switch> =1 Analog dc signal 0V → ECU port input C 
 
7. Time Count 
Completion 
Time Counter <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last value <TimeOperating> = +<TimeOperating> → ECS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
8. Shutdown RPM 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <RPM> Double <RPM> = 0 
 
 
<RPM>  → Web App 
9. Shutdown EGT 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <EGT> Double <EGT> = reducing <EGT>  → Web App 
10. Shutdown Throttle 
Position 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <ThrottlePos> Integer <ThrottlePos> = 0 < ThrottlePos >  → Web App 
11. Shutdown Vout 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <Vout> Double <Vout> = 0 < Vout >  → Web App 
12. Shutdown Fuel 
Flow Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <FuelFlow> Double <FuelFlow> = 0 < FuelFlow >  → Web App 
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13. Total Time 
Operating 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last value Log in Database 
14. Total Time High 
RPM Operating 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <TimeOperatingAbove> Double <TimeOperatingAbove> = 
last value 
Log in Database 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
15. Shutdown RPM 
Display 
Parameter from EOCS <RPM> Double <RPM> = 0 
 
 
Display on browser indicator  
16. Shutdown EGT 
Display 
Parameter from EOCS <EGT> Double <EGT> = reducing Display on browser indicator  
17. Shutdown Throttle 
Position Display 
Parameter from EOCS <ThrottlePos> Integer <ThrottlePos> = 0 Display on browser indicator  
18. Shutdown Vout 
Display 
Parameter from EOCS <Vout> Double <Vout> = 0 Display on browser indicator  
19. Shutdown Fuel 
Flow Display 
Parameter from EOCS <FuelFlow> Double <FuelFlow> = 0 Display on browser indicator  
 
A.7.2 Functional requirement 5.2: Emergency Shutdown local 
Preconditions: Engine output lost or manual control warning on  
Engine Interface Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
1. Emergency 
Shutdown by 
observer  
Emergency shutdown switched 
pressed by observer 
  
<Emergency_switch > Boolean 
 
<Emergency_switch > = 
TRUE 
Analog dc signal 0V → ECU port input D 
 
Analog dc signal 2.5V → ECU port input C 
 
2. Programmatic 
Shutdown When 
engine output lost 
Serial input USB port 1 <Input> String <Input> = null 
 
Analog dc signal 0V → ECU port input D  
After t=30 ms: 
2.5V → ECU port input C 
3. Manual Shutdown Manual warning signal <EDT indicators> Boolean <EDT indicators> = TRUE - Junction box switched to manual by on site 
user 
- Analog dc signal 2.5V → EIS 
- <Operation condition > = manual → EOCS 
 
4. Time Count 
Completion 
Time Counter <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last value <TimeOperating> = +<TimeOperating> → ECS 
Engine Operation Control Software 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
5. Manual Operation 
Notification 
Transmission 
Parameter from EIS <Operation condition >  String <Operation status > = 
“manual” 
<Operation status > → Web App 
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6. Shutdown RPM 
transmission 
Parameter from EIS <RPM> Double <RPM> =0 <RPM>  → Web App 
7. Shutdown EGT 
transmission 
Parameter from EIS <EGT> Double <EGT> = reducing <EGT>  → Web App 
8. Shutdown Throttle 
Position 
transmission 
Parameter from EIS <ThrottlePos> Integer <ThrottlePos> = 0 < ThrottlePos >  → Web App 
9. Shutdown Vout 
transmission 
Parameter from EIS <Vout> Double <Vout> = 0 < Vout >  → Web App 
10. Shutdown Fuel Flow 
transmission 
Parameter from EIS <FuelFlow> Double <FuelFlow> = 0 < FuelFlow >  → Web App 
11. Total Time 
Operating Log 
Parameter from EIS <TimeOperating> Double <TimeOperating> = last value  Log in Database 
12. Total Time High 
RPM Operating Log 
Parameter from EIS <TimeOperatingAbove> Double <TimeOperatingAbove> = 
last value 
 Log in Database 
Client and Web Application 
No Method Input Parameter Type Condition/Action Response 
13. Manual Operation 
Notification 
display 
Parameter from EOCS <Operation status >  String <Operation status > = 
“manual” 
 
Display on browser indicator 
14. Shutdown RPM 
display 
Parameter from EOCS <RPM> Double <RPM> =0 Display on browser indicator 
15. Shutdown EGT 
display 
Parameter from EOCS <EGT> Double <EGT> = reducing Display on browser indicator 
16. Shutdown Throttle 
Position display 
Parameter from EOCS <ThrottlePos> Integer <ThrottlePos> = 0 Display on browser indicator 
17. Shutdown Vout 
display 
Parameter from EOCS <Vout> Double <Vout> = 0 Display on browser indicator 
18. Shutdown Fuel Flow 
display 
Parameter from EOCS <FuelFlow> Double <FuelFlow> = 0 Display on browser indicator 
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Appendix B Risk Assessment 
B.1 Fault Tree Analysis for primary design stage of the system 
B.1.1 Introduction 
Fault Tree analysis is method for qualitative and quantitative risk assessment of 
industrial applications, even at early stage design. It is implemented in power plants, 
chemical, nuclear and aviation industry. The procedure described here is in line with MIL 
– STD – 882D, Standard Practice for Safety System. It is one of multiple methods used. 
B.1.2 Scope 
This analysis intends to present a general overview of the system’s underlying risks and 
identify top undesired events along with the related individual events which can cause 
them. It will initially be a qualitative analysis and an attempt to quantify the results will 
be done prior to commence of more detailed design of the system. The purpose of the 
present analysis is to identify potential risks and determine ways of mitigating them at 
the phase of System Requirements Specification process.   
B.1.3 Considerations 
The analysis is based on a structure of a system consisting of hardware and software 
components, as indicated in the related context model and operated by three users at 
different positions during the operation. It also contains human events and shows their 
interaction with the system in order to lead to a top event through ‘and’ or ‘or’ gates. It 
is not a detailed risk assessment for individual components or systems of the integrated 
project.  
The result of the quantitative FTA may be either a probability or a rate value. However, 
the probability itself can be considered as a kind of rate as well, as it expresses the 
likelihood of an event happening in a defined amount of time during the life cycle of a 
system or component. In this case, the system will not be in constant operation hence 
rate estimation would be a more realistic approach to the risk assessment.  The rate 
may be the cycles of operation. 
Quantitative FTA would not be easy at this stage due to lack of statistical sample of 
failure modes and events, as the project is yet in top level design phase and specific 
components had not yet been decided.  
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The FTA of the under design project has followed a risk assessment of the Olympus gas 
turbine  operating regularly in the test house, which has been based on the experience 
of the staff of the test lab after a vast number of operation cycles and has revealed 
acceptable values of risk for that process. Hereon, major undesired top events are 
identified and added to the risk of the regular process of operation of the engine 
manually in the test lab. 
B.1.4 Top Events 
Two events have been identified as the worst case scenario during an Internet based 
operation of the engine. After the FTA for each event, a respective follow on event tree 
is shown.  
1. Total loss of command. In this situation, the engine runs without the 
capability of being controlled, neither through the Internet, nor manually. In 
that case, the only way of stopping it is to shut off the fuel supply manually, 
once the situation is realized. 
2. Erroneous command order. The engine does not follow an intended 
command but instead executes at power settings other than the desired. 
During this event, the manual control capability is considered to be available 
and the restoration of the desired power settings can be achieved once the 
situation is realized and the on – site user takes over manual control.  
B.1.5 Individual Events 
This section presents the individual events that if combined may lead to the 2 top 
undesirable events. These were then considered in the FTA followed by an Event Tree 
Analysis (ETS), presenting the potential consequences of the top events. 
 Total Loss of Command 
M. Loss of power supply 
N. Network connection loss 
O. Exploit attack 
P. Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
Q. User Misuse 
R. Undetected bugs triggered 
S. Manual control switch failure 
T. Connection – control hardware malfunction 
U. Intercom system failure 
V. Camera system failure 
W. Malware 
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X. Inside attack 
 Erroneous command order 
 A. User Misuse 
B. Undetected bugs triggered 
C. Connection – control hardware malfunction 
D. Engine Sensor Failure 
E. Exploit Attack 
F. DoS Attack 
G. Intercom system failure 
H. Camera system failure 
I. Malware 
J. Inside Attack 
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Figure B-1 FTA for Total loss of control event 
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Figure B-2 - ETA for Total loss of control event 
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Total Control Loss – Boolean analysis with Minimal Cut Sets 
Po: Top undesirable event 
Po = [G+(I+A)(J+A)][A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H] = 
 = (G+IJ+IA+JA+A)( A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H) = 
 = (G+IJ+A)( A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H) = 
 = G(A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H)+IJ(A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H)+A(A+B+C+D+E+F+K+L+H) =  
 = A+AG+GB+GC+GD+GE+GF+GK+GL+GH+IJA+IJB+IJC+IJD+IJE+IJF+IJK+IJL+IJH = 
 = A+GB+GC+GD+GE+GF+GK+GL+GH+IJB+IJC+IJD+IJE+IJF+IJK+IJL+IJH 
 Observations:  
• Large number of combinations: 17 minimal cut – sets 
• Event A is most dominant – Can contribute to top event just by itself 
• Events I, J and G is also in several sets (8)
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Figure B-3 - FTA for Undesirable Operation Command event 
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Figure B-4 - ETA for Undesirable Operation Command event   
 251 
 
 
Undesirable Operation Command – Minimal Cut – Sets 
Po: Top undesirable event 
Po = (G+H)[C+(D+C)+(A+B)+(E+F+I+J)]= 
 = GD+GC+GA+GB+GE+GF+GI+GJ+HC+HD+HA+HB+HE+HF+HI+HJ 
Observations:  
• Large number of combinations: 16 minimal cut – sets 
• Events G and H most dominant – present in several sets (8) 
• No triple combinations here – Easier for top event to occur 
• Events G and H are also dominant in total control loss event 
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B.2 HAZOP analysis for the primary design stage of the system 
B.2.1 Introduction 
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) analysis in accordance with BS IEC 61882:2001(HAZOP standard) is shown here for physical risk analysis 
and mitigation of the project in general and for the SRS procedural risk assessment.  
Table B-1 - HAZOP analysis of the overall project 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Comments Actions Required 
1. NO Switch Does not interchange 
circuits 
Internal mechanism 
failure 
No manual control 
available 
  Simple and reliable mechanism 
2. NO Control hardware 
modules system 
No signal generation Unstable Cable 
connections 
Inability to operate through 
Internet or PC 
 
  Secured wire connections 
Device failure Selection of standardized devices with 
known failure rate 
3. NO Measurement acquisition 
hardware modules 
system 
No signal acquisition Unstable Cable 
connections 
Wrong indications to the 
Control Software and User 
  Secured wire connections 
Device failure Selection of standardized devices with 
known failure rate 
4. NO Control Unit  No interaction with 
hardware and interface 
software 
Improper connection Inability to operate through 
Internet or PC 
 
  Secured wire connections 
Device failure Selection of standardized devices with 
known failure rate 
5. PART 
OF 
Engine Interface Software Inadequate communication 
with CS and hardware 
Weak programming Inconsistent control of the 
engine through Internet or 
PC 
  Thorough testing and validation 
Unstable interaction with 
CS 
Proper establishment of 
communication between EIS and CS 
Partial communication 
with control unit 
Compatible control unit 
 253 
 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Comments Actions Required 
6. PART 
OF 
Control Software Inconsistent interaction with 
other software components 
Triggering of undetected 
bugs 
Wrong response at certain 
input 
  Thorough testing and validation 
Malware System disabled Malware protection software, 
Restricted physical access 
DoS System inoperable Firewall(s), access through secure 
VPN, secure transfer protocols 
Exploit attacks Loss of data, deliberate 
damage 
Firewall(s), access through secure 
VPN, secure transfer protocols, IDS 
Insider attacks Loss of data, deliberate 
damage 
Restricted physical access 
User interface not user 
friendly 
Misuse of system from user Simple and practical UI design, Actual 
real time data display 
7 PART 
OF 
Condition checking 
system 
Partial check of condition 
parameters 
Software disruption as per 
el. 6 
Operation of engine out of 
limits, improper operation 
  As per actions 1-5 of el. 6 
Ambient conditions 
acquisition failure 
Reliable hardware and compatible 
interface software 
Power supply and network 
connection not checked 
Reliable hardware and compatible 
interface software 
8 PART 
OF 
Recorded data storage 
system 
Partial recording of required 
parameters 
As per causes 1-5 el. 6 Loss of recorded data  Not dangerous 
but important 
As per actions 1-5 el. 6 
9 NO Camera system No image No power supply Confusion among users   Power stabiliser 
Mechanical malfunction  Selection of equipment with known 
failure rate 
10 NO Intercom No voice communication No power supply Confusion among users   Power stabiliser 
Mechanical malfunction  Selection of equipment with known 
failure rate 
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No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Comments Actions Required 
11 PART 
OF 
Web Service Poor data transfer Unsatisfactory network 
connection 
Delay or loss of engine 
control 
  Server redundancy, device status 
detector 
Table B-2 - HAZOP analysis for the SRS process 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated 
and realised 
Lack of communication between 
involved parties 
Insufficient Requirements Exhaustive meetings and study of the case 
2. NO Testing of 
feasibility 
Project not 
checked if it could 
be constructed 
Sufficient information not available Insufficient Requirements - Often 
changes of requirements 
 
Research for similar applications 
3. PART OF System 
Requirements 
Clarity 
Disambiguity 
(ambiguity trap) 
Generic form of requirements Often changes of requirements  - Time 
delays 
Structured Form of requirements - Validation of 
requirements 
4. PART OF Identification of 
dependencies 
Hardware and 
Software 
dependencies not 
addressed 
Non functional requirements not clear –  
Components not directly specified 
Insufficient  requirements - Time delays Clarity of System Requirements 
5. NO Identification  of 
Physical risks 
Potential risks of 
the system during 
operation not 
identified 
Lack of information – 
Lack of related applications –  
Underestimation of the situation 
Changes at late stages of design difficult 
to apply  
Derivation of early stage design models of system 
6. PART OF Cost assessment Possible Cost not 
estimated  
Requirements not properly defined Failure to meet requirements Early stage cost assessment  - Evaluation of reusable 
components (Hardware/Software) 
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B.3 Round 1 Risk Assessment 
B.3.1 Round 1 Physical Risk Assessment 
Physical risk assessment of this phase was accomplished by application of Fault Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) in conjunction with 
Fault Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA), in accordance with BS EN 60812-2006. 
Table B-3 - FMECA for the cDAQ-9174 chassis 
Component: cDAQ -9174 chassis 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No interaction with 
I/O modules 
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No signal 
generation or 
readings from the 
engine 
Observe 
consistency of 
engine behavior 
with screen 
readings after 
every given 
command and 
component 
identification on 
the program 
Use within 
specified limits 
Marginal (II) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)  
Negligible (score 2) 
Embedded Software 
failure  
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate 
devices 
Marginal (II) Occasional – 
score 3 
Negligible (score 3) 
Table B-4 – FMECA for the NI 9263 Analogue Output Module 
 Component: NI 9263 Analog Output module 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No output signal 
generation  
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No signal 
generation  
Observe 
consistency of 
engine 
behavior with 
screen readings 
after every 
Use within 
specified limits 
Marginal (II) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)  
Negligible (score 2) 
Embedded Software 
failure  
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 Component: NI 9263 Analog Output module 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation given command  Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate 
devices 
Marginal (II) Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Negligible (score 3) 
Table B-5 - FMECA for the serial to USB converter 
Component: Tronisoft RS232 to USB cable 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Corrupted data Internal wiring – 
connectors chaffing 
or loosness 
Operation Incorrect flow 
indication 
Compare indication 
read on the PC with 
expected values for 
each position of 
throttle setting  
Use within specified 
limits 
Insignificant (I) Remote– score 
1 
0,001 ≤ Pi < 
0,01 
Negligible (score 2) 
Install securely to 
avoid accidental 
dislocation 
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Table B-6 – FMECA for the switch harnesses 
Component: AlsZone JR and FUTABA switch harnesses 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Switch does not 
interchange from 
PC to manual 
control or vice 
versa 
Switch circuit 
looseness 
Start or 
interchanging from 
PC control to 
manual or vice 
versa 
Inability to 
interchange from PC 
control to manual 
and vice versa if 
required 
Inspect functionality 
prior to operation 
Install securely 
and handle with 
proper care only 
by authorized 
staff 
Critical (III) Occasional – 
score 3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
Corrupted or no 
signal  
Connections 
dislocated or 
damaged 
Observe consistency 
of engine behavior 
with screen readings 
after every given 
command  
Install securely to 
avoid accidental 
dislocation. 
Also avoid custom 
interventions as 
much as possible 
 
Critical (III) Occasional – 
score 3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
Table B-7 - FMECA for the extension harnesses 
Component: AlsZone JR and FUTABA extension harnesses 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Corrupted or 
no signal  
Connections 
dislocated or 
damaged 
Operation Partial or total loss 
of control from PC 
Visual Inspection 
prior to operation 
Install securely to 
avoid accidental 
dislocation. 
Also avoid custom 
interventions as 
much as possible 
 
Critical (III) Occasional – 
score 3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
Observe consistency 
of engine behavior 
with screen readings 
after every given 
command  
Critical (III) Occasional – 
score 3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
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Table B-8 - FMECA for the connected PC 
Component: PC RM EXPERT 3000 
                        P/N: 181659(SGX) 
                        S/N: W047392103 
                        Processor: Intel Pentium 4HT 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Motherboard 
failure  
Electric power 
supply peaks 
Operation No connection 
with the 
engine and no 
monitoring 
Monitor the 
voltage of incoming 
power supply  
Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate devices 
Marginal (II) Remote – score 
2 
(0,001 ≤ Pi < 
0,01)  
Tolerable (score 4) 
Non deliberate 
shut down  
Electric power 
supply disruption  
Operation Marginal (II) Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Undesirable 
(score 9) 
Table B-9 - FMECA for the EIS 
Component: LabVIEW engine interface program* 
Failure Mode Causes Operating 
mode 
Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Crash after input 
of boundary 
values  
Undetected bugs – 
exceeding array 
boundaries 
Operation Loss of control and 
monitoring of the 
engine from the PC 
Program not 
responding and 
engine behavior 
does not match 
screen indications 
Verification and 
Validation of the 
designed VI. Unit 
testing, Integration 
testing of sub vi’s, 
boundary value 
testing and 
structural testing 
Critical (III) 
Not Available Not Available 
Engine monitoring 
parameters loss 
Inadequate 
integration of 
relevant VI’s for 
serial data input    
Operation Improper 
monitoring of the 
engine with 
possible erroneous 
command to follow 
Observe 
consistency of 
engine behavior 
with screen 
readings after 
every given 
command 
Marginal (II) 
Not Available Not Available 
No signal 
generation from 
the I/O module 
Incomplete set up of 
VI’s and respective 
ID’s  
Operation Loss of control of 
the engine from the 
PC 
Marginal (II) 
Not Available Not Available 
* Frequency of failures and consequently risk scores will be available after extensive testing during beta version of application release  
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B.3.2 Round 1 Procedural Risk Assessment 
Table B-10 – HAZOP process risk assessment for round 1 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated 
and realised 
Lack of understanding of 
the requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the 
requirements 
Thorough study of the requirements an 
clear breakdown of the objectives  
2. PART OF Testing and 
Validation 
Inadequate 
validation 
Lack of experience in the 
use of applied 
programming language 
Integration problems – 
requirements not 
properly met 
Perform unit testing and Integration 
tests of the sub components of which 
EIS comprises  
3. PART OF Identification of 
hardware 
dependencies 
Appropriate 
Hardware not 
purchased 
Objectives not 
understood or 
inadequate resource 
search  
Delay of the design Thorough study of the objectives and 
the resources of similar applications 
4. NO Identification of 
software 
dependencies 
Communication 
with programs in 
different language 
not investigated 
No similar applications 
immediately  
Delay of the design – 
Changes in later stages of 
the process 
Research for similar applications in the 
literature – practical investigation of 
interfacing approaches 
5. NO Identification  of 
Physical risks 
Potential risks of 
the system during 
operation not 
identified 
Lack of information – 
Lack of related 
applications –  
Underestimation of the 
situation 
Changes at late stages of 
design difficult to apply  
Physical risk assessment and 
identification of hazards – appropriate 
mitigation 
6. PART OF Cost assessment Implementation 
cost excessively 
high  
Narrow research of the 
market and the 
University for existing 
and available resources 
Restrictive cost which will 
lead to redesign affecting 
the whole software 
process 
Investigation for reusable existing 
components (hardware or software) – 
Wide search of the market  
B.4 Round 2 Risk Assessment 
No new hardware was introduced at this round of the Software Process. Therefore, only procedural risk assessment was conducted with 
the application of HAZOP. 
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Table B-11 – HAZOP procedural risk assessment for round 2 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated and 
realised 
Lack of understanding of the 
requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the requirements Thorough study of the requirements an clear 
breakdown of the objectives  
2. PART OF Testing and 
Validation 
Inadequate validation Not enough time  Integration problems – requirements 
not properly met 
Time management - Perform unit testing and 
Integration tests of the sub components of which EOCS 
comprises  
3. PART OF Installation of 
software 
components 
Components not 
installed 
appropriately 
Implications of different 
aspects of installation not 
understood or inadequate 
resource search  
Performance reduction or security 
issues 
Thorough study of the options and techniques for 
estimating propagation delay through networks 
4. NO Identification of 
software 
dependencies 
Communication with 
EIS incomplete 
No similar applications 
immediately  
Delay of the design – Changes in later 
stages of the process 
Research for similar applications in the literature – 
practical investigation of interfacing approaches 
6. PART OF Cost assessment Implementation cost 
excessively high  
Wide research for existing 
and available resources 
Restrictive cost which will lead to 
redesign affecting the whole software 
process 
Investigation for reusable existing components 
(hardware or software) – Wide search of the market  
B.5 Round 3 Risk assessment 
B.5.1 Round 3 procedural risk assessment 
Table B-12 - HAZOP procedural risk assessment for round 3 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated and 
realised 
Lack of understanding of the 
requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the 
requirements 
Thorough study of the requirements an clear breakdown 
of the objectives  
2. PART OF Testing and 
Validation 
Inadequate validation Not enough time  Integration problems – 
requirements not properly met 
Time management - Perform unit testing and Integration 
tests of the sub components of which EOCS comprises  
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3. NO Identification  of 
Physical risks 
Potential risks of the 
system during 
operation not 
identified 
Lack of information – 
Lack of related applications –  
Underestimation of the situation 
Changes at late stages of design 
difficult to apply  
Physical risk assessment and identification of hazards – 
appropriate mitigation 
4. NO Identification of 
software 
dependencies 
Communication with 
between modules 
incomplete 
No similar applications  Delay of the design – Changes in 
later stages of the process 
Research for similar applications in the literature – 
practical investigation of interfacing approaches 
5. NO Identification of 
hardware 
requirements 
Incomplete 
functionality of safety 
features 
No similar applications   Delay of the design – Changes in 
later stages of the process 
Research for similar applications in the literature – similar 
practical examples and manuals of suggested hardware 
components 
6. PART OF Cost assessment Implementation cost 
excessively high  
Narrow research of the market and 
the University for existing and 
available resources 
Restrictive cost which will lead to 
redesign affecting the whole 
software process 
Investigation for reusable existing components 
(hardware or software) – Wide search of the market  
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B.5.2 Round 3 physical risk assessment 
The method applied was Fault Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) in combination with Fault Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), in accordance with BS EN 60812-2006. 
Table B-13 – FMEA and FMECA for NI 9401 Digital I/O module 
Component: NI 9401 Digital I/O module 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No output signal 
generation  
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No fuel flow signal 
reception  
Observe 
consistency of 
engine 
behavior with 
screen readings 
after every 
given command  
Use within 
specified limits 
Insignificant (I) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)
  
Negligible 
(score 1) 
Embedded Software 
failure  
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate 
devices 
Insignificant (I) Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Tolerable 
(score 3) 
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Table B-14 - FMEA and FMECA for NI 9265 Thermocouple Input module 
Component: NI 9265 Thermocouple Input module 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No output signal 
generation  
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No signal 
generation  
Observe 
consistency of 
engine 
behavior with 
screen readings 
after every 
given command  
Use within 
specified limits 
Marginal (II) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)
  
Negligible 
(score 2) 
Embedded Software 
failure  
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate 
devices 
Marginal (II) Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Undesirable 
(score 6) 
Table B-15 - FMEA and FMECA for NI 9215 Analog Input module 
Component: NI 9215 Analog Input module 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure 
detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No output signal 
generation  
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No signal 
reception 
Inspect before 
operation  
Use within 
specified limits 
Marginal (II) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)
  
Negligible 
(score 2) 
Embedded Software 
failure  
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate 
devices 
Marginal (II) Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Undesirable 
(score 6) 
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Table B-16 - FMEA and FMECA for NI 9924 25 pin DSUB to terminal connector box 
Component: NI 9924 25 pin DSUB to terminal connector box 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No signal 
reception  
Internal circuit 
malfunction 
Operation No fuel flow 
signal input 
Observe 
consistency of 
engine behavior 
with screen 
readings after 
every given 
command and 
check condition of 
connected 
components via 
LabVIEW 
Use within specified 
limits 
Insignificant (I) Improbable – 
score 1 
(0 ≤ Pi < 0,001)
  
Negligible 
(score 1) 
Connection 
chaffing 
Improper wiring by 
the user  
Operation Improper fuel 
flow signal 
input 
Follow the 
manufacturer’s 
instructions properly 
Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Tolerable 
(score 3) 
Component 
inoperative 
Power disruption Operation No fuel flow 
signal input 
Ensure power 
stability with 
appropriate devices 
Occasional – 
score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Tolerable 
(score 3) 
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Table B-17 - FMEA and FMECA for Floscan 201-A6 Fuel Flow Transducer 
Component:  Floscan 201-A6 Fuel Flow Transducer 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
No signal  Internal rotor failure Operation No fuel flow 
indication 
Compare indication 
read on the PC with 
expected values for 
each position of 
throttle setting  
Use within specified 
limits 
Insignificant (I) Remote– score 1 
0,001 ≤ Pi < 0,01
 
Negligible 
(score 2) 
Incorrect flow 
indication 
 
Improper 
connection by the 
user or wrong 
adjustment of the K-
Factor 
Operation 
 
Incorrect fuel 
flow 
indication 
Follow the 
manufacturer’s 
instructions properly 
Occasional – score 
3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Tolerable 
(score 3) 
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Table B-18 - FMEA and FMECA for Trust EXIS Chat Pack webcam 
Component: Trust EXIS Chat Pack webcam 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Failure to start Not triggered by 
used software 
(OpenCV) 
Operation No live video 
image 
Run the program  Restart program Insignificant (I) Occasional – score 3 
(0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1) 
Tolerable 
(score 3) 
Mechanical failure  Vibration and noise 
in the test house 
Operation No live video 
image 
Check daily before 
first run of the 
engine 
Place in safe 
distance from the 
engine 
Insignificant (I) Remote– score 1 
0,001 ≤ Pi < 0,01 
Negligible 
(score 2) 
 
Table B-19 - FMEA and FMECA for Maplin 500mA AC to AC Mains Adaptor, N57AT 
Component: Maplin 500mA AC to AC Mains Adaptor, N57AT 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Internal failure  Power surge Start  or Operating Impossible to 
determine voltage of 
main supply 
Inspect functionality 
prior to operation 
Redundancy Critical (III) Improbable – 
score 1 
0,001 ≤ Pi < 
0,01
 
Tolerable (score 3) 
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Component: Maplin 500mA AC to AC Mains Adaptor, N57AT 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Connection 
failure  
Connections not 
properly secured 
Unstable or no 
indication of voltage 
of main supply 
Inspect functionality 
prior to operation 
Install securely to 
avoid accidental 
dislocation. 
Also avoid custom 
interventions as 
much as possible 
Critical (III) Occasional – 
score 3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
Table B-20 – FMEA and FMECA for Maplin LED indication lights 60.13.C1 
Component: Maplin LED indication lights 60.13.C1 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Internal failure  Power surge Start  or Operating Impossible to 
indicate need for 
manual control 
reception 
Inspect functionality 
prior to operation 
Redundancy Critical (III) Remote– score 1 
0,001 ≤ Pi < 0,01
 
Tolerable (score 3) 
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Component: Maplin LED indication lights 60.13.C1 
Failure Mode Causes Operating mode Failure effects  Failure detection 
method 
Mitigation Severity Frequency Risk 
Connection 
failure  
Connections not 
properly secured 
Unstable or no 
indication of need 
for manual control 
reception 
Inspect functionality 
prior to operation 
Install securely to 
avoid accidental 
dislocation. 
Also avoid custom 
interventions as 
much as possible 
 
Critical (III) Occasional – score 
3 
0,01 ≤ Pi < 0,1 
Undesirable (score9) 
B.6 Round 4 Risk Assessment 
Only procedural risk assessment was applicable at this round. 
Table B-21 - HAZOP procedural risk assessment for round 3 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated and 
realised 
Lack of understanding of the 
requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the 
requirements 
Thorough study of the requirements an clear 
breakdown of the objectives  
2. PART OF Testing and 
Validation 
Inadequate validation Not enough time  Integration problems – 
requirements not properly 
met 
Time management - Perform unit testing 
and Integration tests of the sub components 
and the integrated web application  
3. NO Identification  of 
Internet 
connection risks 
Bad connections or 
disrupted networks 
not considered 
Slow networks  – 
Abrupt power loss – 
intermediate server failure 
Unreliable final application  Evaluate the problem and accommodate 
safety features at appropriate positions 
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No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated and 
realised 
Lack of understanding of the 
requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the 
requirements 
Thorough study of the requirements an clear 
breakdown of the objectives  
4. NO Identification of 
software 
dependencies 
Communication with 
application from 
browser incomplete 
No similar applications  Delay of the design – 
Modifications 
Research for similar applications in the 
literature – practical investigation of web 
applications and web services 
5. PART OF Cost assessment Implementation cost 
excessively high  
Narrow research of the 
market and the University 
for existing and available 
resources 
Restrictive cost which will 
lead to redesign affecting the 
whole software process 
Investigation for reusable existing 
components (hardware or software) – Wide 
search of the market  
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B.7 Round 5 Risk Assessment 
Only procedural risk assessment was applicable at this round. 
Table B-22 - HAZOP procedural risk assessment for round 5 
No Guide 
Word 
Element Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Actions Required 
1. PART OF Objectives 
Identification 
Not clearly stated 
and realised 
Lack of understanding of the 
requirements 
Partial fulfillment of the requirements Thorough study of the requirements an clear breakdown of 
the objectives  
2. PART OF Selection of 
validation 
method 
Not easily applicable Lack of experience in formal 
validation methods   
Delay and insufficient validation – 
Problems at released version of 
application 
Extensive research about available methods and software 
tools  in safety critical systems and the aviation industry 
3. PART OF Derivation of 
test cases 
Insufficient test 
cases to obtain 
100% DC 
Improper static analysis of the 
cod – partial identification of 
application states and transitions 
Insufficient validation – Problems at 
released version of application 
Thorough static analysis of the code  - Revisit the validation 
of the individual modules – Study the requirements 
accomplishment 
4. PART OF Validation 
coverage 
Insufficient 
coverage 
Ambiguities of the requirements 
– Inadequate test cases – partial 
identifications of application 
states  
Insufficient validation – Problems at 
released version of application 
Revisit and finalization of the requirements - Revisit the 
validation of the individual modules – Thorough state 
models creation – Perform additional final testing beyond 
the requirements testing to ensure 100% DC coverage 
5. PART OF Cost 
assessment 
Use of non open 
source software 
tools for validation - 
cost excessively high  
Lack of experience in formal 
validation methods  - unsuitable 
selection of method due to lack 
of experience 
Restrictive cost which will lead to delay 
of release and problems after 
Research for similar application in the aviation industry – 
Definition of suitable approach - Investigation for open 
source tools   
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Appendix C Software Components Control Flow Validation 
This Appendix is divided in 3 main sections: LabVIEW components, Java SE components and 
the JavaScript client. The control flow diagram for each module is shown and based on these 
the cyclomatic complexity was calculated and used as guidance for the identification of the 
possible flow paths shown in the corresponding validation tables. The latter include the test 
derived test cases with the required assertions.  
C.1 LabVIEW components 
C.1.1 Switch Signal function 
 
Figure C-1 – EIS.VI Switch Signal function control flow 
Nodes: n = 7 
Edges: e = 7 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 7 – 7 + 2 = 2 
Individual flow paths: 2  
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Table C-1 – Test cases for EIS.VI Switch Signal function 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1 {n1n2n5n6n7} Switch selected, Battery = False No signal generated 
2 {n1n2n3n4n5n6n7} Switch selected, Battery = True Signal generated 
Note: Output signal measured and found to be according to manufacturer’s specification for all 3 
positions of the switch knob.  
C.1.2 Throttle Signal function 
 
Figure C-2 - EIS.VI Throttle Signal function control flow 
Nodes: n = 7 
Edges: e = 7 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 7 – 7 + 2 = 2 
Individual flow paths: 2  
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Table C2 - Test cases for EIS.VI Throttle Signal function 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1 {n1n2n5n6n7} Switch selected, Battery = False No signal generated 
2 {n1n2n3n4n5n6n7} Switch selected, Battery = True Signal generated 
Note: As throttle slider can take 101 positions, boundary values of output signal were 
measured and found to be according to manufacturer’s specification. Also selective values of 
output signal within regular intervals of 20% of the throttle movement were measured and 
found to be according to manufacturer’s specification. 
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C.1.3 EIS.vi ECU Serial function 
 
Figure C-3 - EIS.vi ECU Serial function control flow 
Nodes: n = 33 
Edges: e = 50 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 50 – 33 + 2 = 19 
Individual flow paths: 19 
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Table C-3 - Test cases for EIS.vi ECU Serial function 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n12n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=1 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch off indication 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n13n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=2 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  auto stop indication 
3.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n14n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=9 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch off & start 
clear indication 
4.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n15n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=10 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  auto start & start 
clear indication 
5.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n16n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=20 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch on & starting 
indication 
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n17n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=28 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch on & start 
clear & starting indication 
7.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n18n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=36 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch on & started 
up indication 
8.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n19n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=100 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch on & started 
up & idle calibrated indication 
9.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n20n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]=228 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  switch on & started 
up & idle calibrated & Max RPM indication 
10.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n9n11n11n22n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]!=0|6, normalData[0]= any other value EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  no engine status 
indication 
11.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n7n8n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=6 Vsupply updated 
12.  
{n1n2n3n8n32n33} Battery = False No indications and updates 
13.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n24n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=1 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  RPM low indication 
14.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n25n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=2 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  Switch Channel not 
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Test Case Path Description Assertions 
present indication 
15.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n26n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=4 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  Throttle Channel not 
present indication 
16.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n27n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=8 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  EGT High indication 
17.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n28n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=16 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  Supply Voltage 
indication 
18.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n29n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=32 EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  RPM High indication 
19.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n23n30n31n32n33} Battery = True, array[0]=0,errorData[0]=any other value EGT, RPM, throttle, Vout updated -  No error indication 
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C.1.4 EIS.vi integration testing 
 
Figure C-4 – EIS.vi Integration testing control flow diagram  
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Nodes: n = 11 
Edges: e = 15 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 15 – 11 + 2 = 6 
Individual flow paths: 6 
 
Table C-4 - Test cases for EIS.vi integration testing 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n17n18n19n20} Start RMI server – start MEOCS – close MEOCS  MEOCS closed – RMI server reset and ready 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n12 n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – send battery, throttle or switch 
command 
General Test Harness settings change accordingly 
3.  
{ n1n2n3n4n5n7n9n12n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – send corrupted command using 
TCPClient harness 
General Test Harness settings remain unchanged 
4.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n13n14n15n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – Alter the output message of 
General Test Harness in a wrong format – Send any command from 
MEOCS 
MEOCS indications do not change 
5.  
{ n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n13n14n15n16n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – Alter the output message of 
General Test Harness in a wrong format – Alter the timeout of 
reception socket in class MessageImplementation - Send any 
command from MEOCS 
MEOCS and EISI shut down - RMI server reset and 
ready 
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n11n14n15n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS - Send any command from MEOCS MEOCS and EISI shut down - RMI server reset and 
ready 
7.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n11n14n15n16n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS - Send any command from MEOCS General Test Harness settings change accordingly 
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C.1.5 EIS System Status Determination function 
  
 
Figure C-5 – System Status Determination function control flow 
Nodes: n = 34 
Edges: e = 27 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 34 – 27 + 2 = 9 
Individual flow paths: 9 
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Table C-5 - Test cases for System Status Determination function 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n5n27} systemReady = FALSE systemStatusFlag = 1 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n16n27} systemReady & Node6 = TRUE systemStatusFlag = 8 
3.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n11n20n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6* = FALSE & serialInputError = TRUE & 
switchSignalError = TRUE 
systemStatusFlag = 5 
4.  
{ n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n11n13n17n21n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = TRUE & 
switchSignalError = FALSE & throttleSignalError = TRUE 
systemStatusFlag = 6 
5.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n11n13n17n22n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = TRUE & 
switchSignalError = FALSE & throttleSignalError = FALSE 
systemStatusFlag = 2 
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n12n14n18n23n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = FALSE & 
switchSignalError = TRUE & throttleSignalError = TRUE 
systemStatusFlag = 7 
7.  
{ n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n12n14n18n24n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = FALSE & 
switchSignalError = TRUE & throttleSignalError = FALSE 
systemStatusFlag = 3 
8.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n12n15n19n25n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = FALSE & 
switchSignalError =FALSE & throttleSignalError = TRUE 
systemStatusFlag = 4 
9.  
{ n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n12n15n19n26n27} systemReady  = TRUE & Node6 = FALSE & serialInputError = FALSE & 
switchSignalError =FALSE & throttleSignalError = FALSE 
systemStatusFlag = 0 
*Node6 = serialInputError & switchSignalError & throttleSignalError 
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C.1.6 Mains Supply Interface System (MSIS) of AmbientSensing.vi 
 
Figure C-6 – Mains Supply Interface System (MSIS) control flow 
Nodes: n = 10 
Edges: e = 11 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 11 – 10 + 2 = 3 
Individual flow paths: 3 
Table C-6 – Test cases for Mains Supply Interface System (MSIS) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n9n10} Run function normally elapsedTimeS = 0 – mainsFlag = 0 
2.  
{n1n2n3n5n6n7n9n10} Unplug AC/AC adapter & in 
time < 10 sec re plug it 
elapsedTimeS != 0 – mainsFlag = 0  
After re-plugging: elapsedTimeS != 0 – mainsFlag = 0  
3.  
{ n1n2n3n5n6n8n9n10} Unplug AC/AC adapter and 
leave out fot time > 10 sec 
elapsedTimeS != 0 – mainsFlag = 0  
After 10 sec: elapsedTimeS >10 sec – mainsFlag = 1 
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C.2 Java SE components 
C.2.1 EIS Interface 
 
Figure C-7 – EIS Interface (EISI) control flow 
Nodes: n = 20 
Edges: e = 25 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 25 – 20 + 2 = 7 
Individual flow paths: 3 
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Table C-7 – Test cases for EIS Interface (EISI) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n17n18n19n20} Start RMI server – start MEOCS – close MEOCS  MEOCS closed – RMI server reset and ready 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n12 n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – send battery, throttle or switch 
command 
General Test Harness settings change accordingly 
3.  
{ n1n2n3n4n5n7n9n12n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – send corrupted command using 
TCPClient harness 
General Test Harness settings remain unchanged 
4.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n13n14n15n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – Alter the output message of General 
Test Harness in a wrong format – Send any command from MEOCS 
MEOCS indications do not change 
5.  
{ n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n13n14n15n16n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS – Alter the output message of General 
Test Harness in a wrong format – Alter the timeout of reception socket in 
class MessageImplementation - Send any command from MEOCS 
MEOCS and EISI shut down - RMI server reset and 
ready 
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n11n14n15n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS - Send any command from MEOCS MEOCS and EISI shut down - RMI server reset and 
ready 
7.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n6n10n11n14n15n16n17n18n19n20} RMI Server running – start MEOCS - Send any command from MEOCS General Test Harness settings change accordingly 
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C.2.2 Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS) 
 
Figure C-8 – Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS) control flow 
Nodes: n = 31 
Edges: e = 39 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 39 – 31 + 2 = 10 
Individual flow paths: 10 
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Table C-8 – Test cases for Main Engine Operation Control Software (MEOCS) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n31} MEOCS already in operation or ports 1111, 4444, 1212, 1099, 3311, 9999 
occupied  
MEOCS closed 
2.  
{n1n2n3n6n7n11n10n22n23n31} Input engine data not as specified format from TCPClient test harness Indications not change 
3.  
{ n1n2n3n6n7n11n12n22n23n31} Input engine data as specified format from TCPClient test harness Indications change  
4.  
{ n1n2n3n6n8n13n5n31} MEOCS running and select exit MEOCS closed and EISI closed as well 
5.  
{n1n2n3n6n8n9n15 n14n18n24n31} Click and hold the throttle slider and move without releasing Throttle setting of General Test Harness does not 
change 
6.  
{n1n2n3n6n8n9n15 n14n18n19n25n24n31} Insert a throttle increase more than 20% in the throttle slider Throttle returns to previous position - Throttle 
setting of General Test Harness does not change 
7.  
{ n1n2n3n6n8n9n15 n14n18n19n25n28n30n31} Insert a throttle increase less than 20% in the throttle slider Throttle setting changes in General Test Harness 
along with indications 
8.  
{ n1n2n3n6n8n9n15n16n21n20n26n24n30n31} Click and hold the switch slider and move without releasing Switch position indication of General Test Harness 
does not change 
9.  
{n1n2n3n6n8n9n15n16n21n20n26n27n29n30n31} Set the switch slider to a new position Switch position indication of General Test Harness 
changes accordingly 
10.  
{ n1n2n3n6n8n9n15n16n21n17n30n31} Select the Battery toggle button Battery position of General Test Harness changes 
accordingly 
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C.2.3 Trouble Shooting System (TSS) 
Due to the complexity of this module, the control flow testing was conducted in 3 stages: 
from node 1 to node 26 (CF1), from node 26 to node 39 (CF2) and node 26 analysed into its 
contained simple actions. Node 26 represents the functionality that conducts the checks 
regarding the mains power supply status. 
Prerequisites for CF1:  
1. TCPClient test harness used to send MEOCS format commands 
2. TCPServer test harness engaged to accept output from TSS 
3. Class TSSCentral in package TSS.tss modified to include main function 
4. General Test Harness initiated by TSSCentral main function 
Prerequisites for CF2 and Mains Power Supply functionality: 
1. Class TSSCentral in package TSS.tss TSSCentral configured with mainTss static method 
instead of main() function 
2. MEOCS, EISI and GTH engaged 
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Figure C-9 – Trouble Shooting System (TSS) control flow 
CF1 (nodes 1 – 26):       CF2 (nodes 26 - 39): 
Nodes: n = 26        Nodes: n = 14 
Edges: e = 30        Edges: e = 17 
Cyclomatic Complexity:      Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 30 – 26 + 2 = 6     VG = e – n + 2 = 17 – 14 + 2 = 5 
Individual flow paths: 6      Individual flow paths: 5 
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Table C-9 – Test cases for CF1 of Trouble Shooting System (TSS) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n10n11n13n14n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Let throttle setting 
more than 10 sec stable  
elapsed Time = multiple of 10 sec at check point 1 on IDE output field  -  
compareMode = TRUE and throttleReference = 0 at check point 2 on IDE output field 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n10n12n13n14n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Give throttle 
change command throttle on TCPClient and bring 
back to previous position immediately 
elapsed Time = multiple of 10 sec at check point 1 on IDE output field  -  
compareMode = FALSE and throttleReference = 0 at check point 2 on IDE output field 
3.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n9n15n16n18n19n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Let throttle setting 
more than 10 sec stable 
elapsed Time = !multiple of 10 sec at check point 1 on IDE output field – elapsedTime2 
= multiple of 0.5 sec at check point 3  on IDE output - throttleReference = value.equals 
throttle setting – check point 4 on IDE output indicates “throttleReference Updated”  
4.  
{n1n2n3n4n5n7n9n15n17n18n19n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Let throttle setting 
more than 10 sec stable 
elapsed Time = !multiple of 10 sec at check point 1 on IDE output field – 
elapsedTime2! = multiple of 0.5 sec at check point 3  on IDE output - 
throttleReference = value.equals throttle setting – check point 4 on IDE output 
indicates “throttleReference not Updated”  
5.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n20n21n22n23n24n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Let throttle setting 
more than 10 sec stable 
compareMode = TRUE at check point 2 on IDE output field - check point 5 on IDE 
output indicates “Booleans set”  
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n20n22n23n24n25n26} GTH simulating engine running  - Let throttle on 
MEOCS more than 10 sec stable – Give throttle 
change command throttle on TCPClient 
compareMode = FALSE at check point 6 on IDE output  
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Table C-10 - Test cases for CF1 of Trouble Shooting System (TSS) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n26n27n28n29} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert RPM or EGT ≥ absolute 
limit 
Respective red warning illuminates on MEOCS panel 
and system shutdown – RMI server ready to accept 
connection 
2.  
{ n26n27n29n30n28n39} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert MAINS OFF and no 
commands for 3 min 
Respective yellow warning illuminates on MEOCS 
panel – After 3 min elapsed time  system shutdown 
– RMI server ready to accept connection 
3.  
{n26n27n29n30n31n32n33n35n28n39} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert RPM or EGT > relative 
limit for current throttle setting and no commands for 3 min 
Respective yellow warning illuminates on MEOCS 
panel – After 3 min elapsed time  system shutdown 
– RMI server ready to accept connection 
4.  
{ n26n27n29n30n31n32n33n35n36n37n38n39} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert RPM or EGT > relative 
limit for current throttle setting and no commands for 2.5 min 
Respective yellow warning illuminates on MEOCS 
panel 
5.  
{ n26n27n29n30n31n32n34n37n38n39} GTH simulating engine running – hit exit on MEOCS panel system shutdown – RMI server ready to accept 
connection 
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Figure C-10 – Mains Power Supply functionality of TSS - control flow 
Nodes: n = 11 
Edges: e = 12 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 12 – 11 + 2 = 3 
Individual flow paths: 3 
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Table C-11 – Test cases for Mains Power Supply functionality of TSS 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n711} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert MAINS OFF and no 
commands for 3 min 
Respective yellow warning illuminates on MEOCS panel – After 3 min 
elapsed time  system shutdown – RMI server ready to accept connection 
2.  
{ n1n2n3n4n6n8n9n10n11} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert MAINS OFF and no 
commands for 2.5 min – After 2.5 min hit exit on MEOCS panel 
Respective yellow warning illuminates on MEOCS panel – After 2.5 min 
and prior to 3 min system shutdown – RMI server ready to accept 
connection due to user action 
3.  
{n1n2n3n5n9n10n11} GTH simulating engine running   - On GTH panel insert MAINS ON and no 
commands for 3 min – After 3 min hit exit on MEOCS pan 
System shutdown – RMI server ready to accept connection due to user 
action 
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C.2.4 General Test Harness (GTH) 
 
Figure C-11 – General Test Harness control flow 
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Nodes: n = 23 
Edges: e = 27 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 27 – 23 + 2 = 6 
Individual flow paths: 6 
 
Table C-12 – Test cases for General Test Harness (GTH) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n5n22n23} Click on SYSTEM toggle button SYSTEM NOT READY indication – all readings 0 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n5n22n23} SYSTEM ON – send request with flag 001.00 or 002.00 from 
TCPClient 
Battery indication OFF – No other indications 
3.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n8n9n10n11n14n15n16n17n18n21n22n23} SYSTEM ON – send request 000.00001.00 from TCPClient  Battery indication ON – Readings indications 
change appropriately 
4.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n8n9n10n12n14n15n16n17n18n21n22n23} SYSTEM ON – send request 000.00001.00 from TCPClient - 
send request with 001.00 from TCPClient  
Switch Indication changes accordingly 
5.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n8n9n10n13n14n15n16n17n18n21n22n23} SYSTEM ON – send request 000.00001.00 from TCPClient - 
send request with 002.00 from TCPClient  
Throttle Indication and other indications change 
accordingly 
6.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n8n9n10n13n14n15n16n17n18n19n20n21n22n23} SYSTEM ON – send request 000.00001.00 from TCPClient - 
send request with 002.00 from TCPClient  
Throttle Indication and other indications change 
accordingly – randomness added to RPM and EGT 
(they differ from nominal value for that setting) 
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C.3 JavaScript client (interface.js) functions 
C.3.1 Control buttons functionality 
 
Figure C-12 – Control buttons functionality – control flow 
Prerequisites: 
1. Web page with YUI buttons running  
2. Web console of browser open 
3. Test cases 1-3 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
4. Test case 4, 5 with IE6 or earlier
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Nodes: n = 14 
Edges: e = 17 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 17 – 14 + 2 = 5 
Individual flow paths: 5 
 
Table C-13 – Test cases for Control buttons functionality of interface.js 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n10n11n13n14} Click on tested button On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
changed to green and in 2 seconds back to whitesmoke 
2.  
{n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n10n12n13n14} On server side change return in CommandResource root methods to 
‘not ok’ – click on tested button 
On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour does 
not change 
3.  
{ n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n13n14} Distort connection with server – click on tested button – repeat click On web console status !=200 – no further requests are transmitted 
on click  
4.  
{n1n2n3n5n6n7n8n9n10n11n13n14} Click on tested button On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
changed to green and in 2 seconds back to whitesmoke 
5.  
{n1n2n3n5n6n7n8n9n10n12n13n14} On server side change return in CommandResource root methods to 
‘not ok’ – click on tested button 
On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour does 
not change 
* Battery On button request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/1/1" 
   Battery Off button request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/1/0" 
   Stop button request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/2/0" 
   AutoStop button request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/2/1" 
   Run button request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/2/2" 
 296 
 
 
C.3.2 Throttle slider functionality 
 
Figure C-13 – Throttle slider functionality control flow 
Prerequisites: 
• Web page with YUI slider running  
• Web console of browser open 
• Test cases 1-4 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
• Test case 5 with IE6 or earlier 
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Nodes: n = 20 
Edges: e = 23 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 23 – 20 + 2 = 5 
Individual flow paths: 5 
Table C-14 – Test cases for Throttle Slider functionality 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1. 
{n1n2n3n5n7n8n9n10n12n13n14n15n16n17n19n20} Move slider pointer On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
changed to green and in 2 seconds back to whitesmoke – slider 
text field updated accordingly 
2. 
{n1n2n3n6n7n8n9n10n12n13n14n15n16n17n19n20} Change setting in throttle text field On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
changed to green and in 2 seconds back to whitesmoke – slider 
updated accordingly 
3. 
{n1n2n3n5n7n8n9n10n12n13n14n15n16n18n19n20} On server side change return in CommandResource root 
methods to ‘not ok’ – Move slider pointer 
On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
does not change 
4. 
{n1n2n3n5n7n8n9n10n12n13n14n19n20} Distort connection with server – Move slider pointer – repeat 
move slider pointer 
On web console status !=200 – no further requests are 
transmitted on click  
5. 
{n1n2n3n5n7n8n9n11n12n13n14n15n16n17n19n20} Move slider pointer On web console request* is shown – On specified field colour 
changed to green and in 2 seconds back to whitesmoke – slider 
text field updated accordingly 
* Slider request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/command/3/{integer rang 0-100}" 
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C.3.3 Quit execution function (quitPage) 
 
Figure C-14 – Quit execution function (quitPage) control flow 
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Prerequisites: 
Check point 1: printout ‘request received’at StopResource() root methods    Nodes: n = 15 
• Check point 2: printout ‘request received’at readAmbResource() root methods   Edges: e = 17  
• Check point 3: printout ‘request received’at readEngResource() root methods  Cyclomatic Complexity:  
• readAmb() and reading() functions already embedded      VG = e – n + 2 = 17 – 15 + 2 = 4 
• Web console of browser open         Independent flow paths: 4 
• Test cases 1-3 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
• Test case 4 with IE6 or earlier 
Table C-15 – Test cases for Quit execution function (quitPage) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1. {n1n2n3n15} Modify variable check on page source to be check = 1 
– select Exit  
On web console no request* is shown – On server side no request 
confirmation is printed at check point 1 
2. {n1n2n3n4n5n6n8n9n10n11n12n13n14n15} select Exit On web console request* is shown – Page changes theme prior to closure – 
no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
3. {n1n2n3n4n5n6n8n9n10} Distort connection with server On web console request* is shown – Page changes theme prior to closure – 
no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
4. {n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n9n10n11n12n13n14n15} select Exit On web console request* is shown – Page changes theme prior to closure – 
no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
* Request form: "GET","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/stop" 
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C.3.4 Logout function (logoutPage) 
 
Figure C-156 – Logout function (logoutPage) control flow 
Prerequisites: 
• Check point 4: printout ‘request received’at LogoutResource() root methods 
• Check point 2: printout ‘request received’at readAmbResource() root methods 
• Check point 3: printout ‘request received’at readEngResource() root methods 
• readAmb() and reading() functions already embedded 
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• Web console of browser open 
• Test cases 1,2 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
• Test case 3 with IE6 or earlier
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Nodes: n = 14 
Edges: e = 15 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 15 – 14 + 2 = 3 
Independent flow paths: 3 
 
Table C-16 – Test cases for logout function (logoutPage) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1. {n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n9n10n11n12n13n14} Select logout  On web console request* is shown – Request confirmation printout at check point 4 
- Page changes theme – no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
2. {n1n2n3n4n5n7n8n9n11n12n13n14 Distort connection with server – select logout On web console request* is shown – error message displayed – no requests 
confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 and 4 
3. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n10n11n12n13n14} Select logout  On web console request* is shown – Request confirmation printout at check point 4 
- Page changes theme – no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
* Request form: "GET","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/logout" 
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C.3.5 Ambient data and TSS warnings acquisition function 
 
Figure C-167 – Ambient data and TSS warnings acquisition function (readAmb) control flow 
Prerequisites: 
• Check point 2: printout ‘request received’at readAmbResource() root methods 
• Check point 3: printout ‘request received’at readEngResource() root methods 
• All other functions already embedded 
• Web console of browser open 
• Test cases 1-3 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
• Test case 4 with IE6 or earlier
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Nodes: n = 14 
Edges: e = 16 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 16 – 14 + 2 = 4 
Independent flow paths: 4 
 
Table C-18 – Test cases for ambient data and TSS warnings acquisition function (readAmb) control flow 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n10n12n13n14} Open page  On web console request* is shown – Ambient parameters indications 
are displayed in fields as expected – requests confirmation printouts at 
check points 2 and 3 
2. {n1n2n3n4n5n6n8n9n10n10n12n13n14n15} Modify ReadAmbResource() root methods to return ‘fail’ On web console request* is shown – Page shows error message – no 
requests shown in web console - no requests confirmation printouts at 
check points 2 and 3 
3. {n1n2n3n4n5n6n8n9n10} Distort connection with server On web console request* is shown – Page shows error message – no 
requests shown in web console - no requests confirmation printouts at 
check points 2 and 3 
4. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n10n12n13n14} Open page  On web console request* is shown – Ambient parameters indications 
are displayed in fields as expected – requests confirmation printouts at 
check points 2 and 3 
* Request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/readAmb" 
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C.3.6 Engine data and system status acquisition function 
 
Figure C-17 – Engine data and system status acquisition function (readEng) control flow 
Prerequisites: 
• Check point 2: printout ‘request received’at readAmbResource() root methods 
• Check point 3: printout ‘request received’at readEngResource() root methods 
• All other functions already embedded 
• Web console of browser open 
• Test cases 1, 2 with IE7 or later, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari 
• Test case 3 with IE6 or earlier
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Nodes: n = 14 
Edges: e = 16 
Cyclomatic Complexity: 
VG = e – n + 2 = 16 – 14 + 2 = 4 
Independent flow paths: 4 
 
Table C 19 – Test cases for engine data and system status acquisition function (readEng) 
Test Case Path Description Assertions 
1. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n11n12} Open page  On web console request* is shown – Engine parameters indications are displayed in fields as 
expected – requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
2. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n10n11n12} Distort connection with server On web console request* is shown – Page shows error message – no requests shown in web 
console - no requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
3. {n1n2n3n4n6n7n8n9n11n12} Open page  On web console request* is shown – Engine parameters indications are displayed in fields as 
expected – requests confirmation printouts at check points 2 and 3 
* Request form: "POST","/InternetGasturbine/webresources/readEng" 
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Appendix D Acceptance and Final Validation 
D.1 State machines and NuSMV models 
D.1.1 State machine SM0 
 
Figure D-1 - State machine of main web application (SM0) 
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The NuSMV model for sm0 contains a main module that includes 1 state variable (VAR) state 
and 9 input variables (IVAR) that represent all the potential inputs from the user. By initially 
assigning the state variable state to the value ready, all the possible next values were 
exhaustively defined according to the pervious value of the state variable and the user input 
(Figure D-2).   
 
Figure D-2 - NuSMV model for main state machine sm0 of the application 
There were 11 CTL specifications defined upon the previous NuSMV model. They involved 
AG and EX formulae implying global investigation for transition from one state to the next 
(Figure D-3). Had these specifications not been negated, they would have been evaluated 
true. However, the negation leads the program to produce counter examples showing the 
potential test cases (Figure D-4Figure D-4 – Counterexample for specification 0.5 of NuSMV 
model of sm0). 
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Figure D-3 – CTL specifications for NuSMV model of sm0 
 
Figure D-4 – Counterexample for specification 0.5 of NuSMV model of sm0
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D.1.2 State machine SM1 
 
Figure D-5 - State machine of engine start sub state (SM1) 
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The same approach was followed for sm1, with AG and AX formulae to define ten CTL 
specifications (Figure D-7). The model in this case was more complicated, as there was a 
combination of state variables to describe the transitional states (Figure D-6). The model was 
attempted to be designed as a descriptive abstraction of the actual variables involved in the 
start modes of the application. The start state is identical to the end state, which represents 
the program running but the gas turbine not.    
 
Figure D-6 - NuSMV model for sm1 of the application  
 
Figure D-7 - CTL specifications for NuSMV model of sm1 
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D.1.3 State Machine SM2 
 
Figure D-8 - State machine of engine running sub state (SM2) 
The model corresponding to sm2 (Figure D-8) applied 2 approaches for the definition of the 
specifications (Figure D-9). The main one was identical to the previous models, using CTL 
with AG and EX formulae. With the throttle input as an input variable and a combination of 
state variables, the model navigated throughout the whole envelope of the throttle settings, 
being advanced in intervals of 20%.  The second approach applied LTL to show that the 
model would not allow direct advance from a state where the engine and the related 
indications correspond to idle throttle, to a state that represents 100% throttle. In the last 
case, the LTL counterexample indicated that such a transition would be possible only by 
intervals of 20% throttle increase maximum. 
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Figure D-9 - NuSMV model for SM2  
 
Figure D-10 – LTL and CTL specifications for NuSMV model of SM2 
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D.1.4 State machine SM3 
 
Figure D-11 - State machine of engine stop and mains power supply monitoring sub state (SM3) 
The model of sm3 (Figure D-12) represents the normal shutdown of the engine along with 
automatic shutdown from the program based on power supply loss. This model applies the 
mostly common herein approach with CTL and, AG and EX formulae for the definition of 7 
specifications (Figure D-13). However, one more specification was defined with the use of 
AG and EF formulae. This was expected to produce a counterexample that if the engine was 
running there could be a series of transitions after which eventually the system would be in 
the state of rapid shutdown, which represents the actual STOP condition of the EDT. Time 
can also be seen here as a state variable. Certain values of time in certain states define a 
transition to a next one. 
  
Figure D-12 - NuSMV model for SM3 
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Figure D-13 - CTL specifications for NuSMV model of SM3 
D.1.5 State machine SM4 
 
Figure D-14 - State machine of trouble shooting sub state (SM4) 
The model sm4 (Figure D-15) applied CTL logic with AG and EX formulae and defined 12 
specifications (Figure D-16). Time was also declared as a state variable and particularly two 
different time variables were defined. tm was used to simulate the time elapsed since the 
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last throttle movement. If tm ≥ 5 the program enters monitoring state. Variable ts is the time 
spent whilst in relative warning standby state. If ts ≥ 180 the program enters shutdown state. 
 
Figure D-15 - NuSMV model for sm4 of the application 
 
Figure D-16 - CTL specifications for NuSMV model of sm4 
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D.1.6 State machine SM5 
 
Figure D-17 - State machine of local safety sub state (SM5) 
The final model sm5 (Figure D-18) also applied CTL with AG and EX formulae with 18 
specifications defined (Figure D-19). 
 
Figure D-18 - NuSMV model for sm5 of the application 
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Figure D-19 - CTL specifications for NuSMV model of sm5 
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D.2 Test cases for acceptance validation 
The test cases have been grouped in tables that refer to the corresponding state machine. Each row represents a test case with the following attributes: 
Number of case, NuSMV model specification from which it was derived (format: NuSMV model.spec number), state of the program prerequisite to conduct 
the case, parameters involved, state to which the program will have transitioned after the conduction of the case and finally, the assertions that need to be 
verified.  
Table D-1 – Test cases derived from SM0 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertion 
1 0.1 CTL ready loginerror = TRUE ready Login error page displayed 
Servers running and ready to accept 
2 0.2 CTL ready loginerror = FALSE 
request = TRUE 
 login = TRUE 
idle Selection page displayed 
3 0.3 CTL idle  unique user = TRUE 
 execute = TRUE 
 connection = TRUE 
run Operation panel displayed 
Program running 
4 0.4 CTL idle   unique user = FALSE 
  login = TRUE   
  execute = TRUE 
return page Return page displayed instead of Operation panel 
Program not running 
5 0.5 CTL idle quit page = TRUE 
  
 
ready Selection page closed 
Program not running 
Servers ready to accept 
6 0.6 CTL run  quit page = TRUE 
 interror = FALSE 
 connection = TRUE 
ready Operation panel page closed 
Program not running 
Servers ready to accept 
7 0.7 CTL run interror = TRUE 
 connection = FALSE 
internal error Operation panel disappears 
Error message displayed on page 
Program not running 
8 0.7 CTL run interror = TRUE 
 connection = TRUE 
Internal error Operation panel disappears 
Error message displayed on page 
Program not running 
9 0.7 CTL run interror = FALSE 
 connection = FALSE 
internal_error Operation panel disappears 
Error message displayed on page 
Program not running 
10 0.8 CTL run logout = TRUE logout_idle Operation panel disappears 
Logout message displayed on page 
Program not running 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertion 
11 0.9 CTL logout_idle quit_page = TRUE ready Operation panel page with logout message closes 
Program not running 
Servers ready to accept 
12 0.10 CTL return_page quit_page = TRUE ready Return pages closes 
Program not running 
Servers ready to accept 
13 0.11 CTL internal_error quit_page = TRUE ready Operation Panel page with error message closes 
Program not running 
Servers Ready to accept 
       
Table D-2 – Test cases derived from SM1 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
1 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  No Serial Input 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : No Serial Input 
ambient data = actual 
2 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Switch signal error 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Switch signal error 
 ambient data = actual 
3 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Throttle signal error 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear  
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel Throttle signal error 
ambient data = actual 
4 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Switch & throttle 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual  
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Switch & throttle 
ambient data = actual 
5 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Switch & serial 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear  
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Switch & serial 
ambient data = actual 
6 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Throttle & serial 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual  
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Throttle & serial 
ambient data = actual 
7 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: Status =  Combined 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: zero 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Combined 
ambient data = actual 
8 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto Idle read rpm : actual 
 322 
 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
 battery = on 
Test Harness: System =  Not Ready 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : System not ready 
ambient data = actual 
9 `1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
EISI-EIS: Control =  Normal 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear  
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Combined 
ambient data = actual 
Control status: Normal 
10 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
EISI-EIS: Control =  Observer 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Combined 
ambient data = actual 
Control status: Observer 
11 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
EISI-EIS: Control =  Manual 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Combined 
ambient data = actual 
Control status: Manual 
12 1.1 CTL idle switch = off-auto 
 battery = on 
EISI-EIS: Control =  Observer & Manual 
Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : Combined 
ambient data = actual 
Control status: Observer & Manual 
13 1.2 CTL Idle read switch = run 
 error = TRUE  (Test Harness: Errors = switch 
channel) 
Idle error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on 
engine warning panel: switch channel 
system status panel : actual data 
14 1.2 CTL Idle read switch = run 
 error = TRUE  (Test Harness: Errors = 
throttle channel) 
Idle error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on 
engine warning panel: throttle channel 
system status panel : actual data 
15 1.2 CTL Idle read switch = run 
 error = TRUE  (Test Harness: Errors = supply 
voltage) 
Idle error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on 
engine warning panel: supply voltage 
system status panel : actual data 
16 1.3 CTL Idle read switch = run 
 battery = on 
 error = FALSE 
Eng run rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
17 1.10 CTL Idle read battery = off 
 
idle rpm : zero 
egt: default 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
throttle feedback: zero 
vsup : zero 
vout: zero 
engine status panel : blank 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
18 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = Rpm 
low) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: Rpm low 
system status panel : actual data 
19 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = switch 
channel) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: switch channel 
system status panel : actual data 
20 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = throttle 
channel) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: throttle channel 
system status panel : actual data 
21 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = egt 
high) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: egt high 
system status panel : actual data 
22 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = rpm 
high) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: rpm high 
system status panel : actual data 
23 1.4 CTL eng run error = TRUE(Test Harness: Errors = ecu 
supply) 
eng run error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch on – idle calibrated 
engine warning panel: ecu supply 
system status panel : actual data 
24 1.5 CTL eng run battery = off idle rpm : zero 
egt: default 
throttle feedback: zero 
vsup : zero 
vout: zero 
engine status panel : blank 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
25 1.6 CTL Idle error error = TRUE (Test Harness: Errors= any)  
battery = off   
idle rpm : zero 
egt: default 
throttle feedback: zero 
vsup : zero 
vout: zero 
engine status panel : blank 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
26 1.7 CTL eng run error error = TRUE (Test Harness: Errors= any)  
battery = off   
idle rpm : zero 
egt: default 
throttle feedback: zero 
vsup : zero 
vout: zero 
engine status panel : blank 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
27 1.8 CTL eng run switch = off-auto Idle read rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) -  start clear 
engine warning panel: blank 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
28 1.9 CTL eng run error error = TRUE (Test Harness: Errors= any) 
switch = off-auto 
Idle error rpm : actual 
egt: actual 
throttle feedback: actual 
vsup : actual 
vout: actual 
engine status panel : switch off (auto) 
engine warning panel: actual data 
system status panel : actual data 
ambient data = actual 
       
 
 
Table D-3 - Test cases derived from SM2 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
1 2.1 LTL Idle rpm throttle=100% max rpm Setting: remains idle rpm 
2 2.1 LTL Idle rpm throttle=20% 
throttle=40% 
throttle=60% 
throttle=80% 
throttle=100% 
setting 20% 
setting 40% 
setting 60% 
setting 80% 
maxrpm 
Throttle feedback ≈{20,40,60,80,100} 
egt ≈ {420,440,465,490,510} 
rpm ≈ {60x103, 75x103,95x103, 105x103, 110x103} 
fuel flow = proportional increase 
vout = proportional increase 
3 2.2 CTL max rpm throttle = -100% Idle rpm Throttle feedback ≈ 0 
egt ≈ 395 
rpm ≈ 45x103 
fuel flow ≈ idle value 
vout ≈ idle value 
4 2.3 CTL setting 20% throttle = -20% Idle rpm Throttle feedback ≈ 0 
egt ≈ 395 
rpm ≈ 45x103 
fuel flow ≈ idle value 
 327 
 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
vout ≈ idle value 
5 2.4 CTL setting 40% throttle = -40% Idle rpm Throttle feedback ≈ 0 
egt ≈ 395 
rpm ≈ 45x103 
fuel flow ≈ idle value 
vout ≈ idle value 
6 2.5 CTL setting 60% throttle = -60% Idle rpm Throttle feedback ≈ 0 
egt ≈ 395 
rpm ≈ 45x103 
fuel flow ≈ idle value 
vout ≈ idle value 
7 2.6 CTL setting 80% throttle = -80% Idle rpm Throttle feedback ≈ 0 
egt ≈ 395 
rpm ≈ 45x103 
fuel flow ≈ idle value 
vout ≈ idle value 
8 2.7 CTL setting 80% throttle = -40% setting 40% Throttle feedback ≈ 40 
egt ≈ 440 
rpm ≈ 75x103 
fuel flow ≈ 40% setting  value 
vout ≈ 40% setting  value 
9 2.8 CTL setting 60% throttle = 20% setting 80% Throttle feedback ≈ 80 
egt ≈ 490 
rpm ≈ 105x103 
fuel flow ≈ 80% setting  value 
vout ≈ 80% setting  value 
10 2.9 CTL setting 40% throttle = 80% setting 40% Throttle feedback ≈ 40 
egt ≈ 440 
rpm ≈ 75x103 
fuel flow ≈ 40% setting  value 
vout ≈ 40% setting  value 
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Table D-4 - Test cases derived from SM3 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
1 3.1 CTL running switch = on 
 mains loss = FALSE (Test Harness: Mains: ON) 
running Caution panel: No Mains Loss indication 
2 3.2 CTL running switch = on 
 mains loss = TRUE (Test Harness: Mains: OFF  or Actual Program: unplug 
AC Adaptor) 
mains standby Caution panel: Mains Loss indication 
3 3.3 CTL running  switch = off 
 mains loss = FALSE (Test Harness: Mains: ON) 
rapid shut Test Harness: switch = off, engine shutting down 
Engine status panel: switch = off 
Caution panel: No Mains Loss indication 
4 3.4 CTL running  switch = auto 
 mains loss = FALSE (Test Harness: Mains: ON) 
auto shut Test Harness: switch = auto, engine shutting down 
Engine status panel: switch = auto-stop 
Caution panel: No Mains Loss indication 
5 3.5 CTL  mains 
standby  
switch = on 
 mains loss = FALSE (Test Harness: Mains: ON) 
running Caution panel: No Mains Loss indication 
6 3.6 CTL mains 
standby 
switch = off 
 mains loss = TRUE (Test Harness: Mains: OFF or Actual Program: unplug AC 
Adaptor) 
rapid shut Test Harness: switch = off, engine shutting down 
Engine status panel: switch = off 
Caution panel: Mains Loss indication 
7 3.7 CTL mains 
standby (with 
time in mains 
standby t 
<180 sec)  
switch = auto 
 mains loss = TRUE (Test Harness: Mains: OFF or Actual Program: unplug AC 
Adaptor) 
t<180 sec 
auto shut Test Harness: switch = auto, engine shutting down 
Engine status panel: switch = auto-stop 
Caution panel: Mains Loss indication 
8 3.8 CTL mains 
standby (with 
time in mains 
standby t 
≥180 sec) 
switch = on 
 mains loss = TRUE (Test Harness: Mains: OFF or Actual Program: unplug AC 
Adaptor) 
t ≥180 sec 
auto shut Test Harness: switch = auto, engine shutting down 
Engine status panel: switch = auto-stop 
Caution panel: Mains Loss indication 
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Table D-5 - Test cases derived from SM4 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
1 CTL 4.1 running throttle = FALSE 
time from throttle movement (tm) <5  
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
2 CTL 4.2 running throttle = FALSE 
time from throttle movement (tm) ≥5 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit) 
monitor Caution panel:  Relative limits indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
3 CTL 4.4 running throttle = FALSE 
time from throttle movement (tm) <5  
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Absolute RPM limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
4 CTL 4.4 running throttle = FALSE 
time from throttle movement (tm) <5  
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Absolute EGT limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
5 CTL 4.5 monitor throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM <absolute limit) 
standby Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
6 CTL 4.5 monitor throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT <absolute limit) 
standby Caution panel:  Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
7 CTL 4.6 monitor throttle = FALSE 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Absolute RPM limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
8 CTL 4.6 monitor throttle = FALSE 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Absolute EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
9 CTL 4.7 monitor throttle = TRUE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
10 CTL 4.8 standby  (no throttle = FALSE shutdown Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
absolute 
exceedance) 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) ≥ 180 sec 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
After 3 minutes: Test Harness: switch =auto-stop, 
Program shutdown 
11 CTL 4.8 standby  (no 
absolute 
exceedance) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) ≥ 180 sec 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
After 3 minutes: Test Harness: switch =auto-stop, 
Program shutdown 
12 CTL 4.8 standby  (no 
absolute 
exceedance) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT & RPM = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT & RPM <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) ≥ 180 sec 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative EGT limit indication & 
Relative RPM indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
After 3 minutes: Test Harness: switch =auto-stop, 
Program shutdown 
13 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
Throttle = FALSE 
Input = relind (Test harness: exceedance: submit RPM = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM <absolute limit) 
Time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute RPM limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
14 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute EGT limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
15 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute RPM limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
16 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute EGT limit indication 
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Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
17 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM & EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM  & EGT <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication & 
Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute RPM limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
18 CTL 4.9 standby 
(absolute 
exceedance 
present) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM & EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM  & EGT <absolute limit) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
input = absind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit EGT ≥ absolute limit) 
shutdown Caution panel:  Relative RPM limit indication & 
Relative EGT limit indication 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
Prior to 3 minutes:  
Absolute EGT limit indication 
Test Harness: switch =auto-stop 
Program shutdown 
19 CTL 4.10 Standby (egt 
relative 
indication) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = normal (Test Harness: Exceedance: clear) 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
20 CTL 4.10 Standby (rpm 
relative 
indication) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = normal (Test Harness: Exceedance: clear) 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
21 CTL 4.10 standby (rpm 
& egt relative 
indications) 
throttle = FALSE 
input = normal (Test Harness: Exceedance: clear) 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: submit RPM or EGT = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
22 CTL 4.11 standby 
(persistent 
rpm relative 
indication) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
throttle =TRUE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: Do not clear  RPM  = 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM <absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
23 CTL 4.11 standby 
(persistent 
egt  relative 
indication) 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
throttle =TRUE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: Do not clear  EGT  = 
current throttle setting nominal value < EGT<absolute limit ) 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
24 CTL 4.11 standby 
(persistent 
rpm  & egt 
time in stby (ts) < 180 sec 
throttle =TRUE 
input = relind (Test harness: Exceedance: Do not clear  RPM & EGT  = 
running Caution panel: No indications 
Ambient Pressure = actual value 
Ambient Temperature = actual value 
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Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
relative 
indications) 
current throttle setting nominal value < RPM or EGT<absolute limit ) 
       
 
 
 
Table D-6 - Test cases derived from SM5 
Test Case No Spec No Spec Type Initial state  Parameters Next State Assertions 
1 5.1 CTL run normal emergency stop = TRUE auto stop - switch = auto stop 
- engine shutting down 
2 5.2 CTL run normal switch signal = lost: disconnect port 1 of NI 9263 module  signal loss (switch 
signal loss 
present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- switch signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
3 5.2 CTL run normal throttle  signal = lost: disconnect port 3 of NI 9263 module  signal loss 
(throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
4 5.2 CTL run normal throttle  signal = lost: disconnect ports 3 & 4 of  NI 91263 module  signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
5 5.2 CTL run normal throttle  signal = lost: disconnect or unplug NI DAQ 9174 unit  signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 1 & 2 cease to illuminate on EDT 
warning panel 
6 5.3 CTL run normal observer switch = TRUE: select local override on at observer’s panel  run observer - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Observer”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
browser or manual control panel 
7 5.4 CTL run normal Input=lost: disconnect USB port 3 Input loss - “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
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- serial input warning on at observer’s panel 
8 5.5 CTL run normal manual switch = TRUE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
run manual - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Manual”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
browser or observer’s panel 
9 5.6 CTL run observer emergency stop = TRUE auto stop - switch = auto stop 
- engine shutting down 
10 5.7 CTL run observer switch signal = lost: disconnect port 1 of NI 9263 module  signal loss (switch 
signal loss 
present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- switch signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
11 5.7 CTL run observer throttle  signal = lost: disconnect port 3 of NI 9263 module  signal loss 
(throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
12 5.7 CTL run observer throttle  signal = lost: disconnect ports 3 & 4 of  NI 91263 module  signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
13 5.7 CTL run observer throttle  signal = lost: disconnect or unplug NI DAQ 9174 unit  signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 1 & 2 cease to illuminate on EDT 
warning panel 
14 5.8 CTL run observer observer switch = TRUE: select local override off at observer’s panel run normal - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Normal”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
observer’s panel or manual control panel 
15 5.9 CTL run observer Input=lost: disconnect USB port 3 Input loss - “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- serial input warning on at observer’s panel 
16 5.10 CTL run observer manual switch = TRUE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
run manual - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Manual”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
browser or observer’s panel 
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17 5.11 CTL signal loss emergency stop = TRUE auto stop - switch = auto stop 
- engine shutting down 
18 5.12 CTL signal loss manual switch = TRUE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
run manual - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Manual”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
browser or observer’s panel 
19 5.13 CTL input loss Bring to state input loss and then just monitor for time delay t=30 ms auto stop - switch = auto stop 
- engine shutting down 
20 5.14 CTL run manual - observer switch = FALSE: select local override off at observer’s panel 
- manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
run normal - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Normal”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
observer’s panel or manual control panel 
21 5.15 CTL run manual - observer switch = TRUE: select local override on at observer’s panel 
- manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
run observer - Engine control status on browser& observer’s 
panel = “Observer”. 
- Engine does not listen to any command from 
browser or manual control panel 
22 5.16 CTL run manual - switch signal = lost: disconnect port 1 of NI 9263 module  
- manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
signal loss (switch 
signal loss 
present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- switch signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
23 5.16 CTL run manual - throttle  signal = lost: disconnect port 3 of NI 9263 module  
- manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
signal loss 
(throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle signal warning on at observer’s panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
24 5.16 CTL run manual - throttle  signal = lost: disconnect ports 3 & 4 of  NI 91263 module  
- manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 3 & 4 illuminated on EDT warning 
panel 
25 5.16 CTL run manual - throttle  signal = lost: disconnect or unplug NI DAQ 9174 unit 
 - manual switch = FALSE: on Junction Box place all 5 switches from PC to 
MANUAL 
signal loss (switch 
and throttle signal 
loss present) 
- “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- throttle & switch signal warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- indication lights 1 & 2 cease to illuminate on EDT 
warning panel 
26 5.17 CTL run manual manual stop = TRUE: manual control panel: set run start switch to “Auto-
stop” 
auto-stop - switch = auto stop 
- engine shutting down 
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27 5.18 CTL signal loss Input=lost: disconnect USB port 3 Input loss - “take manual control” warning on at observer’s 
panel 
- serial input warning on at observer’s panel 
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D.3 Acceptance validation tables 
Each row of the table indicates a functional requirement to be tested (format: Function mode.Functional requirement.Sub requirement). Tests conducted 
beyond the functional requirements are noted as –additional (format: Function mode.Functional requirement.-additional-number). Each row of 
requirements includes the following attributes (columns): Number of requirement, state machine where this function is present, test cases applied, method 
of testing (with the EIS and gas turbine engaged or with the General Test Harness instead), the results of the test and finally, any recommendations. 
 
Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
0.1.1 Sm.0 0.2 TH - AP OK  
0.1.2 Sm.0 0.1 TH - AP OK  
0.1.3 Sm.0 0.3 TH - AP OK  
0.1.4 Sm.0 0.3 TH - AP  OK  
0.1.5 Sm.0 0.8 – 0.9 TH - AP OK  
0.1.6 Sm.0 0.6 – 0.7 TH – AP OK  
0.1.7 Sm.0 0.6 – 0.8 TH – AP OK  
0.1.8 Sm.0 0.4 TH – AP OK  
0.1- additional-1 Sm.0 0.5 TH – AP OK  
0.1-additional-2  Sm.0 0.10 TH – AP OK  
0.1-additional-3 Sm.0 0.11 TH – AP OK  
0.1-additional-2  Sm.0 0.12 TH – AP OK  
0.1-additional-3 Sm.0 0.13 TH – AP OK  
0.2.1 Sm.0 0.3 TH – AP Flowplayer error 201: Stream not found Renew Wowza Media Server 3.6.2 License 
1.1.1 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.2 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.3 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.4 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.5 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.6 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.7 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.8 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.9 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.10 - - TH – AP - Suspended 
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
1.1.11 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.12 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.13 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.14 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.15 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.16 - -  - Suspended 
1.1.17 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.18 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.19 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.20 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
1.1.21 Sm.1 1.16 TH – AP OK  
2.1.1 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.2 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.3 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.4 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.5 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.6 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.7 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.8 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.9 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.10 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.11 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.12 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.13 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.14 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
2.1.15 Sm.1 1.13 – 1.14 – 1.15 TH OK  
1.1- additional-1 Sm.1 1.2  TH OK  
1.1- additional-2 Sm.1 1.3 TH OK  
1.1- additional-3 Sm.1 1.4  TH OK  
1.1- additional-4 Sm.1 1.5 TH OK  
1.1- additional-5 Sm.1 1.6  TH OK  
1.1- additional-6 Sm.1 1.7 TH OK  
1.1- additional-7 Sm.1 1.8  TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-8 Sm.1 1.9 TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-9 Sm.1 1.10  TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-10 Sm.1 1.11 TH - AP OK  
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
1.1- additional-11 Sm.1 1.12 TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-12 Sm.1 1.17 TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-13 Sm.1 1.24 TH - AP OK  
1.1- additional-14 Sm.1 1.26 TH OK  
1.1- additional-15 Sm.1 1.27 TH-AP OK  
1.1- additional-16 Sm.1 1.28 TH OK  
2.1- additional-1 Sm.1 1.18 TH OK  
2.1- additional-2 Sm.1 1.19 TH OK  
2.1- additional-3 Sm.1 1.20 TH OK  
2.1- additional-4 Sm.1 1.21 TH OK  
2.1- additional-5 Sm.1 1.22 TH OK  
2.1- additional-6 Sm.1 1.23 TH OK  
2.1- additional-6 Sm.1 1.25 TH OK  
3.1.1 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.2 Sm.2 2.1 – 2.10  TH-AP OK  
3.1.3 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.4 Sm.2 2.1 – 2.10 TH-AP OK  
3.1.5 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.6 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.7 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.8 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.9 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.10 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.11 Sm.2 - - - Suspended 
3.1.12 Sm.2 - - - Suspended 
3.1.13 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.14 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.15 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.16 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.17 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.18 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 - - Suspended 
3.1.19 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 - - Suspended 
3.1.20 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.21 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.22 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.23 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
3.1.24 Sm.2 2.2 – 2.9 TH-AP OK  
3.1.25 Sm.2 2.1 – 2.10 TH-AP OK  
3.2.1 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.2 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.3 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.4 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.5 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.6 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.7 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.8 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.9 Sm.2 - - - Suspended 
3.2.10 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.11 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.12 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.13 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.14 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.15 Sm.2 - - - Suspended 
3.2.16 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.17 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.18 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.19 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.2.20 Sm.2 2.3 – 2.4 – 2.5 – 2.6 – 2.7 – 2.8  TH-AP OK  
3.3.1  - - - Suspended 
3.3.2  - - - Suspended 
3.3.3  - - - Suspended 
4.1.1 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.1.2 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.1.3 Sm.4 4.3– 4.7 – 4.13 – 4.15 TH OK  
4.1.4 Sm.4 4.4 – 4.8 – 4.14 – 4.16  TH OK  
4.1.5 Sm.4 4.3– 4.7 – 4.13 – 4.15 TH OK  
4.1.6 Sm.4 4.4 – 4.8 – 4.14 – 4.16  TH OK  
4.1.7 Sm.4 4.3– 4.4 - 4.7 – 4.8 – 4.13 – 
4.14 -  4.15 – 4.16  
TH OK  
4.1.8 Sm.4 4.4 – 4.8 – 4.14 – 4.16  TH OK  
4.1.9 Sm.4 4.3– 4.7 – 4.13 – 4.15 TH OK  
4.2.1 Sm.4 4.1 TH - AP OK  
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
4.2.2 Sm.4 4.1 TH - AP OK  
4.2.3 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.4 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.5 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.6 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.7 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.8 Sm.4 4.2 TH OK  
4.2.9 Sm.4 4.5 TH OK  
4.2.10 Sm.4 4.6 TH OK  
4.2.11 Sm.4 4.10 – 4.11 – 4.12 TH OK  
4.2.12 Sm.4 4.5 TH OK  
4.2.13 Sm.4 4.6 TH OK  
4.2.14 Sm.4 4.1 TH OK  
4.2.15 Sm.4 4.1 TH OK  
4.2.16 Sm.4 4.5 TH OK  
4.2.17 Sm.4 4.6 TH OK  
4.2- additional-1 Sm.4 4.9 TH OK  
4.2- additional-2 Sm.4 4.17 TH OK  
4.2- additional-3 Sm.4 4.18 TH OK  
4.2- additional-4 Sm.4 4.19 TH OK  
4.2- additional-5 Sm.4 4.20 TH OK  
4.2- additional-6 Sm.4 4.21 TH OK  
4.2- additional-7 Sm.4 4.22 TH OK  
4.2- additional-8 Sm.4 4.23 TH OK  
4.2- additional-9 Sm.4 4.24 TH OK  
4.3.1 Sm.3 3.1 – 3.2 TH - AP OK  
4.3.2 Sm.5 5.2 – 5.3 – 5.4 – 5.10 – 5.11 – 
5.12 
AP OK  
4.3.3 Sm.5 5.5 – 5.13 AP OK  
4.3.4 Sm.5 5.7 – 5.9 - 5.18 AP OK  
4.3.5 Sm.5 5.6 TH- AP OK  
4.3.6 Sm.3 3.1 – 3.2 TH - AP OK  
4.3.7 Sm.3 3.8 TH - AP OK  
4.3.8 Sm.3 3.1 – 3.2 TH - AP OK  
4.3.9 Sm.5 5.6 TH- AP OK  
4.3.10 Sm.3 3.1 – 3.2 TH - AP OK  
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
4.3.11 Sm.5 5.6 TH- AP OK  
4.3- additional-1 Sm.3 3.5 TH OK  
4.3- additional-2 Sm.3 3.6 TH OK  
4.3- additional-3 Sm.3 3.7 TH OK  
4.3- additional-4 Sm.5 5.27 TH- AP OK  
5.1.1 Sm.3 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.2 Sm.3 3.3 TH- AP OK  
5.1.3 Sm.3 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.4 Sm.3 3.3 TH- AP OK  
5.1.5 Sm.3 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.6 Sm.3 3.3 TH- AP OK  
5.1.7 - - - - Suspended 
5.1.8 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.9 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.10 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.11 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.12 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.13 - - - - Suspended 
5.1.14 - - - - Suspended 
5.1.15 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.16 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.17 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.18 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.1.19 Sm.3 3.3 – 3.4 TH- AP OK  
5.2.1 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.2 Sm.5 5.7 -  5.15 – 5.18 – 5.19 AP OK  
5.2.3 Sm.5 5.26 AP OK  
5.2.4 - - - - Suspended 
5.2.5 Sm.5 5.8 – 5.10 – 5.18 TH-AP OK  
5.2.6 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.7 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.8 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.9 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.10 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.11 - - - - Suspended 
5.2.12 - - - - Suspended 
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Requirement Corresponding 
State Machine 
Test Case No Method 
(AP = Actual Program) 
(TH = Tests Harness) 
Results Recommendations 
5.2.13 Sm.5 5.8 – 5.10 – 5.18 TH-AP OK  
5.2.14 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.15 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.16 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.17 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2.18 Sm.5 5.1 TH- AP OK  
5.2- additional-1 Sm.5 5.14 TH- AP OK  
5.2- additional-2 Sm.5 5.16 TH- AP OK  
5.2- additional-3 Sm.5 5.17 AP OK  
5.2- additional-4 Sm.5 5.20 TH- AP OK  
5.2- additional-5 Sm.5 5.21 TH- AP OK  
5.2- additional-6 Sm.5 5.22 AP OK  
5.2- additional-7 Sm.5 5.23 AP OK  
5.2- additional-8 Sm.5 5.24 AP OK  
5.2- additional-9 Sm.5 5.25 AP OK  
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Appendix E Software Components Documentation 
E.1 LabVIEW Modules – EIS.vi 
E.1.1 SwitchSignal function 
 
Figure E-1 – SwitchSignal function block diagram 
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E.1.2 ThrottleSignal function 
 
Figure E-2 – ThrottleSignal function block diagram 
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E.1.3 ECUSerial function 
 
Figure E-3 – ECUSerial function block diagram 
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E.1.4 Fuel flow acquisition - Utilities signal functions 
 
Figure E-4 – FuelFlowRead function 
 
Figure E-5 UtilitiesSignalGeneration function block diagram 
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E.1.5 UtilitiesSignalAcquisition function 
 
 
Figure E-6 – UtilitiesSignalAcquisition function block diagram 
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E.1.6 EDT warning signal generation – Remote emergency shutdown function 
 
Figure E-7 – EDTWarning function block diagram 
 
Figure E-8 RemoteEmergencyShutdown function block diagram 
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E.1.7 TCPClient and TCPServer functions 
 
Figure E-  9 – TCPClient function block diagram 
 
Figure E-10 - TCPServer function block diagram 
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E.2 AmbientSensing.vi 
E.2.1 AmbientTemperature function 
 
Figure E-11 – AmbientTemperature function block diagram 
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E.2.2 Mains Supply Interface System (MSIS) 
 
Figure E-12 – MainsSupplyInterfaceSystem function block diagram 
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E.2.3 TCPClient function 
 
Figure E-13 – AmbientSensing.vi – TCPClient function block diagram 
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E.3 SignalClosure.vi 
 
Figure E-14 – SignalClosure.vi block diagram 
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E.4 Java modules 
Due to extensive length, only the summary of the fields are shown in this document. The 
details are available in the original Javadoc files of the modules. 
E.4.1 Application EISI – package EISI – class AmbientIn.Java 
 
E.4.2 Application EISI – package EISI – class CamCapture.Java 
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E.4.3 Application EISI – package EISI – class ClientEIS.Java 
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E.4.4 Application EISI – package EISI – class CloseWindow.Java 
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Application EISI – package EISI – class EISICentral.Java
 
 
E.4.5 Application EISI – package EISI – class MessageConfiguration.Java 
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E.4.6 Application EISI – package EISI – class 
MessageImplementation.Java 
 
 
E.4.7 Application EISI – package EISI – class ProcessClosure.Java 
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E.4.8 Application EISI – package EISI – class RefreshServer.Java 
 
E.4.9 Application EISI – package EISI – class RestartInfo.Java 
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E.4.10 Application EISI – package EISI – class RMIServer.Java 
 
E.4.11 Application EISI – package EISI – class ServerEIS.Java 
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E.4.12 Application EISI – package EISI – class TSSCall.Java 
 
E.4.13 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
CamReception.Java 
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E.4.14 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
CommandSender.Java 
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E.4.15 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
InUseMessage.Java 
 
 
E.4.16 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
MEOCS.Java 
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E.4.17 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
MessageReceiver.Java 
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E.4.18 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
RMIClient.Java 
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E.4.19 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
TSSInfo.Java 
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E.4.20 Application MEOCS – package eisistart (LAN version) – class 
UserInterface.Java 
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E.4.21 Application MEOCS – package start (WEB version) – class 
CommandSender.Java 
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E.4.22 Application MEOCS – package start (WEB version) – class 
MEOCS.Java 
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E.4.23 Application MEOCS – package start (WEB version) – class 
MessageReceiver.Java 
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E.4.24 Application MEOCS – package start (WEB version) – class 
RMIClient.Java 
 
E.4.25 Application MEOCS – package start (WEB version) – class 
TSSInfo.Java 
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E.4.26 Application MEOCS and EISI – package eisistartinterface (Common 
RMI interface) – interface EISIStartInterface.Java 
 
E.4.27 Application TSS – package tss – class AmbientInput.Java 
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E.4.28 Application TSS – package tss – class 
AutomaticEngineShutdown.Java 
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E.4.29 Application TSS – package tss – class CompareInput.Java 
 
 
  
 375 
 
 
E.4.30 Application TSS – package tss – class EngineInput.Java 
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E.4.31 Application TSS – package tss – class ReadNominals.Java 
 
E.4.32 Application TSS – package tss – class TSSCentral.Java 
 
E.4.33 Application RestartServer – package restartserver – class 
RestartServer.Java 
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E.4.34 Application WatchDog – package watchdog – class WatchDog.Java 
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E.4.35 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
CommandResource.Java 
 
 
E.4.36 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
LogoutResource.Java 
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E.4.37 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
ReadAmbResource.Java 
 
 
 
E.4.38 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
ReadEngResource.Java 
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E.4.39 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
RunResource.Java 
 
 
 
E.4.40 Application InternetGasturbine – package eisistart – class 
StopResource.Java 
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E.5 JavaScript files - interface.js 
 
 
 382 
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Appendix F Installation Guidelines 
F.1 Local Installation 
Prerequisites: 
• Windows 7, 64 bit 
• Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 7 for Windows 7 64 bit 
• LabVIEW 2011SP1 Runtime Environment for Windows 7 64 bit 
• Opencv version 2.4.5 or later for Windows (Only for LAN version). Environmental 
variable PATH value set to “C:\opencv\build\x64\vc10\bin\;” 
• Wowza Media Server version 3.6.2 or later (Only for web version). The following 
environmental values set:  
- WMSAPP_HOME: “C:\Program Files (x86)\Wowza Media Systems\Wowza Media 
Server 3.6.2” 
- WMSCONFIG_HOME: “C:\Program Files (x86)\Wowza Media Systems\Wowza 
Media Server 3.6.2” 
- WMSINSTALL_HOME: “C:\Program Files (x86)\Wowza Media Systems\Wowza 
Media Server 3.6.2\” 
Procedures: 
• Olympus Gas Turbine ECU connected to USB COM3 port 
• Barometer connected to USB COM4 port 
• DAQ unit connected to any available USB port 
• Web Cam connected to any available USB port 
• Preserve ports indicated by the provider available 
• Extraction of provided .zip file that contains folder “Internet Gas Turbine - Local” 
• Start RMI server by executing file WatchDog.jar in sub directiory “/bin” 
• For Web version only: Start Wowza media server by executing  batch file startup.bat in 
sub directiory “/bin” 
Notes: 
• TSS is imported into EISI as an external library upon built 
• NominalValues.txt file is included in the “/bin” directory 
• Documentation of the modules included in the “/docs” sub directory 
Folder “Internet Gas Turbine - Local” PATH listing: 
C:. 
|   tree.txt 
|    
+---bin 
|   |   EIS.aliases 
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|   |   EIS.exe 
|   |   EIS.ini 
|   |   EISI.jar 
|   |   NominalValues.txt 
|   |   README-EISI.TXT 
|   |   README-RestartServer.TXT 
|   |   README-WatchDog.TXT 
|   |   RestartServer.jar 
|   |   SignalClosure.aliases 
|   |   SignalClosure.exe 
|   |   SignalClosure.ini 
|   |   WatchDog.jar 
|   |    
|   \---lib 
|           Javacpp.jar 
|           JavaCV-windows-x86_64.jar 
|           JavaCV.jar 
|           jna-3.5.1.jar 
|           README-TSS.TXT 
|           TSS.jar 
|            
+---docs 
|   +---EISI docs 
|   |   |   allclasses-frame.html 
|   |   |   allclasses-noframe.html 
|   |   |   constant-values.html 
|   |   |   deprecated-list.html 
|   |   |   help-doc.html 
|   |   |   index-all.html 
|   |   |   index.html 
|   |   |   overview-tree.html 
|   |   |   package-list 
|   |   |   serialized-form.html 
|   |   |   stylesheet.css 
|   |   |    
|   |   +---EISI 
|   |   |       AmbientIn.html 
|   |   |       CamCapture.html 
|   |   |       ClientEIS.html 
|   |   |       CloseWindow.html 
|   |   |       EISICentral.html 
|   |   |       MessageConfiguration.html 
|   |   |       MessageImplementation.html 
|   |   |       package-frame.html 
|   |   |       package-summary.html 
|   |   |       package-tree.html 
|   |   |       ProcessClosure.html 
|   |   |       RefreshServer.html 
|   |   |       RestartInfo.html 
|   |   |       RMIServer.html 
|   |   |       ServerEIS.html 
|   |   |       TSSCall.html 
|   |   |        
|   |   +---eisistartinterface 
|   |   |       EISIStartInterface.html 
|   |   |       package-frame.html 
|   |   |       package-summary.html 
|   |   |       package-tree.html 
|   |   |        
|   |   \---resources 
|   |           background.gif 
|   |           tab.gif 
|   |           titlebar.gif 
|   |           titlebar_end.gif 
|   |            
|   +---Monitoring docs 
|   |   |   allclasses-frame.html 
|   |   |   allclasses-noframe.html 
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|   |   |   constant-values.html 
|   |   |   deprecated-list.html 
|   |   |   help-doc.html 
|   |   |   index-all.html 
|   |   |   index.html 
|   |   |   overview-tree.html 
|   |   |   package-list 
|   |   |   serialized-form.html 
|   |   |   stylesheet.css 
|   |   |    
|   |   +---resources 
|   |   |       background.gif 
|   |   |       tab.gif 
|   |   |       titlebar.gif 
|   |   |       titlebar_end.gif 
|   |   |        
|   |   \---watchdog 
|   |           package-frame.html 
|   |           package-summary.html 
|   |           package-tree.html 
|   |           WatchDog.html 
|   |            
|   +---Restart Server docs 
|   |   |   allclasses-frame.html 
|   |   |   allclasses-noframe.html 
|   |   |   constant-values.html 
|   |   |   deprecated-list.html 
|   |   |   help-doc.html 
|   |   |   index-all.html 
|   |   |   index.html 
|   |   |   overview-tree.html 
|   |   |   package-list 
|   |   |   serialized-form.html 
|   |   |   stylesheet.css 
|   |   |    
|   |   +---resources 
|   |   |       background.gif 
|   |   |       tab.gif 
|   |   |       titlebar.gif 
|   |   |       titlebar_end.gif 
|   |   |        
|   |   \---restartserver 
|   |           package-frame.html 
|   |           package-summary.html 
|   |           package-tree.html 
|   |           RestartServer.html 
|   |            
|   \---TSS docs 
|       |   allclasses-frame.html 
|       |   allclasses-noframe.html 
|       |   constant-values.html 
|       |   deprecated-list.html 
|       |   help-doc.html 
|       |   index-all.html 
|       |   index.html 
|       |   overview-tree.html 
|       |   package-list 
|       |   stylesheet.css 
|       |    
|       +---resources 
|       |       background.gif 
|       |       tab.gif 
|       |       titlebar.gif 
|       |       titlebar_end.gif 
|       |        
|       \---tss 
|               AmbientInput.html 
|               AutomaticEngineShutdown.html 
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|               CompareInput.html 
|               EngineInput.html 
|               package-frame.html 
|               package-summary.html 
|               package-tree.html 
|               ReadNominals.html 
|               TSSCentral.html 
|                
\---LabVIEW 
    +---ACAS 
    |       Ambient TCP Client.pdf 
    |       MSIS.pdf 
    |       Thermocouple.pdf 
    |        
    +---EIS 
    |       EDT Warning signal - Emerg signal.pdf 
    |       Fuel flow-Utilities signal.pdf 
    |       SerialInput.pdf 
    |       SwitchSignal.pdf 
    |       TCPClient.pdf 
    |       TCPServer.pdf 
    |       ThrottleSignal.pdf 
    |       Utilities Acquisition.pdf 
    |        
    \---Signal Reset 
            SIGNAL CLOSURE.pdf 
F.2 LAN client Installation 
Prerequisites: 
• Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 6 or later 
Procedures: 
• Extraction of provided .zip file that contains folder “Internet Gas Turbine - Interm - LAN 
version” 
• Preserve ports indicated by the provider available 
• Run client by execution of file MEOCS.jar in sub directory “/bin” 
Notes: 
• JavaCV files are included as an external library 
• Documentation of the modules included in the “/docs” sub directory 
Folder “Internet Gas Turbine - Interm - LAN version” PATH listing: 
C:. 
|   tree.txt 
|    
+---bin 
|   |   MEOCS.jar 
|   |   README.TXT 
|   |    
|   \---lib 
|           Javacpp.jar 
|           JavaCV-windows-x86_64.jar 
|           JavaCV.jar 
|            
\---docs 
    |   allclasses-frame.html 
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    |   allclasses-noframe.html 
    |   constant-values.html 
    |   deprecated-list.html 
    |   help-doc.html 
    |   index-all.html 
    |   index.html 
    |   overview-tree.html 
    |   package-list 
    |   serialized-form.html 
    |   stylesheet.css 
    |    
    +---eisistart 
    |       CamReception.html 
    |       CommandSender.html 
    |       InUseMessage.html 
    |       MEOCS.html 
    |       MessageReceiver.html 
    |       RMIClient.html 
    |       TssInfo.html 
    |       UserInterface.html 
    |        
    +---eisistartinterface 
    |       EISIStartInterface.html 
    |       package-frame.html 
    |       package-summary.html 
    |       package-tree.html 
    |        
    \---resources 
            background.gif 
            tab.gif 
            titlebar.gif 
            titlebar_end.gif 
F.3 Web version – Back End Server 
Prerequisites: 
• Java Runtime Environment (JRE) 7 
• Oracle glassfish version 3.1.2.2 or later  
• Environmental variable JAVA_HOME set to point to Java directory 
Procedures: 
• Extraction of provided .zip file that contains folder “Internet Gas Turbine - Interm - 
web version” 
• Start glassfish domain as administrator: 
 “asadmin start-domain domain_name” 
• Enter administration console of glassfish at port 4848 
• Configure glassfish realm with group names and role names as dictated by web.xml 
and glassfish-web.xml files in sub directory “/WEB-INFO” 
• Add new users in configured realm and set usernames and passwords  
• Deploy the 2 .war files included in sub directory “/bin”: 
 “asadmin deploy path_to_file/Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages.war” 
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 “asadmin deploy path_to_file/InternetGasturbine.war” 
Notes: 
• Application MEOCS is imported in the application InternetGasturbine and included in 
the .war file during the build 
• Documentation of the modules included in the “/docs” sub directory 
Folder Internet Gas Turbine - Interm - web version” PATH listing: 
C:. 
|   tree.txt 
|    
+---bin 
|       InternetGasturbine.war 
|       Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages.war 
|        
+---docs 
|   +---InternetGasTurbine 
|   |   |   allclasses-frame.html 
|   |   |   allclasses-noframe.html 
|   |   |   constant-values.html 
|   |   |   deprecated-list.html 
|   |   |   help-doc.html 
|   |   |   index.html 
|   |   |   overview-tree.html 
|   |   |   package-list 
|   |   |   stylesheet.css 
|   |   |    
|   |   +---eisistart 
|   |   |       CommandResource.html 
|   |   |       LogoutResource.html 
|   |   |       package-frame.html 
|   |   |       package-summary.html 
|   |   |       package-tree.html 
|   |   |       package-use.html 
|   |   |       ReadAmbResource.html 
|   |   |       ReadEngResource.html 
|   |   |       RunResource.html 
|   |   |       StopResource.html 
|   |   |        
|   |   +---index-files 
|   |   |       index-1.html 
|   |   |       index-2.html 
|   |   |       index-3.html 
|   |   |       index-4.html 
|   |   |       index-5.html 
|   |   |       index-6.html 
|   |   |       index-7.html 
|   |   |        
|   |   \---resources 
|   |           background.gif 
|   |           tab.gif 
|   |           titlebar.gif 
|   |           titlebar_end.gif 
|   |            
|   \---MEOCS 
|       |   allclasses-frame.html 
|       |   allclasses-noframe.html 
|       |   constant-values.html 
|       |   deprecated-list.html 
|       |   help-doc.html 
|       |   index-all.html 
|       |   index.html 
|       |   overview-tree.html 
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|       |   package-list 
|       |   serialized-form.html 
|       |   stylesheet.css 
|       |    
|       +---resources 
|       |       background.gif 
|       |       tab.gif 
|       |       titlebar.gif 
|       |       titlebar_end.gif 
|       |        
|       \---start 
|               CamReception.html 
|               CommandSender.html 
|               InUseMessage.html 
|               MEOCS.html 
|               MessageReceiver.html 
|               RMIClient.html 
|               TssInfo.html 
|                
\---WEB-INF 
        glassfish-web.xml 
        web.xml 
F.4 Web version – Front End server 
Prerequisites: 
• Apache server installed 
Procedures: 
• The 2 following Virtual Hosts included in Apache configuration file “httpd-ssl.conf” : 
Virtual Host 1 
<VirtualHost _default_:port> 
DocumentRoot "C:/xampp/htdocs" 
ServerName IP_Address:port 
ServerAdmin admin@IP_Address 
ErrorLog "C:/xampp/apache/logs/error.log" 
TransferLog "C:/xampp/apache/logs/access.log" 
SSLEngine on 
SSLProxyEngine on 
SSLCertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/server.crt" 
SSLCertificateKeyFile "conf/ssl.key/server.key" 
SSLCACertificatePath "c:/xampp/apache/conf/ssl.crt" 
 
<FilesMatch "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php)$"> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
</FilesMatch> 
<Directory "C:/xampp/apache/cgi-bin"> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
</Directory> 
 
SSLOptions StrictRequire 
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 
SSLProxyVerify none 
SSLProxyCheckPeerCN off 
     
    ServerName IP_Address:port 
    ServerAlias www.WebsiteName.com 
     
ProxyRequests off 
<Proxy *> 
Order deny,allow 
Allow from all 
</Proxy> 
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ProxyPass /InternetGasturbine https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/InternetGasturbine 
ProxyPassReverse /InternetGasturbine  https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/InternetGasturbine 
ProxyHTMLURLMap https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/InternetGasturbine 
 
<Location /InternetGasturbine/> 
        ProxyPassReverse / 
        ProxyHTMLEnable On 
        ProxyHTMLURLMap  /      /InternetGasturbine/ 
        RequestHeader    unset  Accept-Encoding 
</Location> 
</VirtualHost> 
 
Virtual Host 2 
 
<VirtualHost _default_:port> 
DocumentRoot "C:/xampp/htdocs" 
ServerName IP_Address:port 
ServerAdmin admin@IP_Address 
ErrorLog "C:/xampp/apache/logs/error.log" 
TransferLog "C:/xampp/apache/logs/access.log" 
SSLEngine on 
SSLProxyEngine on 
SSLCertificateFile "conf/ssl.crt/server.crt" 
SSLCertificateKeyFile "conf/ssl.key/server.key" 
SSLCACertificatePath "c:/xampp/apache/conf/ssl.crt" 
 
<FilesMatch "\.(cgi|shtml|phtml|php)$"> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
</FilesMatch> 
<Directory "C:/xampp/apache/cgi-bin"> 
    SSLOptions +StdEnvVars 
</Directory> 
 
SSLOptions StrictRequire 
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 
SSLProxyVerify none 
SSLProxyCheckPeerCN off 
     
    ServerName IP_Address:port 
    ServerAlias www.WebsiteName.com 
     
ProxyRequests off 
<Proxy *> 
Order deny,allow 
Allow from all 
</Proxy> 
 
ProxyPass /Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages  
ProxyPassReverse /Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages   https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages  
ProxyHTMLURLMap https://IP_Address_of_Back_End:port/Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages  
 
<Location /Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages/> 
        ProxyPassReverse / 
        ProxyHTMLEnable On 
        ProxyHTMLURLMap  /      /Internet_Gas_Turbine_Pages/ 
        RequestHeader    unset  Accept-Encoding 
</Location> 
</VirtualHost> 
• Start the Apache server 
